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Immunity
MARYAM JAMSHIDI†
The Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (“FSIA”) prohibits civil litigation against foreign states,
their agencies, and instrumentalities unless one of several enumerated exceptions to immunity
applies. The most important of these exceptions is for the commercial activity of foreign
sovereigns. While underappreciated, various capitalist interests have comported with and been
furthered by the FSIA. Applying a political economy lens, this Article demonstrates how the
statutory framework for private litigation against foreign sovereigns has aligned with interests
and prerogatives associated with particular stages of capitalist development—as evidenced by
the historical evolution of foreign sovereign immunity doctrine and the FSIA’s eventual passage;
the central role of the commercial activity exception in the foreign sovereign immunity scheme
before and after the FSIA; and the ways courts have interpreted the FSIA’s commercial activity
exception to privilege particular corporate interests and plaintiffs over other types of claims and
claimants. While capitalism’s relationship with the FSIA is a story that has yet to be fully told, its
telling benefits and enriches legal analysis and understanding of the FSIA itself and points the
way to possible reforms of the statute.
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INTRODUCTION
Passed by Congress in 1976, the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act
(“FSIA”)1 governs all civil litigation in United States federal and state courts
against foreign governments, including their agencies and instrumentalities.2
With more cases brought against foreign sovereigns in the United States than
anywhere else3 and with sovereign immunity doctrine largely shaped by
domestic courts,4 the FSIA is one of the most consequential legal regimes for
foreign sovereign immunity worldwide.5
Under the FSIA, foreign states enjoy immunity from civil suit unless an
enumerated exception to that immunity applies—an approach that is known as
“restrictive immunity.”6 Despite including a number of different exceptions to
sovereign immunity,7 the FSIA’s most important and most litigated provision
involves the commercial activity of foreign states.8 Under this provision, a
foreign government, its agencies, and instrumentalities can be sued for their
commercial activities as long as those activities have the requisite territorial
nexus to the United States.9 So, for example, if a foreign state-owned company
breaches its contract with a private corporation, the private corporation can
theoretically use the commercial activity exception to sue the foreign stateowned company, as well as the foreign state itself depending on the company’s
relationship to the state.
While many scholars and practitioners working on the FSIA recognize the
commercial activity exception’s prominence and acknowledge its general

1. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1602–11.
2. Id. § 1603(a). An agency or instrumentality of a foreign state is defined as “a separate legal person,
corporate or otherwise . . . which is an organ of a foreign state or political subdivision thereof, or a majority of
whose shares or other ownership interest is owned by a foreign state or political subdivision thereof . . . which
is neither a citizen of a State of the United States . . . nor created under the laws of a third country.” Id. § 1603(b).
3. XIAODONG YANG, STATE IMMUNITY IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 25 (2012).
4. GAMAL MOURSI BADR, STATE IMMUNITY: AN ANALYTICAL AND PROGNOSTIC VIEW 9 (1984).
5. See YANG, supra note 3, at 25 (noting that “US . . . courts have decided more [foreign sovereign
immunity] cases than the rest of the world put together. . . . ”).
6. M.PA. Kindall, Immunity of States for Noncommercial Torts: A Comparative Analysis of the
International Law Commission’s Draft, 75 CALIF. L. REV. 1849, 1850 n.6 (1987). Historically, “restrictive
immunity” was narrowly used to refer to limits on immunity for foreign sovereigns engaged in commercial
activities. Id. However, contemporary applications of the term are often shorthand for any and all exceptions to
foreign sovereign immunity. Id.; see also YANG, supra note 3, at 3 (describing restrictive immunity as any
restriction on a foreign state’s immunity); Lee M. Caplan, State Immunity, Human Rights, and Jus Cogens: A
Critique of the Normative Hierarchy Theory, 97 AM. J. INT’L L. 741, 758 (2003) (describing the restrictive
theory of immunity as generally “draw[ing] the line between immune and nonimmune state conduct”).
Throughout this Article, restrictive immunity is used in this broader contemporary sense.
7. See infra note 226 for a list of the FSIA’s current immunity exceptions. This Article focuses on the
jurisdiction of courts to hear cases against foreign sovereigns under the FSIA and not their jurisdiction to enforce
judgments against foreign sovereigns, which are subject to a separate set of FSIA exceptions under 28 U.S.C.
§ 1609.
8. De Sanchez v. Banco Central de Nicaragua, 770 F.2d 1386, 1390 (5th Cir. 1985).
9. 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(2). See infra note 256 and accompanying text for a full definition of the
commercial activity exception.
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connection to capitalism,10 there is little scholarship about the relationship
between specific capitalist forces and the commercial activity exception’s
centrality to foreign sovereign immunity doctrine before and after the FSIA’s
passage; the relationship between capitalist interests and the creation of the FSIA
itself; or any exploration of whether or how judicial interpretations of the FSIA’s
commercial activity exception have aligned with or furthered particular trends
associated with capitalism.11
For example, while some have argued that “[t]he elimination of [sovereign]
immunity [for commercial activity] [has] promote[d] the security of contract and
minimize[d] disruption in the normal rules of the marketplace, and thus
further[ed] more broadly the interests of the U.S. economic and political
system,”12 they have failed to explore exactly how those economic interests have
aligned with foreign sovereign immunity doctrine, before and after the FSIA’s
passage.
Indeed, some have rejected the idea that economic ideology plays a
meaningful role in the doctrine of foreign sovereign immunity and have
described the rise of a commercial activity exception as merely a practical
response to foreign states’ increasing commercial engagement.13 In fact, most
scholars have looked to non-economic theories to understand the rise of
restrictions on foreign sovereign immunity, as well as judicial interpretations of
the FSIA. For some of these commentators, limitations on foreign sovereign

10. While there are multiple definitions of varying specificity, capitalism is generally defined as a system
“in which trade, industry, and the means of production are largely or entirely privately owned and operated for
profit.” Christopher Tomlins, Organic Poise? Capitalism as Law, 64 BUFF. L. REV. 61, 63 (2016) (citation
omitted) (quotations omitted). Its central elements include capital accumulation, competitive markets, wage
labor, and private ownership of the means of production. Id.; MICHAEL MANN, THE SOURCES OF SOCIAL POWER
VOLUME 2: THE RISE OF CLASSES AND NATION-STATES, 1760–1914, at 23–24 (2012) [hereinafter MANN,
SOURCES OF SOCIAL POWER VOL. 2].
11. Within the American legal academy, critiques of law’s relationship to capitalism initially emerged over
a century ago with the school of legal realism—an intellectual movement that sought, in part, to understand how
law was shaped by, and itself transformed, social, economic, and political systems. Joseph William Singer, Legal
Realism Now, 76 CALIF. L. REV. 465, 468–69 (1988); David Singh Grewal, The Laws of Capitalism, 128 HARV.
L. REV. 626, 658 (2014). When it came to economic relationships, legal realists saw the law as “specif[ying] the
rights, powers, and enforcement mechanisms that constitute economic transactions, and, more broadly,
economic ordering.” Jedediah Britton-Purdy, David Singh Grewal, Amy Kapczynski & K. Sabeel Rahman,
Building a Law-and-Political-Economy Framework: Beyond the Twentieth Century Synthesis, 129 YALE
L.J. 1784, 1792 (2020). While the legal realist movement began to decline after World War II, legal scholars
have increasingly reengaged with its intellectual project under the banner of law and political economy. Roger
D. Citron, The Nuremberg Trials and American Jurisprudence: The Decline of Legal Realism, the Revival of
Natural Law, and the Development of Legal Process Theory, 2006 MICH. ST. L. REV. 385, 387 (2006); BrittonPurdy et al., supra note 11, at 1791–94; see also Samuel R. Bagenstos, Consent, Coercion and Employment Law,
55 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 409, 411 n.7 (2020) (noting how law and political economy scholars have worked
to revive the insights of legal realism). This Article is situated within this broader legal tradition.
12. Joan E. Donoghue, Taking the “Sovereign” Out of the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act: A Functional
Approach to the Commercial Activity Exception, 17 YALE J. INT’L L. 489, 521 (1992).
13. See YANG, supra note 3, at 22–23 (noting that commercial activity exception arose as a result of
increasing state trading activities but that ideology is neverhtless irrelevant to the “evolution of state immunity
rules”).
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immunity are rooted in the principle of legality.14 According to this view, all
entities, including persons, organizations, and states, should be subject to the
rule of law for reasons of “equity and justice.”15
Still others have argued that principles of territoriality, mutual respect, and
equality between sovereigns represent the FSIA’s central rationales.16 Even
though every nation has exclusive and absolute jurisdiction over its territory, the
FSIA balances the government’s interest in exercising jurisdiction to protect
those injured by foreign states against the need to maintain good foreign
relations with other countries;17 according to this view, courts apply a similar
balancing approach in construing the FSIA’s commercial activity exception.18
While these rationales for the FSIA’s development and evolution have
much force, they fail to appreciate that it was far from inevitable that the
commercial activity exception would be so central to limiting foreign sovereign
immunity. Nor do they pay much heed to how the interests of certain business
groups impacted the structure and substance of the FSIA. They also miss the
ways in which some judicial decisions on the FSIA’s commercial activity
exception have favored certain corporate interests and plaintiffs over others.
This Article fills these gaps. Applying a political economy lens, it
demonstrates how the framework for private litigation against foreign
sovereigns in U.S. courts aligns with and furthers certain capitalist interests and
prerogatives.19 While capitalism did not necessarily cause particular
developments in the law of foreign sovereign immunity, those developments
support and comport with various important themes in capitalism’s evolution
that appear to be more than just coincidental. Different parts of this story
highlight macro-economic forces associated with capitalism’s various stages,
while others also underscore specific lobbying efforts by U.S. business interests.
Understanding these trends is particularly important at this historical moment,

14. Notes and Comments, Sovereign Immunity – Waiver and Execution: Arguments from Continental
Jurisprudence, 74 YALE L.J. 887, 891 (1965).
15. Id. at 890.
16. David A. Brittenham, Note, Foreign Sovereign Immunity and Commercial Activity: A Conflicts
Approach, 83 COLUM. L. REV. 1440, 1467 n.120 (1982).
17. Id. at 1466–68; see also George K. Foster, When Commercial Meets Sovereign: A New Paradigm for
Applying the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act in Crossover Cases, 52 HOUS. L. REV. 361 (2014) (“The FSIA’s
drafters designed the statute to screen out cases that pose heightened foreign relations risks . . . .”); Michael A.
Granne, Defining “Organ of A Foreign State” Under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976, 42 U.C.
DAVIS L. REV. 1, 55 (2008) (describing purpose of FSIA as “prevent[ing] interference with foreign relations by
making it difficult to sue foreign governments and their agencies and instrumentalities”).
18. See, e.g., Federal Jurisdiction and Procedure, 107 HARV. L. REV. 254, 268 (1993) (explaining result
in FSIA commercial activity case as driven by judicial concerns regarding foreign policy consequences of
exercising jurisdiction).
19. In referring to capitalist “interests and prerogatives,” I do not mean to anthropomorphize capitalism.
The interests associated with capitalism are, of course, held not by capitalism itself but by the actors who benefit
from the capitalist system, including for-profit corporations and financial institutions. The terminology of
“capitalist interests” and “capitalist prerogatives” is merely my shorthand reference for the interests of these
groups.
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as critiques and challenges to the capitalist system are becoming prominent
within mainstream public debate in the United States.20
At a general level, this Article demonstrates how and why the commercial
activity exception is at the center of the FSIA’s immunity regime by design.
More specifically, this Article shows how particular interests reflected in
capitalism’s various periods aligned with the emergence of foreign sovereign
immunity doctrine in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries;
comported with the rise of a commercial activity exception to foreign sovereign
immunity in the early twentieth century;21 played a role in the FSIA’s creation;
and have been reflected in and furthered by judicial interpretations of the FSIA’s
commercial activity exception, since the statute’s enactment. On this last point,
this Article tentatively suggests possible remedies for certain inequities created
by these judicial interpretations.
While dividing capitalism into periods or stages is necessarily reductive, it
is something that economists and economic historians recognize as important to
understanding how capitalism has evolved and functioned throughout time.22
The various periods of capitalism described here are ideal types that have been
proposed by some of these experts. Of course, as ideal types, these periods may
not capture all the nuances and contradictions of modern capitalism, or
adequately reflect important disagreements over its evolution. Nevertheless, this
Article’s description of capitalism’s history attempts to capture broad, generally
agreed-upon themes within capitalism’s development, at least within the West,
and bring specificity and concreteness to its relationship with the FSIA.
The first chapter in this story focuses on the Supreme Court’s 1812 decision
in The Schooner Exchange v. McFaddon.23 Schooner Exchange is considered
the most famous early judicial case, both in the United States and globally,
concerning civil litigation against foreign sovereigns.24 It is also widely credited
with establishing the principle that foreign states are absolutely immune from
suit in the courts of other countries.25 The decision in Schooner Exchange
coincided with the first modern period of capitalism dating roughly from the
20. See infra notes 580–84, and accompanying text.
21. While this Article focuses on the United States, the commercial activity exception has been the driving
force behind the embrace of restrictive immunity worldwide. See generally SOMPONG SUCHARITKUL, STATE
IMMUNITIES AND TRADING ACTIVITIES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW (1959). For this reason, a political economy
approach could be useful to understanding foreign sovereign immunity doctrine in other countries as well.
22. DAVID COATES, CAPITALISM: THE BASICS 15 (2016).
23. The Schooner Exchange v. McFaddon, 11 U.S. 116 (1812).
24. Despite its prominence, Schooner Exchange was neither the first case to address the issue of foreign
sovereign immunity nor the historical starting point for the principle of foreign sovereign immunity more
generally. See infra notes 66, 75.
25. YANG, supra note 3, at 8; BADR, supra note 4 at 9–10. This is not to say that Schooner Exchange
established absolute immunity as a rule of customary international law—it did not. Michael Byers, Custom,
Power, and the Power of Rules: Customary International Law from an Interdisciplinary Perspective, 17 MICH.
J. INT’L L. 109, 169 (1995). Many scholars, as well as the Supreme Court, also agree that Schooner Exchange
itself was a limited decision, even if it was eventually understood as supporting an absolute theory of immunity.
See infra notes 67–68 and accompanying text.
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early to the mid-to-late nineteenth century.26 This was a time when laissez-faire
theories were ascendant and when capitalist countries, like the United States,
were moving (however inconsistently) toward that approach to commerce.27
While the laissez-faire economic system is subject to varying definitions, 28 it is
generally opposed to state regulation and involvement in commercial markets
and activities.29
Though the inherently private nature of commerce is a central principle of
capitalism,30 Western states did not embrace this ideal until the laissez-faire
period.31 As this Article demonstrates, Schooner Exchange implicitly reflected
the laissez-faire view of commerce as the domain of private, rather than state,
actors. In doing so, it laid the conceptual groundwork for restricting the
immunity of foreign sovereigns whenever they behaved as commercial, and
therefore “private,” actors.32
In the late nineteenth century, capitalist states, including the United States,
began to engage more directly with commercial markets, assuming not only a
more active regulatory role but also ownership of corporate enterprises and
greater participation in trade and commerce.33 This period of relatively robust
state intervention in the capitalist system started from the late nineteenth century,
began to unravel in the early 1970s, and came to a close roughly around the end
of the Cold War in 1989.34 This period also witnessed the first modern era of
globalized trade from the end of the nineteenth century through World War II.35
This marks the second chapter in the story of the FSIA’s political economy.
With states increasingly acting as global commercial players, foreign sovereign
immunity began to be reconciled with the capitalist market system. Amidst
increasing, albeit fractured, global trade, 36 some countries, including the United
26. COATES, supra note 22, at 12.
27. SUCHARITKUL, supra note 21, at 14; see also infra Part I.B.
28. P.W.J. Bartrip, State Intervention in Mid-Nineteenth Century Britain: Fact or Fiction, 23 J. BRITISH
STUD. 63, 63, 82–83 (1983).
29. Jacob Viner, The Intellectual History of Laissez Faire, 3 J.L. & ECON. 45, 45–46 (1960). While beyond
the scope of this Article, the laissez faire system was not a natural or spontaneous occurrence but rather the result
of organized and sustained state intervention that required the creation of a centralized administrative state to
protect private property rights, remove existing restrictions on markets, and ensure the exploitation of labor. See
KARL POLANYI, THE GREAT TRANSFORMATION: THE POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC ORIGINS OF OUR TIME 145–47
(1944) (arguing that laissez-faire economics “far from doing away with the need for [state] control, regulation,
and intervention[,] enormously increased their range,” including but not limited to “repealing harmful
restrictions” on free markets).
30. See infra note 94, and accompanying text.
31. As discussed in Part I.B, states continued to engage in commercial activity during the first few centuries
of capitalism. This state-led commercial activity began to drop off (though did not by any means disappear)
during the early nineteenth century with the rise of laissez-faire policies.
32. See infra note 77–84 and accompanying text.
33. MANN, SOURCES OF SOCIAL POWER VOL. 2, supra note 10, at 479.
34. COATES, supra note 22, at 13–14.
35. Transnational trade had actually started to increase during the middle of the nineteenth century,
primarily as a result of British efforts. MANN, SOURCES OF SOCIAL POWER VOL. 2, supra note 10, at 282–85.
36. See infra Part II.A. This first great wave of globalization experienced a significant downturn from the
start of World War I to the end of World War II, when it began increasing again. Esteban Ortiz-Ospina & Diana
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States, started to restrict the immunity of foreign sovereigns engaged in
commercial activities. As this Article demonstrates, during this period, U.S.
courts and Executive Branch officials began to signal their support for restricting
foreign sovereign immunity in certain cases involving state-owned merchant
ships and corporations, particularly during the interwar period.37 This rising
commitment to restrictive immunity was not, however, only a byproduct of
patterns in global trade—it was also consistent with capitalism’s place within
the U.S. legal system, including with existing restrictions on the immunity of
federal and state governments engaged in commercial acts.38
The third chapter in the political economy of the FSIA begins with the end
of World War II. As the influence of the Soviet Union and communism spread
across the globe after 1945, there was even more state involvement and
engagement in commercial activities.39 The second modern period of
globalization also started during this time,40 with the United States and other
capitalist countries working to create an international trading system and
liberalize trading practices between and within countries.41 Against this
backdrop, the United States took its first step toward formally embracing
restrictive immunity in the Tate Letter, which was issued in 1952 by the State
Department’s Acting Legal Advisor, Jack Tate.42 The Tate Letter not only
marked official American adoption of restrictive immunity; it was also
principally aimed at the commercial activities of foreign states.43 This focus
aligned with the U.S. government’s twin desires, at the time, of both “fighting”
communism and promoting and protecting free trade between U.S. enterprises
and foreign sovereigns, including companies owned by communist countries.44
When restrictive immunity was codified by the FSIA in 1976, these
impulses, especially the desire to protect and facilitate trade, were reflected in

Beltekian, Trade and Globalization, OUR WORLD IN DATA (2014), https://ourworldindata.org/trade-andglobalization#trade-from-a-historical-perspective (last updated Oct. 2018). Nevertheless, the volume of trade
during the inter-war period was still greater than it had been for the preceding 400 years—globalization in some
form or another had arrived. Id.
37. See infra Part II.A–B.
38. See infra Part II.D. The relationship between federal and state sovereign immunity and foreign
sovereign immunity does not flow in one direction. Indeed, recently, scholars have argued that the FSIA’s
approach to defining commercial activity can help reform prevailing jurisprudential approaches to federal
sovereign immunity, which has increasingly served as a “sovereign shield” protecting private government
contractors from liability. See generally Kate Sablosky Elengold & Jonathan D. Glater, The Sovereign in
Commerce, 73 STAN. L. REV. 1101 (2021) (arguing that the “solution to the sovereign-shield problem” requires
an “analysis [that] turn[s] on the nature of the activity performed, not the identity of the actor performing it.”).
39. Bernard Fensterwald, Jr., Sovereign Immunity and Soviet State Trading, 63 HARV. L. REV. 614, 614–
15 (1950).
40. Ortiz-Ospina & Beltekian, supra note 36.
41. Raymond Vernon, Introduction, in STATE TRADING IN INTERNATIONAL MARKETS: THEORY AND
PRACTICE OF INDUSTRIALIZED AND DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 1 (M.M. Kostecki ed., 1982).
42. See Alfred Dunhill of London, Inc. v. Republic of Cuba, 425 U.S. 682, 711–15 (1976) (containing the
full text of the Tate Letter).
43. See infra Part III.A.
44. See infra Part III.A.
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the commercial activity exception’s dominance of the FSIA.45 It is at this stage,
in particular, that the U.S. business community’s lobbying efforts most clearly
influenced the foreign sovereign immunity regime, as reflected in the FSIA’s
legislative history.46
This brings us to the fourth and current chapter in the political economy of
the FSIA. This period of capitalist development, which has been described as
“neoliberalism,”47 fully emerged after the end of the Cold War.48 It is a period
of increasing commodification of goods and services,49 deregulation of capital
and labor markets,50 and predominance of financial markets51 as the main drivers
of the U.S. economy. It is also a period of weakening workers’ rights52 and
increasing economic inequality,53 with wealth concentrated in the hands of the
few54 and corporate profits substantially increasing worldwide.55
In the forty-five years since the FSIA’s enactment, judicial interpretations
of the commercial activity exception have reflected these trends. Especially
when it comes to the Supreme Court, jurisprudence on the commercial activity

45. See infra Part III.B.
46. See infra Part III.B. This is not to say U.S. business interests did not play a direct role in earlier
developments in foreign sovereign immunity doctrine, including, for example, the issuance of the Tate Letter.
While corporate and business lobbying may have triggered these and other government responses to foreign
sovereign immunity pre-FSIA, publicly available information does not settle that question one way or another.
47. “Neoliberalism” is defined as a system “guided by the imperatives of the international reproduction of
capital, represented by the financial markets and the interests of US capital.” ALFREDO SAAD-FILHO, VALUE
AND CRISIS: ESSAYS ON LABOUR, MONEY, AND CONTEMPORARY CAPITALISM 8 (2018).
48. Even though neoliberalism did not fully take root until the end of the Cold War in 1989, it began to
emerge in the late 1970s and early 1980s. COATES, supra note 22, at 29–30.
49. See ERNEST MANDEL, LATE CAPITALISM 387–88 (1975) (describing late capitalism, which overlaps
with neoliberalism, as resulting in ever more commodification of daily life). Commodification is the process of
monetizing and selling goods and services, including ones that do not produce any surplus value, via the market.
COATES, supra note 22, at 20; see also notes 291–94 and accompanying text for a more in-depth discussion of
commodification.
50. MICHAEL MANN, THE SOURCES OF SOCIAL POWER VOLUME 4: GLOBALIZATIONS, 1945–2011, at 131
(2013) [hereinafter MANN, SOURCES OF SOCIAL POWER VOL. 4].
51. SAAD-FILHO, supra note 47, at 302–03; DAVID HARVEY, THE CONDITION OF POSTMODERNITY: AN
ENQUIRY INTO THE ORIGINS OF CULTURAL CHANGE 194 (1992).
52. Eoin Flaherty, Complex Inequalities in the Age of Financialisation: Piketty, Marx, and Class-Biased
Power Resources, in TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY INEQUALITY AND CAPITALISM: PIKETTY, MARX AND BEYOND 86,
96–97 (Lauran Langman & David A. Smith eds., 2017).
53. THOMAS PIKETTY, CAPITAL IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 15 (2014).
54. See id. at 43, 249 (showing that in 2010 20% of the national income of the United States, which is the
sum of all income from capital and labor of all residents, was held by the top 1% of the population and 50% of
the national income was held by the top 10%); Juliana Menasce Horowitz, Ruth Igielnik & Rakesh Kochhar,
Most Americans Say There Is Too Much Economic Inequality in the U.S., but Fewer Than Half Call It a Top
Priority, PEW RSCH. CTR. (Jan. 9, 2020), https://www.pewsocialtrends.org/2020/01/09/trends-in-income-andwealth-inequality (showing that “[t]he richest families in the U.S. have experienced greater gains in wealth than
other families in recent decades, a trend that reinforces the growing concentration of financial resources at the
top”). The erosion of workers’ rights and increasing economic inequality go hand in hand. Flaherty, supra note
52, at 86–87.
55. SAAD-FILHO, supra note 47, at 305–06; Richard Dobbs, Tim Koller & Sree Ramaswamy, The Future
and How to Survive It, HARV. BUS. REV., Oct. 2015, at 48.
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exception has sometimes privileged the interests of the global financial system,56
encouraged commodification57 and deregulation,58 and provided greater
opportunities for corporate, as compared to individual, plaintiffs59 to succeed on
their claims.60 For example, courts have developed relatively pro-plaintiff
approaches in commercial activity cases involving corporate concerns,
especially those relating to global financial markets.61 By contrast, individuals
with certain kinds of claims connected to their employment or consumer activity
have often had less luck bringing suit under the exception.62 In some
jurisdictions, there have also been noticeably different outcomes for U.S.
corporations suing for pure financial losses suffered in the United States—which
have often been successful—as compared to individuals bringing similar claims,
which have often failed.63 In general, by giving corporations a better chance than
individuals of recouping their financial losses,64 some of the jurisprudence on
the commercial activity exception aligns with the economic inequality and
wealth gap endemic to neoliberalism, while also helping erode the rights of
American workers.65
This Article proceeds as follows. Part I examines the Schooner Exchange
case and highlights its commitment to the belief, ascendant during the laissezfaire period, that commerce is inherently private. Part II demonstrates how
increasing state involvement in commercial activity starting in the late
nineteenth century aligned with increasing, albeit tentative, embrace of
restrictive immunity for the commercial actions of foreign sovereigns after
World War I. It also shows how these incipient moves in favor of restrictive
56. Some countries understood the FSIA’s benefits to U.S. financial institutions early on. According to one
commentator, the British dropped their long-standing reticence to restrictive immunity and quickly incorporated
it into their own sovereign immunity statute in 1978 after “London began to lose some international business to
New York” following the FSIA’s passage. BADR, supra note 4, at 1.
57. See infra Part IV.A.
58. See infra Part IV.A–B.
59. In referencing “corporate plaintiffs” and “corporate interests” in the context of Congress’s passage of
the FSIA and judicial interpretations of the statute, I use the term “corporate” to denote business organizations
generally, including but not limited to corporations.
60. See infra Part IV.A–B. In favoring the interests of capitalism, Supreme Court jurisprudence on the
FSIA’s commercial activity exception arguably aligns with the Court’s long-standing commitment to supporting
business interests. See generally ADAM WINKLER, WE THE CORPORATIONS: HOW AMERICAN BUSINESSES WON
THEIR RIGHTS (2018) (tracing the historical path to corporations gaining personhood and constitutional rights).
61. See infra Part IV.B. While these sorts of claims are not exclusively brought by corporations, they are
more typical of corporate rather than individual plaintiffs.
62. See infra Part IV.A–B. These claims related to employment and consumer activity include human
rights-related claims as well as personal injury claims. See infra Part IV.A–B. These injuries are often, though
not always, sustained abroad and are arguably often connected to a foreign sovereign’s commercial acts either
in the United States or abroad. See infra Part IV.A–B.
63. See infra Part IV.B.2.
64. In privileging corporate over individual plaintiffs in some cases, the courts have arguably departed
from the FSIA itself, which makes no distinction between corporate and individual plaintiffs in commercial
activity cases.
65. See infra Part IV.B.2. The commercial activity exception’s tendency to privilege contract over other
kinds of claims in some circumstances also aligns with neoliberalism’s wealth gap as discussed in Part IV.C.
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immunity were influenced by limitations on the immunity of federal and state
governments engaged in commercial acts. Part III discusses the Tate Letter as
well as the FSIA’s passage, setting these developments against the backdrop of
communism’s spread and an explosion in globalization after World War II. It
also highlights substantial support for the FSIA’s passage amongst the U.S.
business community, as well as the bill’s sensitivity to that community’s
interests. Part IV analyzes how judicial interpretations of the FSIA’s commercial
activity exception align with interests associated with the neoliberal period. This
Article concludes with a brief discussion of tentative solutions to some of the
inequities reflected in jurisprudence on the commercial activity exception.
While capitalism’s relationship to the FSIA is a story that ought to be told,
the purpose of this Article is not to suggest that all or even most aspects of the
FSIA can be explained by capitalism. Instead, this Article’s more modest project
is to demonstrate how a political economy frame highlights underappreciated
and underexplored aspects of the statute’s history generally and the commercial
activity exception’s evolution and application more specifically. In particular, it
aims to draw attention to jurisprudential trends on the commercial activity
exception that exacerbate socio-economic inequalities, in the hopes policy
makers and judges might be encouraged to remedy those shortcomings.
I. THE SCHOONER EXCHANGE AND THE “PRIVATE” NATURE OF COMMERCE
Decided by the Supreme Court in 1812, The Schooner Exchange v.
McFaddon is considered to be the most important early judicial decision on
foreign sovereign immunity.66 While the limits of the Schooner Exchange
holding have been noted,67 it remains widely credited with establishing the
absolute theory of immunity.68 What is, perhaps, less understood about Schooner
Exchange, however, is that it set the stage for a commercial exception to foreign
66. See Republic of Austria v. Altmann, 541 U.S. 677, 688 (2004) (describing Schooner Exchange as the
“source of our foreign sovereign immunity jurisprudence”); Spacil v. Crowe, 489 F.2d 614, 616 (5th Cir. 1974)
(“In the famous case of The Schooner Exchange v. McFaddon . . . the Supreme Court first enunciated the
doctrine of immunity for foreign sovereigns . . . .”). In fact, the Supreme Court addressed (and upheld) foreign
sovereign immunity before Schooner Exchange in cases involving ships owned by foreign governments. See,
e.g., U.S. v. Richard Peters, Dist. Judge, 3 U.S. 121, 130 (1795) (holding that “by the laws of nations, the vessels
of war of belligerent powers, duly by them authorized, to cruise against their enemies, and to make prize of their
ships and goods . . . are not amenable before the tribunals of neutral powers for their conduct therein, but are
only answerable to the sovereign in whose immediate service they were, and from whom they derived their
authority . . .”).
67. See Samantar v. Yusuf, 560 U.S. 305, 311 (2010) (noting that “[t]he Court’s specific holding in
Schooner Exchange was that a federal court lacked jurisdiction over ‘a national armed vessel . . . of the emperor
of France’ . . .”); Verlinden B.V. v. Cent. Bank of Nigeria, 461 U.S. 480, 486 (1983) (noting that “the narrow
holding of The Schooner Exchange was only that the courts of the United States lack jurisdiction over an armed
ship of a foreign state found in our port . . . .”); Beth Stephens, The Modern Common Law of Foreign Official
Immunity, 79 FORDHAM L. REV. 2669, 2689–90 (2011) (arguing that Schooner Exchange was a limited decision
that applied the “personal immunity of royal sovereigns to the distinct entity of the state and its possessions” in
situations where the “the forum state has explicitly or implicitly given them leave to enter its territory”).
68. Samantar, 560 U.S. at 311 (noting that despite its limited holding Schooner Exchange has been
interpreted as extending absolute immunity to foreign sovereigns); Verlinden, 461 U.S. at 486 (same).
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sovereign immunity by implicitly embracing newly ascendant capitalist
understandings about the private nature of commerce. This perspective on
commercial activity marked a turning point in a complex and evolving
relationship between the nation-state and capitalism. While states had been
active commercial participants during the first few centuries of capitalism’s
expansion, they began to exit the commercial sphere in the early nineteenth
century alongside the rising popularity of laissez-faire economic policies. These
policies created a stark and largely unprecedented public/private divide that
defined the marketplace as the inherent domain of private, not governmental,
actors—a view reflected in the Schooner Exchange opinion.
Part I.A begins with an analysis of Schooner Exchange and highlights its
role in articulating the ideological underpinnings for restricting foreign
sovereign immunity based on commercial activity. Part I.B demonstrates how
the Schooner Exchange view of commercial activity coincided with the
emergence of a public/private divide that placed commerce on the private side
of the ledger. As this Subpart demonstrates, Schooner Exchange provides ample
support for a commercial exception to foreign sovereign immunity while also
underscoring the less than inevitable nature of this exception and its connections
to certain capitalist conceptions of commerce that became dominant during the
laissez-faire period.
A. SCHOONER EXCHANGE
Schooner Exchange involved the “very delicate and important inquiry” as
to whether a U.S. court could take jurisdiction and determine ownership over a
foreign state’s armed vessel present within the territorial jurisdiction of the
United States.69 In Schooner Exchange, plaintiffs, who were American citizens,
claimed they were the true owners of a French warship that was docked in the
Philadelphia harbor.70 According to plaintiffs, who sought attachment and return
of the ship,71 their vessel had been forcibly taken on the high seas by agents of
the French government.72
In an opinion written by Chief Justice John Marshall, the Supreme Court
rejected plaintiffs’ suit. It held that an armed ship on U.S. territory belonging to
a foreign country at peace with the U.S. government could not be subject to the
jurisdiction of U.S. courts.73 As the Court reasoned, a foreign sovereign that
enters another sovereign’s territory with its consent enjoys immunity from that
country’s territorial jurisdiction, as a function of the “perfect equality and
absolute independence” of all sovereigns.74

69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.

The Schooner Exchange v. McFaddon, 11 U.S. 116, 135 (1812).
Id. at 117.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 147.
Id. at 137–39.

April 2022

THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF FOREIGN SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY

597

In reaching this conclusion, the Court appears implicitly to have been
guided by the dictum par in parem non habet imperium, or “an equal has no
authority over an equal,”75 which is a general principle of international law.76 At
the same time, however, the Court defined sovereign equality exclusively in
terms of a state’s “public” acts77—something not strictly demanded by the par
in parem non habet imperium principle.78 As part of its analysis, the Court
canvassed different circumstances in which sovereigns were exempt from the
jurisdiction of the territorial states in which they were present.79 These
situations, which ranged from immunity given to foreign ministers to
exemptions from arrest and detention afforded to foreign monarchs, focused on
the dignity and autonomy sovereigns were entitled to when engaged in
exclusively “public” duties.80 In dicta, the Court explicitly contrasted these
public activities with private acts—which it largely defined in commercial
terms:
When private individuals of one nation spread themselves through another as
business or caprice may direct, mingling indiscriminately with the inhabitants
of that other, or when merchant vessels enter for the purposes of trade, it would
be obviously inconvenient and dangerous to society, and would subject the
laws to continual infraction, and the government to degradation, if such
individuals or merchants did not owe temporary and local allegiance, and were
not amenable to the jurisdiction of the country.81

The Court went on to suggest that a sovereign engaging in such private
commercial activities, like property ownership, might not be entitled to
immunity in foreign courts, noting that “[a] prince, by acquiring private property
in a foreign country, may possibly be considered as subjecting that property to

75. Caplan, supra note 6, at 748. The par in parem non habet imperium principle dates back to the
fourteenth century. Id. at 748 n.50. Generally speaking, the doctrine of sovereign immunity can be “traced to the
time-honored personal inviolability of sovereigns and their ambassadors when present or traveling in foreign
countries.” Id. at 745 n.31.
76. Thomas Weatherall, Jus Cogens and Sovereign Immunity: Reconciling Divergence in Contemporary
Jurisprudence, 46 GEO. J. INT’L L. 1151, 1156 (2015). As some have argued, foreign sovereign immunity
doctrine, as reflected in Schooner Exchange, seeks to balance the principle of par in parem non habet imperium
against another principle of international law, namely that states enjoy exclusive and absolute jurisdiction over
their own territory. Caplan, supra note 6, at 745–46.
77. Schooner Exchange did, however, reference one kind of “public act” that would not be entitled to
immunity, namely, where another sovereign uses a state’s territory for military purposes without the latter’s
express consent. See The Schooner Exchange v. McFaddon, 11 U.S. 116, 140–41 (1812) (“[T]he general license
to foreigners to enter the dominions of a friendly power, is never understood to extend to a military force, and
an army marching into the dominions of another sovereign, may justly be considered as committing an act of
hostility, and, if not opposed by force, acquires no privilege by its irregular and improper conduct.”).
78. See Caplan, supra note 6, at 748–49 (suggesting that under the literal meaning of par in parem non
habet imperium states are entitled to absolute immunity without exception).
79. Schooner Exchange, 11 U.S. at 137–41.
80. Id. at 137–39.
81. Id. at 144.
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the territorial jurisdiction; he may be considered as so far laying down the prince,
and assuming the character of a private individual . . . .”82
B. THE PUBLIC/PRIVATE DIVIDE
There is nothing inevitable about the Court’s suggestion in Schooner
Exchange that commercial activity may be an exception to sovereign immunity83
or its intimation that commerce is a private endeavor.84 Indeed, while states
largely refrained from direct engagement in commercial activity during
substantial parts of the nineteenth century, they had been relatively active
commercial players in earlier centuries through the 1700s.85 In light of the state’s
historic involvement in commerce, why did the Court suggest that commercial
activity was essentially “private” and possibly grounds for limiting foreign
sovereign immunity? One possible explanation can be found in the relationship
between the nation-state system, the rise of capitalism, and particular views
about the nature of commerce that were ascendant during capitalism’s laissezfaire period.
The nation-state system emerged in 1648 with the Peace of Westphalia,
which laid the groundwork for a system of state sovereignty based on territorial
borders.86 It was also around this time that capitalism emerged as an economic
and social system.87 While it did not create the nation-state, the nation-state was
critical to capitalism’s spread and eventual dominance.88 As scholars have
argued, states provided public goods89 that private commercial enterprises
needed for organizational and production purposes,90 including judicial systems
82. Id. at 146. While Schooner Exchange did not reach the issue, in 1820, U.S. Attorney General William
Wirt took a clear position in support of a commercial activity exception to sovereign immunity, writing that “‘if
a foreign [state-owned] ship, departing voluntarily from her appropriate character, chooses to adopt that of a
merchant . . . she must . . . be subject to all the consequences of such adoption, and be treated . . . as a
merchant . . . .’” Remarks by Jordan Paust, In International Human Rights in American Courts: The Case of
Nelson v. Saudi Arabia, 86 AM. SOC’Y INT’L L. PROC. 324, 326 (1992). One commentator has described this as
the first official U.S. recognition of a commercial activity exception. Id. As discussed in Part III, this recognition
would become more frequent during the early half of the twentieth century and become official government
policy through the Tate Letter.
83. See Caplan, supra note 6, at 754 (conceding that the distinction between governmental and commercial
acts, for purpose of sovereign immunity, is “admittedly somewhat arbitrary”).
84. This lack of inevitability is underscored by language in Schooner Exchange defining foreign sovereign
immunity as an exception to “the full and complete power of a nation within its own territories” that is based on
“the consent of the nation itself.” The Schooner Exchange v. McFaddon, 11 U.S. 116, 136 (1812). This language
suggests that exceptions to foreign sovereign immunity could include almost any activity a nation decided not
to consent to. Despite this potential expansiveness, Schooner Exchange defined the absence of such consent as
largely (though not exclusively) coextensive with the private/commercial activity of foreign sovereigns. Id. at
145–46.
85. See infra notes 94–97 and accompanying text.
86. Harold K. Jacobson, Book Review, The Sovereign State and Its Competitors, 90 AM. J. INT’L L. 519,
526 (1996).
87. ELLEN MEIKSINS WOOD, THE ORIGIN OF CAPITALISM 125 (2017).
88. COATES, supra note 22, at 13.
89. MANN, SOURCES OF SOCIAL POWER VOL. 2, supra note 10, at 480.
90. Id. at 480, 482.
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that guaranteed the predictability and certainty needed for business
transactions.91 In return for these public goods, states reaped the benefits of
capitalist enterprise, including revenue92 and goods necessary to the running of
government.93
For several centuries, this mutually beneficial relationship did not neatly
obey the central capitalist presumption that commerce is exclusively a private
endeavor.94 Instead, lines between the so-called “public” work of government
and the “private” activities of commercial actors were significantly blurred.
Nation-states not only remained involved in commercial activities during this
time;95 many overseas trading companies maintained dual public and private
characters as well.96
During the early nineteenth century, this all began to change, as a clearer
distinction between “private” commerce and “public” state action became
ascendant.97 This was a period when the laissez-faire economic approach started
to gain more currency. Laissez-faire economics rejects state restrictions on and
involvement in commerce and trade.98 While the transition to a laissez-faire
economy was fitful (including but not limited to the United States),99 the idea
91. Id. at 490; BRIAN Z. TAMANAHA, ON THE RULE OF LAW: HISTORY, POLITICS, AND THEORY 119 (2004).
92. MANN, SOURCES OF SOCIAL POWER VOL. 2, supra note 10, at 499.
93. Id. at 132–33.
94. See ADAM SMITH, AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND CAUSES OF THE WEALTH OF NATIONS, BOOK IV
29–30 (Andrew Skinner ed., 1999) (1776) (describing capitalist commerce as the product of the private efforts
of self-interested individuals without state interference).
95. SUCHARITKUL, supra note 21, at 14.
96. Janet McLean, The Transnational Corporation in History: Lessons for Today?, 79 IND. L.J. 363, 365
(2004).
97. Id.
98. SUCHARITKUL, supra note 21, at 14.
99. There is much to be said about the limits of laissez-faire in early nineteenth century America, as well
as commercial sectors globally. While a full accounting of this history is well beyond the scope of this Article,
a few points are worth making. First, where the United States is concerned, laissez-faire policies became more
popular after the Civil War, as compared to the first half of the nineteenth century. Bradley V. Bateman, Bringing
in the State? The Life and Times of Laissez-Faire in the Nineteenth Century United States, 37 HIST. POL.
ECON. 175, 180 (2005). That being said, in the early nineteenth century, “the idea that the government had little
or no constructive role to play in the economy dominated American life.” Id. Second, in terms of global
commercial sectors, the laissez-faire approach faced particular resistance in the realm of international, and
specifically colonial, trade. José Luís Cardoso, The Political Economy of Rising Capitalism, in THE CAMBRIDGE
HISTORY OF CAPITALISM VOL. 1: THE RISE OF CAPITALISM FROM ANCIENT ORIGINS TO 1848, at 574, 583 (Larry
Neal & Jeffrey Williams eds., 2014). At the time, some scholars argued for colonial trade to obey the rules of
laissez-faire since “the restrictive processes inherent in the colonial system were prejudicial to the development
of trade as a whole, given that they hindered the free enterprise of a multiplicity of agents and interests.” Id. at
584. Indeed, between 1780 and 1880, European colonialism slowed down (it would increase again during the
late nineteenth century until World War I) as the fusion of state power and commercial interests became
disfavored. POLANYI, supra note 29, at 221–22. Colonial trade was not, however, the only arena where the
adoption of laissez-faire policies was strained or incomplete. During the laissez-faire period, state-involvement
in banking was not uncommon, in both the United States as well as Europe. See infra Part II.D (discussing
ownership of American bank by state of Georgia); see generally Julienne M. Laureyseens, Growth of Central
Banking: The Société Générale des Pays-Bas and the Impact of the Function of General State Cashier on
Belgium’s Monetary System 1822-1830, 14 BUS. & ECON. HIST. 125 (1985) (describing the important role
played by the state-created bank, Société Générale des Pays-Bas, in Belgium’s nineteenth century
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that the market belonged to private parties engaged in commerce for
predominantly profit-seeking goals, without any direct state intervention or
participation, became a more readily acceptable notion.100
It was against this backdrop that Schooner Exchange emerged. With the
commercial world increasingly defined as exclusively “private,” the Court
suggested that, if states did act as commercial players, they would be treated as
any other private actor in the market would be—a view that aligned with the
prevailing laissez-faire spirit of the time.
As the next part explores, a desire to formally restrict immunity for foreign
sovereigns engaged in commercial acts began to emerge in the United States in
the early twentieth century, just as states were re-asserting themselves as
commercial actors in a new globalized market.
II. THE MOVE TOWARD RESTRICTIVE IMMUNITY IN EARLY TWENTIETH
CENTURY AMERICA
Many have described the absolute theory of immunity as the prevailing
U.S. approach to foreign sovereign immunity until the State Department
embraced restrictive immunity via the Tate Letter in 1952.101 This Part
challenges that view.102 It highlights significant debate, during the first half of
the twentieth century, amongst jurists, U.S. government officials, as well as
scholars, suggesting that foreign sovereign immunity should be limited. Even
though other kinds of foreign sovereign cases—involving tortious accidents or
unlawful conduct during war—also raised important immunity questions, calls
to restrict immunity during this period were driven primarily by the commercial
activity of foreign states.103 Indeed, as this Part explains, many supporters of
industrialization). In fact, as political economist Karl Polanyi has argued, state-involvement in banking,
particularly in the form of central banks that set monetary and credit policy for a state or group of states, was
one of the ways the state intervened to support laissez-faire economies in the nineteenth century. POLANYI, supra
note 29, at 201–04.
100. SUCHARITKUL, supra note 21, at 14–15; see also Cardoso, supra note 99, at 582 (arguing that, as early
as the second half of the eighteenth century, there was a “decline in intervention of national states in regulating
internal and external markets . . . .”).
101. See, e.g., Christopher A. Whytock, Foreign State Immunity and the Right to Court Access, 93 B.U. L.
REV. 2033, 2042 (2013) (“[T]here seems to be general agreement that the absolute doctrine prevailed in the early
twentieth century [in the United States] . . . .”); Michele Potestà, State Immunity and Jus Cogens Violations: the
Alien Tort Statute Against the Latest Developments in the “Law of Nations,” 28 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 571, 573
(2010) (describing absolute immunity as the prevailing American approach to foreign sovereign immunity from
Schooner Exchange until the shift to restrictive immunity in the Tate Letter).
102. Some scholars have also highlighted fraught judicial commitments to absolute immunity before the
Tate Letter. See Chimène Keitner, Prosecuting Foreign States, 61 VA. J. INT’L L. 221, 230 (2021) (“The rule in
United States courts, as elsewhere in the period from 1920 to 1952, was that agencies or instrumentalities of
foreign sovereigns that were engaged in commercial activities, were amenable to suit for causes of action arising
in connection to those activities.”) (citation omitted). This Subpart supplements these accounts by providing an
extensive review of the relevant case law and analyzing debates within the Executive branch and contemporary
scholarship on absolute versus restrictive immunity during this period. Most importantly, this Subpart
demonstrates the ways these incipient moves toward restrictive immunity aligned with various capitalist forces.
103. For example, tortious accidents allegedly caused by foreign-state owned entities were not infrequently
litigated in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. See generally, e.g., The Republic of Mexico v. Hoffman,
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restrictive immunity were motivated by a desire to facilitate cross-border
commerce between private U.S. businesses and state trading companies, while
ensuring state involvement in commercial activity did not distort the rules of the
capitalist market system.
These calls to restrict foreign sovereign immunity coincided with a period
in modern capitalism when laissez-faire commitments were giving way to
increased state involvement in the commercial sphere and participation in global
commerce. Indeed, globalized trade experienced its first great modern wave
from the end of the nineteenth century through World War II, though it was
subject to ebbs and flows because of world events and rising protectionist trade
policies in many Western countries. As states reemerged as commercial players
on the global stage, foreign sovereign immunity began to be reconciled with the
rules of the capitalist marketplace.104 American efforts to restrict foreign
sovereign immunity—which were gaining in steam but remained incomplete
and limited during this period—aligned with this trend.
The push towards restrictive immunity did not, however, only emerge
alongside a capitalist period in which states were increasingly behaving as
economic actors in a globalized marketplace. It also reflected a deeper
disconnect between the principle of absolute immunity and the capitalist
commitments of the U.S. legal system. Indeed, as efforts to restrict immunity for
the commercial activities of foreign states emerged, they were bolstered by

324 U.S. 30 (1945) (denying immunity for merchant ship owned but not possessed by Mexican government in
action relating to collision in Mexican waters); The Roseric, 254 F. 154 (D.N.J. 1918) (upholding the immunity
of a British government controlled ship that had negligently collided with a privately owned vessel); The Pampa,
245 F. 137 (E.D.N.Y. 1917) (upholding immunity for Argentine navy vessel that collided with another vessel);
Mason v. Intercolonial Ry. Of Can., 83 N.E. 876 (Mass. 1908) (upholding foreign sovereign immunity for
Canadian railway, owned by the British king, in action for personal injuries); The Pizzaro v. Matthias, 19 F. Cas.
786 (S.D.N.Y. 1852) (upholding immunity for public armed vessel of Spanish government that collided with
private vessel). So too the sovereign immunity of foreign-owned ships that had violated U.S. or international
law, especially with regard to state neutrality during war, was challenged as far back as the early nineteenth
century. See The Santissima Trinidad, 20 U.S. 283, 354 (1822) (holding that, in war, a public ship in the service
of a foreign government forfeits its prize property where the ship has violated U.S. neutrality); The Divina
Pastora, 17 U.S. 52, 63–64 (1819) (holding that the acts of one state against another in war are not amenable to
suit in the United States unless U.S. neutrality has been violated); see generally Ervin v. Quintanilla, 99 F.2d
935, 940 (5th Cir. 1938) (“It is of course true that no foreign government may, in breach of our laws, or against
our consent, exercise any act of sovereignty here.”). Even though some of these cases were successful ones for
plaintiffs, they were not the primary drivers of efforts to restrict immunity, especially from the Executive branch
and scholars, during this period.
104. Even before American courts took action, efforts to restrict foreign sovereign immunity were already
occurring in continental Europe. See YANG, supra note 3, at 13–15 (noting embrace of restrictive immunity by
Italian, Belgian, Swiss, Austrian, Greek and French courts in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries).
The two countries that were the earliest adopters of restrictive sovereign immunity—Belgium (1903) and Italy
(1886)—were small states. Pierre-Hugues Verdier & Erik Voeten, How Does Customary International Law
Change? The Case of State Immunity, 59 INT’L STUD. Q. 209, 214, 220 (2015). As with Schooner Exchange,
courts in these countries often restricted sovereign immunity based on the capitalist notion that commerce was
an inherently private endeavor. See, e.g., SUCHARITKUL, supra note 21, at 233–40 (collecting Italian court cases
in which sovereigns were stripped of their immunity for commercial acts because of their “private” nature).

602

HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL

Vol. 73:3

similar restrictions on the immunity of federal and state governments engaged
in commercial work.
Part II.A begins by exploring emerging tensions within the U.S. judiciary
regarding absolute immunity during the first half of the twentieth century. While
the courts did not embrace restrictive immunity in all situations, they were more
inclined to do so in certain circumstances, particularly where the commercial
activities of state-owned companies were involved. Part II.B–C examines rising
(though similarly disjointed) support for restrictive immunity within the State
Department, as well as more whole-hearted support for restrictive immunity
amongst scholars. Part II.D demonstrates how efforts to restrict the immunity of
foreign sovereigns were informed by limits on the immunity of federal and state
governments for their commercial activities.
A. THE EVOLVING JUDICIAL VIEW ON FOREIGN SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY
During much of the nineteenth century, the issue of whether foreign
sovereigns should be immune for their commercial activities rarely arose in U.S.
courts,105 likely because the practice itself was disfavored.106 The commercial
activity of foreign states became a more pressing issue, however, as laissez-faire
policies gave way to greater state regulation and participation in the market
starting in the late nineteenth century.107 In England, for example, the
government assumed share-ownership of private companies and took control of
certain industries in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.108 The
1917 Russian Revolution led to the creation of the first nation-state to enjoy an
absolute monopoly on foreign trade.109 Even the U.S. government got into the
economic game, boosting its involvement in commercial activities during World
War I and the Great Depression.110 By the eve of World War II, many Western
capitalist countries were directly engaged in commercial and business activities,

105. There were a few exceptions to this trend in the late nineteenth century. See generally Hassard v. United
States of Mexico, 1899 WL 398 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Nov. 1, 1899); 46 A.D. 623 (N.Y. Sup Ct. 1899), aff’d 173 N.Y.
645 (1903) (relying on foreign sovereign immunity to dismiss suit against Mexico and two of its regional states
relating to bonds issued by defendants); Long v. The Tampico, 16 F. 491 (S.D.N.Y. 1883) (denying sovereign
immunity in suit seeking to recoup compensation for commercial services rendered to two ships owned by the
Mexican government because the ships were not technically the property of the Mexican government or in its
possession when the services in question were rendered).
106. The relative absence of foreign sovereign immunity cases involving commercial activity in U.S. courts
during the mid to late-nineteenth century may also have been a byproduct of U.S. trade policy at the time. For
much of the nineteenth century, the U.S. government levied tariffs on imports initially to raise revenue for the
government (from 1790 to 1860 tariffs made up 90% of government revenue) and later to protect certain
domestic industries from foreign competition. DOUGLAS A. IRWIN, CLASHING OVER COMMERCE: A HISTORY OF
U.S. TRADE POLICY 7 (2017). While it is beyond the scope of this Article to explore this issue in depth, these
restrictions on foreign imports may have made it even less likely that foreign sovereign commercial activity,
itself already limited, would be a source of litigation in U.S. courts.
107. SUCHARITKUL, supra note 21, at 15.
108. Id. at 16.
109. Id. at 17.
110. Elengold & Glater, supra note 38, at 1129–30.
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including through state-owned corporate enterprises.111 This increase in
commercial activity by foreign states coincided with the first great modern
period of globalization,112 albeit one fractured by a rise in protectionist trade
policies,113 the Great Depression, and the outbreak of World Wars I and II.114
During this period, judicial responses to the foreign sovereign immunity
issue were a byproduct of rising state-involvement in trade coupled with
globalization’s substantial, though still incomplete, impact within the United
States.115 Much of this case law revolved around state-owned merchant ships
and corporations.116 In the merchant ship context, U.S. courts displayed a
willingness to restrict immunity in some circumstances but not in others. In the
context of state-owned corporations, by contrast, courts tended to be more open
and consistent in restricting foreign sovereign immunity. The net result was a
disjointed approach to sovereign immunity that suggested a desire, nevertheless,
to restrict immunity where states engaged in commercial activities in particular
kinds of situations.
Judicial approaches to foreign sovereign immunity also reflected other
trends during this period. Many decisions on foreign sovereign immunity for
state-owned merchant ships and corporations often turned on the relationship
between those entities and the foreign state. In particular, questions of sovereign
ownership and possession of the commercial entity, as well as the entity’s
separate legal status, were generally more central to the sovereign immunity
question than the “private” nature of commerce.117 Some courts even rejected
111. SUCHARITKUL, supra note 21, at 17–18.
112. Ortiz-Ospina & Beltekian, supra note 36.
113. MICHAEL MANN, THE SOURCES OF SOCIAL POWER VOLUME 3: GLOBAL EMPIRES AND REVOLUTION,
1890–1945, at 23 (2013) [hereinafter MICHAEL MANN, SOURCES OF SOCIAL POWER VOL. 3]. As globalized trade
was becoming more common from the late nineteenth century through World War II, many Western states
increasingly instituted customs tariffs and embargoes on imports and foreign investment, amongst other trade
restrictions. POLANYI, supra note 29, at 150. These protectionist policies responded not only to globalization but
also to the excesses of the laissez-faire period—they were, nevertheless, intended to preserve the basic essence
of a laissez-faire economy, namely that the market regulate itself. Id. at 155.
114. IRWIN, supra note 106, at 344, 371, 450. This fracturing of globalization largely took geographic form.
Refusing to engage in free trade with one another, Western powers sought to acquire overseas territories that
they could force to trade on their terms. POLANYI, supra note 29, at 225–27; MICHAEL MANN, SOURCES OF
SOCIAL POWER VOL. 3, supra note 113, at 23. As a result, much of the “free trade” of this period was between
colonial powers and their colonies. Id.
115. In the United States, the impact of global trade was arguably limited by protectionist trade policies
during the first few decades of the twentieth century. IRWIN, supra note 106, at 330. At the same time, domestic
efforts to promote free trade grew, albeit fitfully, as the United States became a bigger player in the global
economy and a key financial power and major creditor to the rest of the world. Id. at 316, 344–46.
116. While courts during this period also heard cases involving the public armed ships of foreign sovereigns,
see cases cited supra note 103, increasing numbers of foreign-state owned merchant ships as well as corporations
raised novel problems for the courts. For example, in The Maipo, a case decided in 1918, the district court noted
that while judicial precedent “has consistently been in the direction of holding immune the property of a
sovereign owned in his sovereign capacity and in his possession,” the courts had never specifically decided
whether a foreign-state owned vessel ought to retain its immunity where it was engaged in commercial activity.
252 F. 627, 629 (S.D.N.Y. 1918).
117. As discussed below in Part II.A.1–2, because corporations had long been treated as separate legal
entities from their owners (McLean, supra note 96, at 364), courts were more likely to restrict immunity for the
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the distinction between public and private activity all together. Still, despite a
general reticence to label commercial activity as “private,” many courts drew a
distinction between sovereign and commercial acts. For example, cases denying
immunity for foreign-state owned merchant ships or corporations often reflected
the view that commercial (as distinct from sovereign) activity should be subject
to the laws of the market. Whether or not judges believed commerce was
synonymous with “private” activity, foreign sovereign immunity cases from this
period suggest that, for some courts, commercial activity removed governments
from the sovereign realm and placed them, instead, within the realm of the
marketplace.
The next two Subparts examine these debates, looking first at foreign stateowned merchant ships and then at foreign state-owned corporations.
1. Foreign State-Owned Merchant Ships
During and after World War I, there was a precipitous rise in state-owned
merchant ships.118 Where these merchant ships were merely owned, but not
possessed, by a foreign sovereign, no immunity would attach to the ship’s
activities.119 Even where the foreign government pressed its claims and
advocated for its interest in the ship, courts consistently withheld immunity and
left the foreign sovereign exposed to suit.120 By contrast, where a merchant ship
was both owned and possessed by a foreign government, courts were more apt
to uphold immunity, even where ships were arguably engaged in commercial
activities.121 The reason for the distinction between ownership and possession
was unclear, but may have “depend[ed] upon the aggravation of the indignity
where the interference with the vessel” prevents the foreign state from operating
it.122
Even in merchant ship cases where the government owned and possessed
the vessel, however, courts sometimes disagreed over whether immunity ought
to protect a state engaged in commercial activities—a disagreement driven, in
part, by the implicit view that these activities should not be treated as sovereign
or protected from the rules of the market.123 The most notable example of this
commercial activities of state-owned corporations. In contrast to corporations, courts considered ships, which
were owned and possessed by a foreign government, to be one in the same with their government-owners and
were more inclined to uphold foreign sovereign immunity for those defendants. The Maipo, 252 F. at 630.
118. The Republic of Mexico v. Hoffman, 324 U.S. 30, 41 (1945) (Frankfurter, J., concurring) (quoting
Compania Naviera Vascongado v. S.S. Cristina [1938] AC 485, 521–22).
119. Id. at 36–38; see also The Beaton Park, 65 F. Supp. 211 (W.D. Wash. 1946) (denying immunity to
merchant ship that was engaged in commercial activity and owned, but not operated, by the Canadian
government).
120. Hoffman, 324 U.S. at 35–38.
121. SUCHARITKUL, supra note 21, at 75. While courts generally bestowed immunity on these ships, they
also made immunity dependent on certain conditions, including by requiring foreign governments to register the
sovereign character of their ships through official U.S. government channels. Id.
122. Hoffman, 324 U.S. at 38.
123. In some cases, courts upheld immunity while also expressing the view that sovereigns should not be
immune for their commercial activities because such activities were regularly engaged in by private persons.
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disagreement can be seen in a line of decisions relating to Berizzi Bros. Co. v.
The Pesaro.124 Pesaro was the first Supreme Court case to explicitly extend
immunity to a foreign state’s commercial activities. In that case, the Supreme
Court held that a merchant ship, which was owned and operated by the Italian
government and engaged in trade, was entitled to sovereign immunity for its
commercial acts.125
In sharp contrast to the Supreme Court’s decision in Pesaro, the district
court decision in that case126 concluded that, because it was engaged in
commerce, the ship in question was not entitled to sovereign immunity,
regardless of whether she was owned and possessed by a foreign sovereign.127
Even though the district court rejected the distinction between private and public
acts as “specious,” it intimated that commercial activity was by its “nature” not
entitled to immunity.128 In reaching this decision, the court relied on a number
of factors suggesting that commercial acts were, at the very least, different from
sovereign ones, and that such acts should be subject to market rules.
First, the district court noted substantial criticism of absolute immunity as
an anachronism that should be abandoned in light of the modern state’s wideranging commercial activities.129 Second, while it suggested that sovereign or
political activity would be subject to immunity, it pointed to precedent, both
domestic and foreign, suggesting that immunity should not apply to a state’s
commercial activities.130 Finally, the district court observed that “[t]o deprive
parties injured in the ordinary course of trade of their common and wellestablished legal remedies would . . . work great hardship on them.”131 By
contrast, restrictions on foreign sovereign immunity for merchant ships would
encourage trade and commerce with these foreign state-owned enterprises.132
See, e.g., The Maipo, 259 F. 367, 368 (S.D.N.Y. 1919) (upholding immunity for ship owned and possessed by
Chilean government while noting that “it may be the opinion of counsel, as it assuredly is my opinion, that when
a sovereign republic, empire, or whatnot, goes into business and engages in the carrying trade, it ought to be
subject to the liabilities of carriers just as much as any private person”).
124. Berizzi Bros. Co. v. The Pesaro, 271 U.S. 562, 570–71 (1926).
125. Id. at 576.
126. The Pesaro (Pesaro I), 277 F. 473 (S.D.N.Y. 1921), rev’d sub nom. on other grounds, Berizzi Bros.
Co. v. The Pesaro, 271 U.S. 562 (1926).
127. See id. at 481 (concluding that “the immunity of a public ship should depend primarily not upon her
ownership but upon the nature of the service in which she is engaged and the purpose for which she is
employed”).
128. Id. at 482. Even though it rejected the private/public distinction, the district court in Pesaro nevertheless
suggested commerce may be a “private” activity by pointing to language in Schooner Exchange drawing “a
manifest distinction between the private property of the person who happens to be a prince and that military
force which supports the sovereign power and maintains the dignity and the independence of a nation.” Id. at
476.
129. Id. at 475.
130. Id. at 482–85.
131. Id. at 481.
132. See id. (noting that if immunity was granted to state-owned ships engaged in ordinary commercial
activities, “[s]hippers would hesitate to trade with government ships”). While the district court also relied on the
fact that the ship was not immune from suit under Italian law, the bulk of the decision focused on the commercial
activity issue. Id. at 482–83.
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The district court in Pesaro was not the only court to abrogate foreign
sovereign immunity for merchant ships that were both owned and possessed by
foreign states. Nor was it the only one to distinguish between sovereign and
commercial activity. Other courts also viewed the rules of the marketplace as
demanding restrictions on foreign sovereign immunity. For example, in the case
of Gul Djemal, which preceded the Supreme Court’s decision in Pesaro, the
district court held that a vessel operated and owned by the Turkish government
was not entitled to immunity, in part, because it was engaged in ordinary
commercial activity.133 In explaining its decision, the district court noted that a
foreign state that engages in trade and commerce divests itself of its “sovereign
character.”134 The court also noted that “[t]he existing immunities and
prerogatives of governments are all but too extensive, and the one here claimed
should not be permitted to destroy, as it would, the basic principle that in trade
and commerce there should be for the persons engaged therein a fair field and
no favors.”135
Several years after the Supreme Court’s decision in Pesaro, some of the
Court’s justices suggested the case had gone too far in upholding immunity for
a foreign states’ merchant ships. In 1945, Justice Felix Frankfurter penned a
concurrence, joined by Justice Hugo Black, in which he urged the Court to
disavow the Pesaro decision.136 Frankfurter’s opinion attacked the notion that
government ownership and possession were determinative of the foreign
sovereign immunity issue, noting that it was “too tenuous a distinction [for]
differentiat[ing] between foreign government-owned vessels engaged merely in
trade that are immune from suit and those that are not.”137 Instead, Frankfurter
suggested immunity should simply not be given to commercial ships owned by
foreign governments, a position he justified, in part, by noting rising state
participation in trading activities:
Half a century ago foreign Governments very seldom embarked in trade with
ordinary ships, though they not infrequently owned vessels destined for public
uses, and in particular hospital vessels, supply ships and surveying or
exploring vessels. These were doubtless very strong reasons for extending the
privilege long possessed by ships of war to public ships of the nature
mentioned; but there has been a very large development of State-owned
commercial ships since the Great War, and the question whether the immunity
should continue to be given to ordinary trading ships has become acute. Is it

133. The Gul Djemal, 296 F. 567, 569 (S.D.N.Y. 1922), aff’d, 264 U.S. 90 (1924).
134. Id. at 569. While the court’s decision to limit sovereign immunity also turned on the fact that diplomatic
relations between the U.S. and Turkish governments were severed at the time of the ship’s seizure, the bulk of
the decision focused, yet again, on the ship’s commercial activities. Id.
135. Id. The district court’s decision in Guj Djemal came after the district court decision in Pesaro, which
was used as a basis for the Guj Djemal opinion. Id. at 568.
136. The Republic of Mexico. v. Hoffman, 324 U.S. 30, 39–40 (1945) (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
137. Id.
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consistent with sovereign dignity to acquire a tramp steamer and to compete
with ordinary shippers and ship-owners in the markets of the world?138

By suggesting that a state’s involvement in trading activities was different
from its activities for public use, Frankfurter may not have explicitly drawn a
line between public and private acts. He did, however, suggest that commercial
activities were distinct from the sort of activities that deserved sovereign
immunity protection.
2. Foreign State-Owned Corporations
Merchant ships were not the only vehicle for a foreign state’s commercial
activities. State-owned corporations were also becoming active in international
commerce during the first half of the twentieth century. Where states directly
engaged in commerce, and did not use the corporate form, courts largely upheld
immunity.139 However, in cases involving foreign state-owned corporations,
courts were even more inclined to restrict immunity than they were in the
merchant ship context.140 In various cases, including after the Supreme Court’s
decision in Pesaro, courts generally denied immunity to foreign state-owned
corporations engaged in commercial acts.141
These restrictions on immunity were often a result both of the separate legal
form of the corporation—which represents one of the central vehicles for
commerce and trade142—and the corporation’s participation in commerce.143
Though courts rarely mentioned the “private” nature of commercial activity, the
combination of a corporation’s separate legal form with its commercial
endeavors often prompted courts to restrict immunity and subject foreign stateowned corporations to the rules of the marketplace. For example, in Coale v.
Societe Co-op Suisse des Charbons, Basle, the court denied immunity on a
breach of contract claim against a government-controlled and created Swiss
company because it was an independent corporation engaging in commercial
acts.144 Even though the company had been established by the Swiss government
to engage in the importation and distribution of coal on the government’s behalf
and was controlled by the government, the court concluded that the company
138. Id. at 41 (quotations omitted) (citation omitted).
139. See, e.g., Oliver Am. Trading Co. v. Gov’t of U.S. of Mex., 5 F.2d 659, 661–67 (2d. Cir. 1924)
(upholding foreign sovereign immunity for contract claim against Mexican state-owned and operated railroad
which was not a separate corporate entity but rather an arm of the Mexican government); Bradford v. Dir. Gen.
of R.R.s of Mex., 278 S.W. 251, 252 (Tex. App. 1925) (same).
140. At the time, scholars took note of increasing judicial reluctance to give state-owned companies
immunity from suit during the early twentieth century. Immunity from Suit of Foreign Sovereign
Instrumentalities and Obligations, 50 YALE L.J. 1088, 1089 (1941).
141. SUCHARITKUL, supra note 21, at 187.
142. McLean, supra note 96, at 365.
143. See Dunlap v. Banco Cent. Del Ecuador, 41 N.Y.S.2d 650, 652 (Sup. Ct. 1943) (noting that immunity
is unavailable to a corporation organized or controlled by a foreign state where it is carrying out private,
commercial activities as a separate legal entity); Hannes v. Kingdom of Roumania Monopolies Inst., 20 N.Y.S.2d
825, 834 (App. Div. 1940), order resettled, 26 N.Y.S.2d 856 (App. Div. 1940) (same).
144. See Coale v. Société Co-op Suisse des Charbons Basle, 21 F.2d 180, 180–81 (S.D.N.Y. 1921).
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was not entitled to immunity because “the latter, as a corporate entity, was liable
for its corporate [including commercial] obligations.”145
In U.S. v. Deutsches Kalisyndikat Gesellschaft, a case involving U.S.
antitrust claims against several defendants, including a French company, the
court rejected the French government’s argument that the defendant company
was entitled to immunity simply because it was created and owned by France
and worked for the benefit of the state.146 Relying on Pesaro, the court rejected
the notion that the “public or governmental” nature of the activities in question
was relevant147 and generally held that “the person of the foreign sovereign and
those who represent him are immune, whether their acts are commercial tortious,
criminal, or not, no matter where performed.”148 Nevertheless, the court
concluded that immunity was inappropriate in that case because, under the
general corporation laws of France where defendant was organized, it was a
separate legal entity that could be sued.149 While that separateness was
decisive,150 the court also noted that by engaging in commercial activity in the
United States defendant was acting as any private corporation would.151
Relying on Deutsches Kalisyndikat Gesellschaft and Coale, the court in
Ulen & Co. v. Bank Gospodarstwa Krajowego held, as a general matter, that “a
corporation organized by either a domestic or foreign government for
commercial objects in which the government is interested, does not share the
immunity of the sovereign.”152 Concluding that defendant bank, which was a
“State institution” of the Republic of Poland, was not entitled to immunity, the
court relied both on the bank’s separate legal status153 as well as its involvement
in commercial activities to reach its decision.154 As in Deutsches Kalisyndikat
Gesellschaft and Coale, the court’s holding suggested the combination of
corporate separateness and commercial activity stripped defendant of any
sovereign protections and made it amenable to suit, as any other market player
would be.

145. Id. at 181.
146. U.S. v. Deutsches Kalisyndikat Gesellschaft, 31 F.2d 199, 202–03 (S.D.N.Y. 1929).
147. Id. at 201.
148. Id.
149. Id. at 202.
150. Id.
151. See id. (noting that “[t]he only difference between the defendants and other foreign corporations and
their officers and agents doing business in the United States is that the French Republic owns a part of the stock
of the defendant corporation, and that the defendant company and its agents are selling potash for the French
government as well as for others”).
152. Ulen v. Bank Gospodarstwa Krajowego (Nat’l Econ. Bank), 24 N.Y.S.2d 201, 206 (App. Div. 1940).
153. While there was some dispute over whether defendant was technically a corporation, the court found
that it had “all the characteristics of a corporation.” Id.
154. Id.
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B. THE EVOLVING STATE DEPARTMENT VIEW ON FOREIGN SOVEREIGN
IMMUNITY
As happened amongst courts during the first half of the twentieth century,
officials inside the State Department also grappled with the increasing
commercial practices of foreign states and the serious economic implications of
bestowing immunity on their commercial activities. Much like the courts, State
Department efforts to restrict immunity were tentative while also seemingly
guided by the belief that the commercial activities of foreign states should be
subject to market rules.
At the time, the State Department’s position on foreign sovereign immunity
was incredibly important since it had substantial influence on the courts.155
Though there were exceptions,156 typically where the State Department
recognized and allowed a claim of immunity by a foreign state,157 or decided an
issue of fact relating to the status of a foreign state or state-owned entity, courts
largely considered those determinations to be binding on them.158
The State Department’s embrace of restrictive immunity seems to have
started after the end of World War I, when the department began to more
consistently deny immunity in cases involving states’ commercial activities.159
In a letter issued in November 1918 to the U.S. Attorney General, Secretary of
State Robert Lansing stated that, “‘[w]here [state-owned] vessels [a]re engaged
in commercial pursuits, they should be subject to the obligations and restrictions
of trade, if they were to enjoy its benefits and profits’” (“Lansing Letter”).160 In
Lansing’s view, the reasons for restricting immunity were the “‘soundness of the
theory that when a sovereign enters into a business, he submits himself to the
conditions thereof.”161 A conservative democrat who had risen to the post of
secretary during World War I, Lansing believed “blindly in the value of
capitalism” and was “in the forefront of those pressing for its global
expansion.”162
In accordance with the Lansing Letter, by the early 1920s, the State
Department was explicitly declining to support immunity for foreign stateowned merchant ships in U.S. courts.163 Indeed, in the Pesaro case, the State
155. SUCHARITKUL, supra note 21, at 192.
156. In some cases, where the State Department suggested immunity not be granted, the courts overruled its
suggestion, as the Supreme Court did in the Pesaro case. Id.; see also supra notes 124–125 and accompanying
text. After 1945, however, the judicial practice of deferring to State Department suggestions of immunity would
become more institutionalized and consistent. SUCHARITKUL, supra note 21, at 192–93.
157. According to one decision from 1941, the State Department had only conclusively intervened in favor
of dismissal in two suits involving foreign sovereign immunity until that point; one of them was The Schooner
Exchange case. Sullivan v. State of Sao Paolo, 122 F.2d 355, 357 (2d. Cir. 1941).
158. SUCHARITKUL, supra note 21, at 191.
159. Id. at 195–96.
160. Id. at 196 (quotations omitted) (citation omitted). Notably, the Justice Department disagreed with
Lansing’s view and generally remained supportive of absolute immunity for foreign sovereigns. Id. at 195 n.43.
161. Id. at 196 (quotations omitted) (citation omitted).
162. DAVID GLASER, ROBERT LANSING: A STUDY IN STATECRAFT 18 (2015).
163. The Pesaro (Pesaro I), 277 F. 473, 479 (S.D.N.Y. 1921).
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Department suggested that immunity not be granted. In a letter to the district
court in Pesaro, the State Department stated that “government-owned merchant
vessels or vessels under requisition of governments whose flag they fly
employed in commerce should not be regarded as entitled to the immunities
accorded public vessels of war.”164
The State Department also applied this restrictive immunity approach to
foreign state-owned companies. For example, in the Deutsches Kalisyndikat
Gesellschaft case, the State Department took the position “that agencies of
foreign governments engaged in ordinary commercial transactions in the United
States enjoy no privileges or immunities not appertaining to other foreign
corporations, agencies, or individuals doing business here, and . . . should
conform to the laws of this country governing such transactions . . . .”165
Despite these pronouncements, the State Department’s immunity practices
were not consistent, particularly during World War II when the Department
made more regular suggestions of immunity.166 This shift was, however, likely
a response to the exigencies of the war rather than a retreat from the department’s
previous position. Indeed, that position was soon reaffirmed by the Tate Letter,
which was issued only a few years after the war’s end.
C. THE SCHOLARLY VIEW ON FOREIGN SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY
While judicial and State Department approaches to restrictive immunity
may have remained incomplete during the first half of the twentieth century,
most scholars in the United States whole-heartedly supported limits on
immunity for the commercial activities of foreign countries as state involvement
in global trade was surging. Indeed, these scholars rarely made mention of other
grounds for restricting foreign sovereign immunity in U.S. courts.167 Like their
judicial and executive branch counterparts, many of these scholars believed
these restrictions were important for leveling the commercial playing field
between private business and foreign sovereigns, as well as to facilitate trade.
For many scholars, failing to create a commercial activity exception to
foreign sovereign immunity distorted the free market and adversely affected

164. Id. at 479–80 n.3.
165. U.S. v. Deutsches Kalisyndikat Gesellschaft, 31 F.2d 199, 200 (S.D.N.Y. 1929); see also Molina v.
Comision Reguladora del Mercado de Henequen, 103 A. 397, 398 (N.J. 1918) (communicating State
Department’s view that “political subdivisions of a foreign government engaging in ordinary commercial
transactions must be regarded as subjecting themselves to the obligations arising from commercial transactions
if they are also to reap the benefits and enjoy the rights of trade”).
166. See, e.g., Ex parte Republic of Peru, 318 U.S. 578, 581 (1943) (case in which State Department
supported Peruvian government’s request for sovereign immunity on behalf of a ship chartered by a private
company to carry a cargo of sugar to New York).
167. While torts committed by sovereigns did give rise to some scholarly calls to restrict immunity, these
were not as widespread as calls to limit sovereign immunity for commercial activities. Indeed, to the extent
scholars advocated for tort exceptions to foreign sovereign immunity, these arguments were often framed in
terms of the state’s underlying commercial activities. Alfred Hayes, Private Claims Against Foreign Sovereigns,
38 HARV. L. REV. 599, 601 (1925).
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private business interests—on this view, immunity gave states an unfair
economic advantage over private companies.168 Other commentators suggested
that immunity for commercial activities encouraged the formation of anticompetitive business cartels between states and private companies.169 As early
as the 1920s, some even recommended passing legislation such that “a foreign
state engaged in commercial undertakings which extends its operations into the
United States would ipso facto consent to the jurisdiction of the territorial
sovereign.”170 For some scholars, restricting the immunity of foreign sovereigns
engaged in commerce would also benefit trade between private parties and stateowned corporations.171
D. IMMUNITY FOR FEDERAL AND STATE GOVERNMENTS ENGAGED IN
COMMERCIAL ACTIVITY
The United States’ gradual embrace of restrictive immunity during the first
half of the twentieth century was more than just aligned with a period of greater
commercial activity by states around the globe. It was also consistent with
capitalism’s place within the U.S. legal system and drew inspiration from
existing restrictions on the immunity of state and federal governments engaged
in commercial activities.
Described by some scholars as the most capitalist country in the world,172
the United States’ legal and political commitments have often tracked its
capitalistic impulses. Indeed, as conventionally understood, the American
Revolution was, at least partially, the result of British attempts to regulate
American capitalism, through the levying of taxes,173 as well as restrictions
placed on colonial occupation and possession of indigenous lands.174 American
colonists responded to these measures by creating a Constitution that would
“guarantee . . . the power of capitalist property in America.”175 For the founders
of the American Republic, “[p]rivate property became truly sacred, inviolate
from state and anarchism alike.”176 For these men, all of whom were wealthy
property owners,177 individual rights and liberties were merely the political

168. Immunity from Suit of Foreign Sovereign Instrumentalities and Obligations, supra note 140, at 1089;
John G. Hervey, The Immunity of Foreign States When Engaged in Commercial Enterprises: A Proposed
Solution, 27 MICH. L. REV. 751, 751 (1929); Hayes, supra note 167, at 601.
169. Hervey, supra note 168, at 751–55.
170. Id. at 773. See Sovereign Immunity for Commercial Instrumentalities of Foreign Governments,
58 YALE L.J. 176, 182 (1948) (advocating for restrictive immunity legislation in the “interest of private
[commercial] rights”).
171. See, e.g., Fensterwald, Jr., supra note 39, at 614 (“[P]rivate traders will be reluctant to deal with state
traders if their legal rights and remedies are greatly curtailed by the principle of sovereign immunity.”).
172. MANN, SOURCES OF SOCIAL POWER VOL. 2, supra note 10, at 137.
173. Id. at 151.
174. AZIZ RANA, THE TWO FACES OF AMERICAN FREEDOM 65–70 (2010).
175. MANN, SOURCES OF SOCIAL POWER VOL. 2, supra note 10, at 158.
176. Id.
177. Id. at 150.
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expression of the free market and necessary to its existence.178 In particular,
individual rights were meant to ensure that private property was protected from
interference by the state, as well as the masses.179
The American commitment to capitalism was reflected, in part, in how
courts, as well as Congress, handled federal and state government involvement
in commercial activity. In general, this approach was characterized by two
important legal principles: that government-owned corporations did not enjoy
the sovereign’s immunity from suit; and that the sovereign itself could be sued
for its private, commercial activities.
The first of these two principles was established by Chief Justice Marshall
in Bank of the United States v. Planter’s Bank of Georgia.180 In that case,
Planter’s Bank claimed immunity from suit because one of its incorporators was
the state of Georgia. In rejecting the bank’s argument, Justice Marshall held that:
[W]hen a government becomes a partner in any trading company, it devests
itself, so far as concerns the transactions of that company, of its sovereign
character, and takes that of a private citizen. Instead of communicating to the
company its privileges and its prerogatives, it descends to a level with those
with whom it associates itself, and takes the character which belongs to its
associates, and to the business which is to be transacted. Thus, many States of
this Union who have an interest in Banks, are not suable even in their own
Courts; yet they never exempt the corporation from being sued.181

In dicta, Marshall laid down an identical rule for the federal government’s
corporate affairs:
The government of the Union held shares in the old Bank of the United States;
but the privileges of the government were not imparted by that circumstance
to the Bank . . . . The government . . . by becoming a corporator, lays down its
sovereignty, so far as respects the transactions of the corporation, and
exercises no power or privilege which is not derived from the charter.”182

Subsequent Supreme Court case law reaffirmed and expanded on this
notion, definitively establishing that a corporation does not enjoy the immunities
of state or federal government, even where the government is the corporation’s
sole owner.183
As jurisprudence and state practice developed, government itself became
directly accountable for its corporate activities. In the 1850s, Congress passed
178. JOYCE APPLEBY, CAPITALISM AND A NEW SOCIAL ORDER: THE REPUBLICAN VISION OF THE 1790S, at
22 (1984).
179. MANN, SOURCES OF SOCIAL POWER VOL. 2, supra note 10, at 156–57.
180. Bank of U.S. v. Planters’ Bank of Georgia, 22 U.S. 904 (1824).
181. Id. at 907.
182. Id. at 908.
183. See Keifer & Keifer v. Reconstruction Fin. Corp., 306 U.S. 381, 388 (1939) (holding that corporations
created by the federal government do not become entitled to its immunity simply because they do its work);
Briscoe v. Bank of Commonwealth of Ky., 36 U.S. 257, 325–26 (1837) (“[A] state, when it becomes a
stockholder in a bank, imparts none of its attributes of sovereignty to the institution; and . . . this is equally the
case, whether it own a whole or a part of the stock of the bank.”).
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legislation subjecting the federal government to suits enforcing contract
rights.184 During the early part of the twentieth century, Congress passed
additional legislation allowing the federal government to be sued in maritime
cases for contract and other claims.185
These legal developments had a very clear impact on courts limiting
foreign sovereign immunity for commercial activities in the early twentieth
century.186 In the Guj Djemal case, for example, the district court cited to
Planter’s Bank, in holding that a foreign-state owned ship engaged in commerce
was not entitled to immunity.187 In its decision to restrict foreign sovereign
immunity, the lower court in Pesaro also cited to Planter’s Bank as well as a
range of other cases in which federal and state government immunity was limited
in the commercial context.188
In the Beaton Park case, the district court referenced the U.S. government’s
lack of immunity for its commercial activities in denying foreign sovereign
immunity to a merchant ship owned, but not operated, by the Canadian
government and engaged in “ordinary commercial operation[s].”189 As the court
observed:
In this country our theory as to government in business is that when our
Government enters upon an ordinary commercial business undertaking, such
as operating merchant ships, it does so under the same liabilities and
responsibilities as private individuals when they engage in the same kind of
business; and Congress has given consent for the institution of legal actions
by those aggrieved for the enforcement of such liabilities of the
Government.190

Other cases withholding immunity from foreign state-owned corporations
made similar references to case law denying immunity to corporations owned
by or instrumentalities or agencies of federal or state governments.191
184. Court of Claims Act of 1855, 10 Stat. 612. Generally, the U.S. government is immune from suit unless
Congress expressly waives its immunity. U.S. v. Lee, 106 U.S. 196, 204–06 (1882). In the 1940s, Congress also
passed the Federal Tort Claims Act, allowing the U.S. government to be sued for torts committed by persons
acting on its behalf. Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1346.
185. Public Vessels Act, 46 U.S.C. § 31102; Suits in Admiralty Act, 46 U.S.C. § 30903.
186. As discussed in Part III.A, these considerations were also mentioned in the Tate Letter to justify
restricting foreign sovereign immunity. See infra note 192 and accompanying text.
187. The Gul Djemal, 296 F. 567, 569 (S.D.N.Y. 1922), aff’d, 264 U.S. 90 (1924).
188. See The Pesaro (Pesaro I), 277 F. 473, 476–78 (S.D.N.Y. 1921) (citing to various cases in which
sovereign immunity was abrogated, including a suit involving a bank owned by the state of Kentucky).
189. The Beaton Park, 65 F. Supp. 211, 212 (W.D. Wash. 1946). Although plaintiff had brought suit relating
to a maritime collision, rather than a commercial claim, the court in Beaton Park denied sovereign immunity
based, in part, on the ship’s commercial work at the time of the accident. Id. at 212–13.
190. Id. at 212. In the course of withholding foreign sovereign immunity from a Mexican-owned merchant
ship, the Supreme Court in The Republic of Mexico v. Hoffman also cited to several cases in which liens were
enforced against property owned but not in the actual possession or operation of the U.S. government. 324 U.S.
30, 37 (1945).
191. See, e.g., Hannes v. Kingdom of Roumania Monopolies Inst., 20 N.Y.S.2d 825, 834–35 (App. Div.
1940) (tentatively suggesting that foreign state-owned corporation should not receive immunity and citing to
various cases in which corporations that were agencies of the U.S. government were not given immunity); Ulen

614

HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL

Vol. 73:3

Though underappreciated, early twentieth century efforts to restrict the
immunity of foreign sovereigns for commercial acts were still fitful and
incomplete. As the second wave of modern globalization emerged after World
War II, those efforts began to crystallize into formal government policy. As
discussed in the next Part, the shift began with the State Department’s official
adoption of the restrictive theory of immunity and culminated in the passage of
the FSIA.
III. THE TATE LETTER AND PASSAGE OF THE FSIA
The Tate Letter marked the United States’ formal commitment to
restrictive immunity.192 Formal U.S. support for restrictive immunity came at an
important political and economic moment. Following World War II, the United
States had dedicated itself to fighting communism and furthering the second
modern wave of globalization, which was just beginning. Restricting immunity
for the commercial activities of foreign sovereigns comported with both those
goals. In particular, it helped support American interests in liberalizing and
expanding trade across borders by encouraging commerce between American
companies and state-owned enterprises, while still preserving market rules.
Returning to the Schooner Exchange view, a belief in the inherently “private”
nature of commercial activity re-emerged during this time.193 The Tate Letter
approach to foreign sovereign immunity was eventually codified in 1976 by the
FSIA,194 with substantial support from the American business community.
Part III.A demonstrates how the State Department conceptualized
restrictive immunity in commercial terms by examining the Tate Letter’s text. It
also explores how this focus aligned with the letter’s ideological and historical
backdrop. Part III.B turns to the FSIA’s passage, highlighting both
macroeconomic trends and the American business community’s important role
in advocating for the bill. In particular, it demonstrates how the FSIA’s drafters
supported that community’s interests by placing the commercial activity
exception front and center, as well as by generally structing the statute in ways
that facilitated, rather than disrupted, trade with foreign states.
v. Bank Gospodarstwa Krajowego (Nat’l Econ. Bank), 24 N.Y.S.2d 201, 204–06 (App. Div. 1940) (holding that
foreign state-owned corporation should not receive immunity citing to various cases in which corporations
owned by or instrumentalities of federal or state governments were not given immunity).
192. Alfred Dunhill of London, Inc. v. Republic of Cuba, 425 U.S. 682, 711–15 (1976) (full text of Tate
Letter).
193. The reemergence of the inherently “private” nature of commercial activity may partially reflect
America’s general abandonment of protectionist policies and commitment to free trade after World War II. The
U.S. government’s rejection of trade protectionism was not, however, wholly consistent throughout the second
half of the twentieth century, especially during the 1970s. See, e.g., IRWIN, supra note 106, at 547–48 (describing
the Nixon administration efforts to restrict importation of textiles from abroad). Nevertheless, the U.S.
government has generally remained committed to free trade, despite notable departures from that rule. See
generally Nancy Williams, Note, The Resilience of Protectionism in U.S. Trade Policy, 99 B.U. L. REV. 683
(2019) (arguing that protectionism never “completely left U.S. trade law and policy”).
194. See Republic of Argentina v. Weltover, Inc., 504 U.S. 607, 612 (1992) (noting that FSIA codified the
Tate Letter).
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A. THE TATE LETTER
In 1952, the State Department’s Acting Legal Advisor, Jack Tate, issued a
letter officially committing the United States to restrictive sovereign
immunity.195 As revealed by its text, while the Tate Letter broadly indicated that
the restrictive view would apply to a foreign sovereign’s “private” acts, it
specifically targeted foreign states’ commercial activities.196 This focus on
commercial activity also comported with broader U.S. interests in combatting
communism and promoting free trade.
Beginning with the text itself, the Tate Letter’s focus on commercial
activity is evident in several ways. First, its use of the phrase “restrictive
immunity” likely alluded to the term’s prevailing definition at the time—namely
to restrict immunity for a foreign state’s commercial activities.197 Second, the
letter highlighted the U.S. government’s own lack of immunity for suits in
contract,198 and long practice of refraining from invoking immunity for its
merchant vessels,199 as well as similar practices by other countries.200 Third, and
perhaps most tellingly, the Tate Letter stated that “the widespread and increasing
practice on the part of governments of engaging in commercial activities makes
necessary a practice which will enable persons doing business with them to have
their rights determined in the courts.”201 This is the only reference in the Tate
Letter to the kinds of cases that would be impacted by restrictive immunity.
Finally, while the Tate Letter did not explicitly reference communism, its
focus on the practices of communist and non-communist states further suggests
that restrictive immunity was synonymous with commercial activity. As the Tate
Letter noted, the “Soviet Union and its satellites” fully accepted the absolute
theory of immunity.202 By contrast the Tate Letter described other countries,
which were mostly non-communist,203 as adopting or moving towards a
restrictive approach.204 As others have observed, the Soviet Union’s adherence
to absolute immunity was predicated on “the notion that there are two
antagonistic economic systems in the modern world, and that the choice between
the restrictive and the absolute theories of sovereign immunity translate[d] into

195. Alfred Dunhill, 425 U.S. at 711–15 (full text of Tate Letter).
196. While the Tate Letter mentioned that the United States could be sued in tort, this was the only reference
to a possible non-commercial reason for adopting restrictive immunity and was dwarfed by the many commercial
justifications the letter gave for limiting foreign sovereign immunity. Alfred Dunhill, 425 U.S. at 714.
197. See Kindall, supra note 6, at 1850 n.6 (describing the historical definition of “restrictive immunity”).
198. Alfred Dunhill, 425 U.S. at 714.
199. Id.
200. Id. at 713.
201. Id. at 714.
202. Id.
203. Id. at 712–13. Amongst other countries, the letter mentioned that Romania had adopted restrictive
immunity. Id. at 713. What the letter does not mention, however, is that while Romania had adopted restrictive
immunity during the inter-war period (when it was not a communist country) it reverted to absolute immunity
after World War II when it became a Soviet satellite state. Verdier & Voeten, supra note 104, at 214 n.8.
204. Alfred Dunhill, 425 U.S. at 712–14.
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a choice between the free-market and the centrally-controlled economic
systems.”205 While the Tate Letter did not reference these different economic
systems, its comparison of communist and noncommunist state practice suggests
the letter’s drafters viewed the choice between immunity regimes as driven by
commercial concerns.206
This focus on commercial activity comported with the Tate Letter’s
ideological and historical backdrop. First and foremost, restricting immunity for
foreign states’ commercial activities aligned with the U.S. government’s
ideological battle against communism.207 As the Tate Letter itself notes, the
commitment to absolute immunity amongst communist countries208 was “most
persuasive” that the United States should “change its policy” and adopt the
restrictive view.209 While the letter does not elaborate on this statement,
restricting foreign sovereign immunity for commercial activities—more than
any other kind of restriction on immunity—would directly threaten the
communist view of economic ordering.210
Second, adopting restrictive immunity for commercial activities aligned
with American interests in promoting free trade, including with foreign stateowned enterprises. By the time World War II was over, the United States had
dedicated itself to creating a multilateral free trading system that would ensure
the expansion of international trade and eliminate barriers to it211—a situation
that was viewed as benefiting American corporations.212 As suggested by the
U.S. government’s bilateral treaties of friendship, commerce, and navigation
(FCNs) with other countries, restrictive immunity would help eliminate trade
barriers that were anathema to this global trading system. Right after World War
II and before the Tate Letter, the U.S. government started to include provisions
restricting the immunity of state-owned commercial entities in these FCN
treaties in order to encourage trade with these states.213 A broad government
205. Christopher Osakwe, A Soviet Perspective on Foreign Sovereign Immunity: Law and Practice, 23 VA.
J. INT’L L. 13, 13–14 (1982).
206. See Alfred Dunhill, 425 U.S. at 712–14.
207. See IRWIN, supra note 106, at 495 (noting that one of the U.S. government’s main foreign policy
concerns after World War II was to contain the spread of “Soviet Communism”). This impulse was reflected in
contemporaneous scholarly writing which argued that responding to communism’s expansion required
restricting state immunity. See, e.g., Sovereign Immunity for Commercial Instrumentalities of Foreign
Governments, supra note 170, at 177 (“In an era of increasing socialism abroad, re-examination of the present
policy of the United States toward granting [foreign sovereign] immunity may be in order.”).
208. This portion of the letter refers to these countries as “state trading countries.” Alfred Dunhill, 425 U.S.
at 714.
209. Id.
210. Osakwe, supra note 205, at 21–22. While communist and noncommunist states were generally divided
on the issue of restrictive immunity, communist states eventually became more flexible in their approach to
foreign sovereign immunity in order to do business in non-communist countries. See infra note 237 and
accompanying text.
211. IRWIN, supra note 106, at 460–63, 471–72.
212. MANN, SOURCES OF SOCIAL POWER VOL. 4, supra note 50, at 24–25.
213. SUCHARITKUL, supra note 21, at 196–97. Specifically, after World War II, the U.S. government’s FCN
treaties regularly included a waiver of sovereign immunity for commercial enterprises owned or controlled by
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commitment to lifting immunity for all foreign states engaged in commercial
activities would not only support this practice, but also remove a potential trade
barrier between American businesses and foreign state-owned commercial
entities more broadly.
Finally, for the United States, restrictive immunity was also a practical
necessity in a globalized trading system in which communist state-owned
companies were important players. Even though the U.S. commitment to free
trade was connected to its fight against communism,214 the United States
understood that trade with communist state-owned enterprises could not be
avoided. As one scholar described the situation, while the United States had once
prohibited Soviet trade delegations from coming to the country,215 this was no
longer feasible given “the possibility, even the probability, that state trading will
either continue on the present scale or increase.”216 It was imperative, therefore,
for the United States to embrace “[a] new theory of ‘no immunity,’ logically
based on a recognition of a radical change in conditions” triggered by
“communism and state socialism as practical realities.”217
In theory, the State Department’s decision to officially embrace restrictive
immunity amounted to a sea change in judicial decisions on foreign sovereign
immunity for commercial activities. In reality, however, the results were mixed.
In some cases, the department’s immunity decisions gave more weight to
political rather than economic and legal concerns.218 In other cases, where the
State Department did not weigh in, courts made immunity decisions based on
“outdated” understandings of departmental practices.219 In some cases, judges
even granted immunity where the State Department had suggested otherwise.220
As a result of this unpredictability and inconsistency, commentators soon began
calling for a more reliable approach to immunity determinations.221 These calls
culminated in the creation of the FSIA, which codified restrictive immunity and
placed all immunity decisions squarely with the courts.222

foreign governments. John F. Coyle, The Treaty of Friendship, Commerce, and Navigation in the Modern Era,
51 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 302, 315 (2013).
214. IRWIN, supra note 106, at 495.
215. Fensterwald, Jr., supra note 39, at 634–35.
216. Id. at 635, 640.
217. Id. at 635, 641.
218. Sigmund Timberg, Sovereign Immunity and Act of State Defenses: Transnational Boycotts and
Economic Coercion, 55 TEX. L. REV. 1, 11 (1976).
219. Fredric Alan Weber, The Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976, Its Origins, Meaning, and Effect,
3 YALE STUD. WORLD PUB. ORD. 1, 10 (1976).
220. Id. at 12.
221. See, e.g., Monroe Leigh, Sovereign Immunity—the Case of the ‘Imias’, 68 AM. J. INT’L L. 280 (1974)
(criticizing post-Tate Letter practices and urging action on then-stalled foreign sovereign immunity legislation).
222. Jurisdiction of U.S. Courts in Suits Against Foreign States: Hearings on H.R. 11315 before the
Subcomm. On Admin. L. & Gov’t Rels. Of the H. Comm. On the Judiciary, 94th Cong. 25 (1976) (statement of
Monroe Leigh, Legal Adviser, U.S. Dep’t of State, accompanied by Michael Sandler, Legal Adviser’s Off., State
Dep’t) [hereinafter Leigh Testimony].
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B. PASSAGE OF THE FSIA
The FSIA went into effect on January 19, 1977.223 At its heart were the
same abiding concerns with trade and commerce—particularly with the
continuing rise of state trading companies and desire to facilitate and protect
trade with those entities—that had long aligned with the push toward restrictive
immunity during this period of state involvement in commercial activities.
While the FSIA’s legislative history variously describes the statute’s
purpose as “depoliticizing the area of sovereign immunity”224 and “minimiz[ing]
irritations in foreign relations arising out of . . . litigation [against foreign
states],”225 it is dominated by references to the FSIA’s important commercial
character and benefits to trade. Indeed, while the FSIA bill included several
exceptions to sovereign immunity,226 the main focus of and impetus for the bill
was the commercial activity exception.227 As one government official noted
during Congressional hearings on the FSIA, the statute’s approach to sovereign
immunity was necessary “because it is manifest now that the adjudication of a
commercial claim against a foreign state on the merits does not affront the
sovereignty of a foreign nation.”228
The FSIA’s focus on free trade can also be seen in other testimony about
the statute’s benefits to private enterprise, including lobbying by U.S. business
interests, as well as efforts by its drafters to ensure the FSIA would not impede
free trade with foreign sovereigns.
To begin with testimony on the bill, during Congressional hearings,
representatives from the State Department, which had been primarily

223. See Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94–583, 90 Stat. 2891 (Oct. 21, 1976)
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 28 U.S.C.) (noting FSIA would go into effect ninety days after date
of enactment).
224. Jurisdiction of U.S. Courts in Suits Against Foreign States: Hearing on H.R. 11315 before the H.
Comm. On the Judiciary, 94th Cong. 31 (1976) (statement of Bruno Ristau, Chief, Foreign Litig. Section, Civ.
Div., U.S. Dep’t of Just.) [hereinafter Ristau Testimony].
225. Leigh Testimony, supra note 222, at 29.
226. As originally passed, the FSIA created exceptions to immunity in the following circumstances: (1) for
certain types of cases involving the commercial activity of foreign sovereigns; (2) in cases of express or implied
waiver of immunity by the foreign state; (3) in cases involving a foreign sovereign’s expropriation of property
in violation of international law; (4) in cases involving rights in property in the United States acquired by
succession or gift or immovable property in the United States; (5) in cases involving noncommercial torts
committed in the United States by foreign sovereigns; and (6) in cases involving enforcement of maritime liens,
based on a foreign state’s commercial activities, against a vessel or cargo of the foreign state. Foreign Sovereign
Immunities Act. In subsequent years, the FSIA was amended to create immunity exceptions for: (1) enforcement
of agreements to arbitrate or arbitral awards against foreign sovereigns, under certain enumerated circumstances;
(2) in cases involving foreclosure of a preferred mortgage as defined under the statute; (3) in certain cases
involving expropriated art work; (4) in cases involving acts of international terrorism committed by designated
state sponsors of terrorism; and (5) in cases involving international terrorist attacks on U.S. soil caused by the
tortious acts of a foreign state or its officials taken in their official capacity. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1605(a)(6), (d), (h)(2);
id. § 1605A; id. § 1605B.
227. See infra note 261 and accompanying text for definition of the commercial activity exception.
228. Ristau Testimony, supra note 224, at 30.
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responsible—along with the Justice Department—for crafting the legislation,229
emphasized the FSIA’s upside for trade and commerce:
[F]rom the standpoint of the private citizen, the current [Tate Letter] system
generates considerable commercial uncertainty . . . . [W]hen the foreign state
enters the marketplace or when it acts as a private party, there is no
justification in modern international law for allowing the foreign state to avoid
the economic costs of the agreements which it may breach . . . . The law
should not permit the foreign state to shift these everyday burdens of the
marketplace onto the shoulders of private parties . . . . [I]n this modern world
of transnational commerce where foreign state enterprises are everyday
participants, this is a bill whose time has come.230

A representative from the Justice Department similarly emphasized the
bill’s commercial purpose and benefits to those doing business with state-owned
enterprises:
The restrictive theory rests, at bottom, upon consideration that the widespread
practices on the part of governments engaging in commercial activities makes
necessary a practice which will enable persons doing business with them to
have their rights determined in the courts. That consideration is even more
forceful today than it was two decades ago, for the intervening years have seen
a sharp increase in the volume of trade between American businesses and
foreign states or their instrumentalities, acting in a commercial
capacity . . . . In sum, private parties with claims against foreign states arising
out of their commercial or private-law activities should not be denied their day
in court . . . .231

Various corporate interest groups lobbied on behalf of the bill, which they
understood as promoting the interests of U.S. business. At one Congressional
hearing, a representative from one of these corporate interest groups noted that
“enactment of [the FSIA] would . . . benefit the American business community
as a whole . . . [and] constitute a significant step in placing private parties on the
basis of nearer equality with governmental entities before the law in commercial
disputes.”232 Representatives from another interest group described the bill as
similarly critical for commercial reasons: “From our perspective, this bill is
important because of the increasing tendency of governments abroad to conduct
foreign business through state trading organizations, state-owned corporations,
or directly through government ministries.”233

229. H.R. REP. NO. 94-1487, at 9 (1976).
230. Leigh Testimony, supra note 222, at 27, 29.
231. Ristau Testimony, supra note 224, at 30–31.
232. Jurisdiction of U.S. Courts in Suits Against Foreign States: Hearing on H.R. 11315 before the H.
Comm. On the Judiciary, 94th Cong. 80 (1976) (statement of Cecil J. Olmstead, Chairman, the Rule of L.
Comm., and Vice President, the Texaco Co., accompanied by Timothy Atkeson Couns.).
233. Jurisdiction of U.S. Courts in Suits Against Foreign States: Hearing on H.R. 11315 before the H.
Comm. On the Judiciary, 94th Cong. 71 (1976) (letter from Timothy W. Stanley, President of the Int’l Econ.
Pol’y Ass’n, to the Hon. Walter Flowers).
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Reinforcing the bill’s value to American business interests, members of the
private bar celebrated the FSIA bill for providing private parties with a more
reliable means of protecting their commercial interests as compared with the old
Tate Letter approach. One private attorney, who testified in favor of the FSIA,
lambasted the State Department for disproportionately favoring foreign
sovereigns in commercial disputes with private parties post-Tate Letter.234 In
this attorney’s view, since the FSIA would eliminate the State Department’s
influential role in sovereign immunity determinations, it would better protect
private parties engaged in commerce with foreign sovereigns.235
In addition to statements about the FSIA’s benefits to free trade and
commerce, the statute’s legislative history demonstrates sensitivity to how the
FSIA’s restrictive immunity regime might impact U.S. business with foreign
states. In addressing this issue, representatives from the State Department argued
that restrictive immunity would not disrupt trade with non-communist countries
because many of those countries were increasingly adopting the restrictive
approach.236 With respect to communist states, the State Department similarly
argued that, even though those countries were committed to absolute immunity,
the switch would “do nothing to exacerbate the very minor difference we
occasionally have with the state trading companies of the socialist
governments.”237
Indeed, Congress otherwise structured the FSIA bill in ways that
facilitated, rather than disrupted, American business with foreign sovereigns.238
For example, the bill included a requirement that commercial activity cases have
a substantial connection to the United States—a requirement that was likely
included “to anticipate the fears of the [American] business community in
general that the United States would otherwise become an international

234. Jurisdiction of U.S. Courts in Suits Against Foreign States: Hearing on H.R. 11315 before the H.
Comm. On the Judiciary, 94th Cong. 59–60 (1976) (statement of Peter D. Trooboff, Att’y, Covington and
Burling, Wash., D.C., and Co Chairman, Comm. On Transnat’l Jud. Proc., Am. Bar Ass’n, Int’l L. Section)
[hereinafter Trooboff Testimony].
235. Id. at 60.
236. Leigh Testimony, supra note 222, at 56.
237. Id. Even though many communist countries remained officially committed to absolute immunity until
the end of the Cold War, the need to engage in business transactions with capitalist states tempered their
expectations about receiving absolute immunity in those countries; indeed, on some occasions, communist
countries even agreed to waive their sovereign immunity in treaties with other states. Verdier & Voeten, supra
note 104, at 215.
238. As mentioned earlier, the FSIA extends immunity, under certain circumstances, to the agencies and
instrumentalities of foreign sovereigns. See 28 U.S.C. § 1603 (a)–(b). This provision could be understood to
undermine, rather than protect, American business interests since it makes it possible for separately incorporated
foreign state-owned corporations to be immune from suit. In fact, some countries do not extend sovereign
immunity to separately incorporated foreign state-owned corporations. Keitner, supra note 102, at 246–47. But,
as Part IV makes clear, furthering American business interests does not mean subjecting foreign state-owned
corporations to suit in all situations. Indeed, extending immunity to certain agencies and instrumentalities may
be understood, at times, as protecting American corporate interests by ensuring that foreign state-owned
companies are not dissuaded from doing business in the United States because the country has become an
“international collection agency.” See infra notes 239–45 and accompanying text.
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collection agency, to the injury of its trade with foreign states.”239 The
legislation’s treatment of execution and pre-judgment attachment of foreign
sovereign assets was similarly understood to promote, rather than disrupt, trade
and commerce. Under the proposed bill, plaintiffs could execute judgments
against a state’s commercial property related to the commercial activity under
dispute, but could not touch unrelated commercial property240—a provision
understood to promote “investment by foreign states in American capital
markets.”241 As for pre-judgment attachment of a foreign state’s commercial
assets, it was prohibited by the bill242—another provision meant to placate the
interests of a domestic business community concerned foreign states might
otherwise refrain from investing in American markets.243 Finally, the FSIA bill
immunized the assets of foreign central banks “held for [their] own account”
from attachment or execution absent an express waiver244—a protection
intended, yet again, to avoid discouraging foreign investment in the United
States.245
As described so far, the commercial activity exception has long been
central to the development of foreign sovereign immunity doctrine in ways that
comport with and support certain capitalist interests. Concerns relating to
capitalism would continue to be reflected in the FSIA’s development over the
coming decades, as explored in the next part.
IV. CAPITALISM & THE FSIA’S COMMERCIAL ACTIVITY EXCEPTION
Since the statute’s enactment, capitalism’s alignment with the FSIA has
been most clearly evident in judicial approaches to the commercial activity
exception.246 Over the last forty-five years, courts have rounded out the contours
239. Weber, supra note 219, at 42–43. This provision was understood to adversely impact the interests of
“alien traders,” who wanted to sue foreign sovereigns in U.S. courts, and to have less of a negative effect on
American corporations. Id.
240. Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976 § 4(a), 28 U.S.C. § 1610. In contrast to property owned by
the state itself, the FSIA bill generally gave less protection to the assets of a state’s agencies or instrumentalities
engaged in commercial activities in the United States. Id.
241. Weber, supra note 219, at 43.
242. 28 U.S.C. § 1610.
243. Weber, supra note 219, at 42–44.
244. Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976 § 4(a), 28 U.S.C. § 1611. This immunity applies regardless
of whether the central bank is independent from the foreign state. NML Capital, Ltd. V. Banco Central de la
Republica Argentina, 652 F.3d 172, 188–90 (2d Cir. 2011). But see Iran Threat Reduction and Syria Human
Rights Act 2012 § 502, 22 U.S.C. § 8772(a) (creating an exception to the FSIA’s central bank execution rules
that allows Iran’s central bank assets to be executed on or attached in specific terrorism-related cases subject to
particular judicial findings, even if there is no express waiver of attachment by Iran or the bank).
245. Ingrid Wuerth, Immunity from Execution of Central Bank Assets, in THE CAMBRIDGE HANDBOOK OF
IMMUNITIES AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 266, 266 (Tom Ruys, Nicolas Angelet & Luca Ferro eds., 2019).
246. While beyond the scope of this Article, other exceptions included in (or absent from) the FSIA may
have been prompted, at least in part, by capitalist concerns. For example, while the original FSIA bill created an
exception to immunity for expropriated property taken “in violation of international law” it did not address
violations of civil or human rights enshrined under international law. Weber, supra note 219, at 46. Indeed, there
is still no immunity exception in the FSIA for claims relating to human or civil rights. As some have noted, the
“[most] likely explanation [for this] . . . is that only deprivations of property rights [are] important enough to
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of the exception, in some cases reinforcing and in others expanding upon
Congress’s wishes. In some cases, these interpretations (whether intentionally
or not) have bolstered trends endemic to capitalism’s neoliberal period.
This period of capitalist development began to take root in the late 1970s
but only fully emerged with the end of the Cold War.247 It was triggered by
various events that occurred in the early 1970s, including the plunging value of
the U.S. dollar, rising inflation, a precipitous rise in oil prices, increasing
unemployment, and decreasing rates of foreign trade.248 Together these and
other factors led to criticism of state intervention in the market and calls to return
to more laissez-faire-like approaches to capitalist economics.249
The neoliberal period that has since been ushered in has featured increasing
commodification of goods and services,250 deregulation of capital and labor
markets,251 and the predominance of finance as the main driver of the U.S.
economy.252 It has also featured substantial economic inequality, as manifested
by a small wealthy elite,253 increasing corporate profits world-wide,254 and
weaker rights for workers.255 As this Part explores, judicial approaches to the
commercial activity exception have comported with a number of these trends.
According to the commercial activity exception:
A foreign state shall not be immune from the jurisdiction of courts of the
United States or of the States in any case . . . .
(2) in which the action is based upon a commercial activity carried on in the
United States by the foreign state; or upon an act performed in the United
States in connection with a commercial activity of the foreign state elsewhere;
or upon an act outside the territory of the United States in connection with a

American policy makers and the American business community to warrant the strain such a suit would create in
our relations with the defendant state.” Id. More recently, the Supreme Court reaffirmed this view, and held that
the expropriation exception is limited to violations of the property rights of aliens and does not extend to
violations of international human rights law. See Federal Republic of Germany v. Philipp, 141 S. Ct. 703, 712
(2021) (holding that “the expropriation exception is best read as referencing the international law of
expropriation rather than of human rights”). In reaching this decision, the Court noted that the expropriation
exception reflects the U.S. government’s desire “to protect the property of its citizens abroad as part of a defense
of America’s free enterprise system” rather than an “all-purpose jurisdictional hook for adjudicating human
rights violations.” Id. at 713.
247. See supra note 48, and accompanying text; COATES, supra note 22, at 29–30.
248. JOYCE APPLEBY, THE RELENTLESS REVOLUTION: A HISTORY OF CAPITALISM 576–77, 587 (2010).
249. Id. at 587–91.
250. See supra note 49 and accompanying text; COATES, supra note 22, at 20 (defining commodification).
251. See MANN, SOURCES OF SOCIAL POWER VOL. 4, supra note 50, at 131.
252. See SAAD-FILHO, supra note 47, at 302–03; HARVEY, supra note 51, at 194. The type of finance that
has dominated U.S. and global markets since the 1970s is primarily driven by speculative, short-term
investments in things like stocks and debt instruments rather than in trade and manufacturing. See NOAM
CHOMSKY, PROFIT OVER PEOPLE: NEOLIBERALISM AND GLOBAL ORDER 23 (1998) (noting that, in 1971, “90
percent of international financial transactions were related to the real economy—trade or long-term investment”
while “by 1995 about 95 percent of the vastly greater sums were speculative”).
253. See PIKETTY, supra note 53, at 15, 43, 249; Horowitz et al., supra note 54.
254. See SAAD-FILHO, supra note 47, at 305–06; Dobbs et al., supra note 55, at 48.
255. See Flaherty, supra note 52, at 96–97.
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commercial activity of the foreign state elsewhere and that act causes a direct
effect in the United States.256

Applying a political economy lens, this Part examines how neoliberalism
has aligned with judicial approaches to two of the most important issues raised
by the commercial activity exception: the definition of commercial activity itself
and the requirement that the commercial activity have a territorial connection to
the United States.
Overall, judicial approaches to these issues have, at times, promoted
commodification, and demonstrated a particular tendency to protect the global
financial industry, headquartered in New York.257 They have facilitated
deregulation by privileging continued trade and commerce between U.S.
business and foreign sovereigns over other interests that tend to favor the rights
of individuals, especially consumers and workers. Judicial approaches to the
commercial activity exception also have affinities with the economic inequality
characteristic of the neoliberal age, by providing greater opportunities for
corporate, rather than individual, plaintiffs to recoup financial losses. In these
ways, judicial interpretations of the commercial activity exception have, in some
cases, helped reinforce an important overall trend in neoliberal capitalism: the
“system[ic] favour[ing] [of] large capital at the expense of small capital and the
workers.”258
This Part unpacks these various claims. Part IV.A demonstrates how the
Supreme Court’s expansive definition of commercial activity in Republic of
Argentina v. Weltover has facilitated the commodification of a vast array of
activities.259 It shows how this commodification has particularly benefitted
plaintiffs with claims aligned with the interests of the global financial industry.
At the same time, Part IV.A shows how, despite its breadth, Weltover’s
definition of commercial activity has excluded certain interests—particularly
human rights claims—even when those claims arguably satisfy the Weltover test
for commercial activity. Part IV.A demonstrates how this exclusion furthers
neoliberalism by protecting against regulatory interventions that may threaten
corporate interests, while also comporting with the FSIA’s tendency to protect
trade and other commercial transactions with foreign states.
Part IV.B demonstrates how judicial approaches to the territorial nexus
requirement have similarly promoted deregulatory objectives, while also
256. 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(2).
257. See Saskia Sassen, Global Financial Centers, 78 FOREIGN AFFS. 75, 75 (1999) (describing New York,
as well as London, as the foremost centers of global finance). While other cities, like Singapore and Hong Kong,
have emerged in recent years as important financial centers, New York continues to dominate the world of global
finance. Huw Jones, New York, London Keep Top Spots in Global Financial Centres Index, REUTERS (Sept. 24,
2021, 1:04 AM), https://www.reuters.com/business/finance/new-york-london-keep-top-spots-global-financialcentres-index-2021-09-24.
258. SAAD-FILHO, supra note 47, at 216.
259. While many often use the terms commodification and commercialization interchangeably,
commodification is different from commercialization, which exists in both capitalist and non-capitalist systems
and simply denotes the act of exchange or trade. WOOD, supra note 87, at 76.
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favoring corporate, over individual, plaintiffs. Specifically, Part IV.B shows
how some defendant-friendly interpretations of the territorial nexus requirement
have been developed in the context of commercial activity cases raising personal
injury, human rights, or employment claims, while more plaintiff-friendly
approaches have emerged in cases that further the interests of global finance.
This trend further undermines workers’ rights and generally helps facilitate
deregulation, while promoting trade and commerce with foreign sovereigns. In
addition, Part IV.B demonstrates how, in certain jurisdictions, the territorial
nexus requirement has aligned with neoliberalism’s economic inequality and
wealth gap by giving more protections to corporations and other business
organizations suffering pure financial losses in the United States, as compared
to individual plaintiffs in the United States suffering the same kind of loss.
Finally, Part IV.C describes how the commercial activity exception’s
territorial nexus requirement is more often triggered in cases involving
contractual rights—which are central to the orderly running of a capitalist
economic system—and less likely to be triggered in other kinds of commercial
cases, including those involving business torts. As with Part IV.B, this Subpart
demonstrates how these circumstances benefit corporate, over individual,
plaintiffs in ways that reinforce economic inequality.
The analysis conducted in this Part is based on a qualitative review of
hundreds of judicial opinions from the FSIA’s inception until early 2021. In
particular, it homes in on major developments in judicial approaches to the
commercial activity exception, which are often reflected in Supreme Court
decisions. The argument presented in this Part is not that courts have been
explicitly or even implicitly guided by the concerns of neoliberalism or that
those concerns explain all judicial decision-making under the commercial
activity exception. Instead, the more modest argument is that a noticeable and
underexplored trend in judicial approaches to the exception is that certain
capitalist concerns and corporate plaintiffs have, at times, benefitted over
individuals and interests that do not promote the ends of neoliberal capitalism.260
This is especially true for individual plaintiffs bringing claims for human rights,
260. While beyond the scope of this Article, it may be fruitful to apply a political economy lens to other
exceptions to FSIA immunity. In particular, a political economy approach to the FSIA’s terrorism-related
exceptions, under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1605A and 1605B, would be useful in unpacking the political forces behind
those exceptions, including lobbying efforts by the plaintiffs’ bar and other groups, as well as the impact, if any,
those exceptions (and the laws related to them) have had on corporate and financial interests in the United States.
For example, Section 1605B was added to the FSIA via the Justice Against Sponsors of Terrorism Act. Pub. L.
No. 114-222, 130 Stat. 852 (2016). [hereinafter “JASTA”]. This exception to immunity, which primarily targets
Saudi Arabia, was passed as a result of lobbying by families of 9/11 victims who had previously sought but
failed to sue Saudi Arabia for the attack because the Saudi government was protected by foreign sovereign
immunity. Chris Mondics, If 9/11 Plaintiffs Prevail, Saudis Could Face Up to $100 Billion in Damages, THE
PHILA. INQUIRER, (Sept. 25, 2016), https://www.inquirer.com/philly/business/law/20160926_If_9_11_
plaintiffs_prevail__Saudis_could_face_up_to__100_billion_in_damages.html; see also Iran Threat Reduction
and Syria Human Rights Act 2012 § 502, 22 U.S.C. § 8772(a) (subjecting central bank assets of Iran—a country
with which the United States has little to no economic and financial relationship—to attachment in specific
terrorism-related cases).
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personal injury, or employment, even where those claims are arguably connected
to the commercial acts of foreign sovereigns.
A. DEFINING COMMERCIAL ACTIVITY: ALTERNATIVELY BOOSTING &
RESTRICTING COMMODIFICATION
The FSIA provides a broad definition of commercial activity. As reflected
in the statute:
(d) A “commercial activity” means either a regular course of commercial
conduct or a particular commercial transaction or act. The commercial
character of an activity shall be determined by reference to the nature of the
course of conduct or particular transaction or act, rather than by reference to
its purpose.261

Providing little in the way of other guidance, the FSIA’s drafters gave the
courts significant latitude to parse the nuances of the definition.262 As this
Subpart explores, courts soon began to disagree over the proper interpretation of
“commercial activity,” especially when it came to the nature/purpose issue.
Some courts took the position that only the nature of the activity could be
considered, though they sometimes disagreed about how “nature” should be
defined. Other courts suggested the “purpose” of the activity could also be part
of the analysis.
In Republic of Argentina v. Weltover, the Supreme Court weighed in on
these debates and issued three key holdings.263 First, it held that only the nature
of the act could be considered in defining commercial activity.264 Second, it held
that an activity was commercial in “nature” as long as it was something a private
person could do.265 Third, it held that commercial activity did not require a
profit-motive.266
As this Subpart argues, these holdings did more than just provide an
interpretation of the FSIA’s text and legislative history; they generated a
definition of commercial activity that was as expansive as the statute would
allow. In doing so, Weltover effectively ended judicial efforts, however
unconscious or implicit, to take a more modest approach to defining
commerciality. As this Subpart reveals, this outcome supported the goals of
neoliberalism by ensuring that a vast array of activities would be commodified,
including those that U.S. judicial practice had once treated as sovereign in
nature. This result has been particularly favorable to plaintiffs with claims

261. 28 U.S.C. § 1603(d).
262. H.R. REP. NO. 1487, at 16 (1976); see Republic of Argentina v. Weltover, Inc., 504 U.S. 607, 612
(1992) (noting that the FSIA’s commercial activity exception leaves the critical term “commercial” largely
undefined).
263. Weltover, 504 U.S. at 607.
264. Id. at 614.
265. Id.
266. Id.
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relating to the global financial industry, especially those having to do with the
public debts of foreign sovereigns.
Part IV.A ends by examining the Supreme Court’s inconsistent
commitment to the Weltover test for certain types of claims. As demonstrated by
its decision in Saudi Arabia v. Nelson,267 the Court has taken a muddled
approach to the Weltover test in response to human rights-based claims, even
where those claims arguably satisfy Weltover’s definition of commercial
activity. This discrepancy, between the Weltover and Nelson approaches to
commercial activity, further aligns with neoliberalism by protecting against
regulatory interventions that may threaten corporate interests.268 In particular, it
protects corporate transactions with foreign sovereigns by ensuring the United
States does not become the sort of “international collection agency”269 that might
threaten continued U.S. business with foreign governments—a goal of the FSIA
itself that aligns with neoliberal capitalism’s privileging of “profit over
people.”270
1. Republic of Argentina v. Weltover
As the FSIA’s legislative history makes clear, the commercial activity
exception is intended to cover a “broad spectrum” of activity.271 Nevertheless,
the statute and its legislative history left various questions unanswered.
Critically, while the text of the commercial activity exception indicates that
commercial activity should be defined in terms of its “nature,” rather than
“purpose,” the legislative history seems to combine the two. For example, it
implies that not-for-profit activity could be considered commercial in nature,272
while also stating that a profit-making purpose could render an activity
presumptively commercial273—a confusing pair of statements, if nature is truly
all that matters.
Because of this sparse and somewhat contradictory guidance,274 courts took
different approaches to determining whether foreign sovereign activity was
267. Saudi Arabia v. Nelson, 507 U.S. 349, 350 (1993).
268. As with judicial approaches to the territorial nexus requirement, differing approaches to the definition
of commercial activity in Weltover and Nelson suggest that individual plaintiffs, who are more likely to bring
human rights-based claims, will have a harder time satisfying the test for commercial activity as compared to
corporate plaintiffs, who are more likely to bring claims implicating the interests of the global financial industry.
269. See Weber, supra note 219, at 42–43; see also supra note 239 and accompanying text.
270. See CHOMSKY, supra note 252, at 36 (noting that the present neoliberal order places “profit over
people”).
271. H.R. REP. NO. 94-1487, at 16 (1976). Notably, the FSIA approach to defining commercial activity
departs from earlier proposals for a foreign sovereign immunity statute that took a narrower view of commercial
activity. See Andreas F. Lowenfeld, Claims Against Foreign States – A Proposal for Reform of United States
Law, 44 N.Y.U. L. REV. 901, 937 (1969) (proposed foreign sovereign immunity statute that would have allowed
suit for “express or implied contract[s] entered into, to be performed, or arising out of transactions in the United
States” but no other kinds of commercial claims).
272. H.R. REP. NO. 94-1487, at 16 (1976).
273. Id.; YANG, supra note 3, at 87.
274. Donoghue, supra note 12, at 517.
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commercial in the early days of the FSIA. Some courts embraced an exclusively
nature-based test. Many of these courts took the additional step of defining
commerciality as those actions a private person could undertake275 —something
that was loosely suggested by the legislative history.276 Other courts that adopted
an exclusively nature-based test took a different route and focused more on
whether the activity was inherently sovereign.277
Still other courts questioned the nature/purpose distinction all together. For
example, in De Sanchez v. Banco Central de Nicaragua, the Fifth Circuit held
that the commercial activity exception did not bar the court from “considering
the purposes of different types of activities.”278 In De Sanchez, plaintiff
attempted to cash a check denominated in U.S. dollars and issued by Banco
Central before a revolution toppled the president.279 Plaintiff, whose husband
had been the Minister of Defense under the toppled leader, was unable to cash
the check after the new government placed a stop-payment order on it.280 In
holding that defendant’s issuance of the check was a sovereign act, the court
conceded that it took into consideration the purpose of the activity, namely, to
regulate the sale of foreign currency.281 In doing so, the court insisted, that “an
absolute separation is [not] always possible between the ontology and teleology
of an act . . . [as] the essence of an act is [often] defined by its purpose.”282
The Supreme Court’s decision in Weltover reinforced the “nature” test’s
dominance and rejected the purpose test in all circumstances. In Weltover, the
Supreme Court considered whether Argentina and its state-owned bank, which
had issued bonds as public debt and then failed to honor them on their maturity
date, had engaged in commercial activity.283 In concluding that defendants’ acts
were commercial ones, the Court held that the bonds in question were “garden
variety debt instruments,” and, therefore, commercial in nature.284 In
emphasizing that it was only the “nature” of the activity that should be
275. Some courts questioned the logic of this “private person” test, implicitly raising concerns about how
the test exclusively embraced capitalist economic notions. See, e.g., Matter of Sedeco Inc., 543 F. Supp. 561,
565–66 (S.D. Tex. 1982), vacated on other grounds by Complaint of Sedeco, Inc., 610 F. Supp. 306 (S.D. Tex.
1984) (noting that to conclude that “every act done by a foreign state which could be done by a private citizen
in the United States” is commercial activity is unrealistic and denies “the existence of other types of governments
and economic systems”).
276. Donoghue, supra note 12, at 500. While the FSIA’s legislative history does not expressly say that
commercial activity is defined in terms of what “private persons” can do, it does state that a contract that is “of
the same character as a contract which might be made by a private person” satisfies the definition. H.R. REP.
NO. 1487, at 16 (1976).
277. Donoghue, supra note 12, at 512–13. Some courts combined a sovereignty and private-person test. Id.
278. De Sanchez v. Banco Central de Nicaragua, 770 F.2d 1385, 1393 (5th Cir. 1985).
279. Id. at 1387.
280. Id.
281. Id. at 1393.
282. Id.
283. Republic of Argentina v. Weltover, Inc., 504 U.S. 612, 609–10, 617. As discussed in Part IV.B.2,
Argentina unilaterally rescheduled the payment dates on the bonds, which were denominated in U.S. dollars and
were supposed to be paid to plaintiffs in New York.
284. Id. at 615.
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considered, the Court held that what mattered was not “whether the foreign
government is acting with a profit motive or instead with the aim of fulfilling
uniquely sovereign objectives.”285 Rather, what was important was that the
“particular actions that the foreign state performs . . . are the type of actions by
which a private party engages in ‘trade and traffic or commerce[.]’”286
In holding that commercial activity is the kind of activity a private party
engages in and does not require a profit-motive, Weltover was not inconsistent
with the FSIA’s language or legislative history. It did, however, double-down
on a particularly expansive reading of the FSIA’s definition of commercial
activity287 and ensure it would be determinative in most cases.288
For various reasons, this outcome favors interests aligned with
neoliberalism, especially with regards to commodification and the global
financial industry.289 First, Weltover generally facilitates commodification,
which is central to capitalist commercial transactions290 and particularly
important to neoliberal capitalism.291 Commodities are “goods and services
produced for sale, rather than consumption by their own producers,” and have
both use value as well as exchange value—what this means is that commodities
are both socially valuable and can be exchanged for other commodities, like
money.292
In theory, anything can be made into a commodity, as “[v]alue . . . is never
an inherent property of objects, but is a judgment made about them by
subjects.”293 By embracing a private person test that eschews a profit-motive,
Weltover helps make this theoretical possibility an actual reality.294 This is
because the test favors commodification of any foreign sovereign activity that
may be analogous to an activity a private person might pursue in the market—
even if the actual activity in question has no inherent exchange value and/or

285. Id. at 614 (emphasis added).
286. Id. (quotations omitted) (citation omitted).
287. See YANG, supra note 3, at 91 (arguing that post-Weltover, the definition of commercial activity leaves
“precious little that is done by a State, short of an all-out war, outside the scope” of the exception).
288. Id. As discussed in Part IV.A.2, Weltover’s broad approach to defining commercial activity has not
been applied to human rights cases.
289. Of course, as discussed in Part I.B, defining commercial activity as anything a private person does also
comports with capitalism’s view of commercial activity as the exclusive purview of private actors.
290. MANN, SOURCES OF SOCIAL POWER VOL. 2, supra note 10, at 23; KARL MARX, CAPITAL: A CRITICAL
ANALYSIS OF CAPITALIST PRODUCTION (Samuel Moore & Edward Aveling trans., Fredrick Engels eds., 1887),
reprinted in MARX AND ENGELS COLLECTED WORKS VOLUME 35 – KARL MARX: CAPITAL VOLUME I 31, 157
(2010).
291. See HARVEY, supra note 352, at 160.
292. SAAD-FILHO, supra note 47, at 20.
293. Arjun Appadurai, Introduction: Commodities and the Politics of Value, in THE SOCIAL LIFE OF THINGS:
COMMODITIES IN CULTURAL PERSPECTIVE 3, 3 (Arjun Appadurai ed., 1986).
294. Republic of Argentina v. Weltover, Inc., 504 U.S. 607, 614–15 (1992).
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does not involve a commercial transaction or act.295 This outcome has been
borne out by caselaw applying the Weltover test.296
Second, Weltover aligns with neoliberalism by subjecting debt
instruments—which are a key component of the global financial system297—to
legal accountability even when issued by foreign sovereigns. Under leading
post-Tate Letter, pre-FSIA case law, public debts were considered sovereign
activity.298 Indeed, an earlier iteration of the FSIA bill prohibited claims against
foreign countries for “debt obligations incurred for general governmental
purposes.”299 Though the FSIA’s final version did not include this provision,300
it also did not indicate whether all public debt fell within the commercial activity
exception’s reach. Indeed, some courts suggested, post-FSIA, that some kinds of
public debt might still be immune from suit.301
The Weltover decision bucked these perspectives.302 While it claimed to
have “no occasion to consider” whether public debt was per se commercial
295. By eschewing a profit-motive, the Weltover test also ensures plaintiffs that expect to financially profit
from their transactions with foreign sovereigns, even where the sovereigns themselves do not, will be able to
satisfy the definition of commercial activity. Indeed, in Weltover, the public debt in question did not appear to
result in any financial “profit” to the Argentine government. See id. at 616 (noting that “Argentina points to the
fact that the transactions in which the [bonds] were issued did not have the ordinary commercial consequence of
raising capital or financing acquisitions”).
296. In one FSIA case involving the Holy See, the court expressly noted these odd, yet inevitable, results of
the Weltover test. As it noted, “with purpose and motive deleted from the evaluation, the [religious and pastoral]
activities of the Holy See might be characterized as commercial. This would be, to say the least, ironic . . . [t]o
describe core religious duties as the equivalent of private commercial activity may superficially apply existing
precedent, but ultimately results in a transmogrification of the facts.” Doe v. Holy See, 434 F. Supp. 2d 925, 941
(D. Or. 2006), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, on other grounds, 557 F.3d 1066 (9th Cir. 2009); see also Sun v.
Taiwan, 201 F.3d 1105, 1107–08 (9th Cir. 2000) (defining the sponsoring and operation of a not-for-profit
cultural tour aimed at fostering cultural exchange as commercial); Malewicz v. City of Amsterdam, 362 F. Supp.
2d 298, 313–14 (D.D.C. 2005) (defining the temporary loan of artwork for educational purposes between notfor-profit museums as commercial); Dale v. Colagiovanni, 337 F. Supp. 2d 825, 839 (S.D. Miss. 2004), aff’d by
433 F.3d 425 (5th Cir. 2006) (describing the creation of a charitable trust as commercial). Congress itself has
not always been comfortable with the expansive approach to commercial activity Weltover facilitated. Indeed,
in 2016, it passed an amendment to the FSIA that explicitly extended sovereign immunity to certain temporary
loans of artwork. Foreign Cultural Exchange Jurisdictional Immunity Clarification Act, Pub. L. No. 114-319,
130 Stat. 1618 (2016).
297. See ADAIR TURNER, BETWEEN DEBT AND THE DEVIL: MONEY, CREDIT, AND FIXING GLOBAL FINANCE
21–23 (2016) (illustrating the centrality of debt to the growth of the global financial industry).
298. See Victory Transport, Inc. v. Comisaria General de Abastecimientos y Transportes, 336 F.2d 354, 360
(2d Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 381 U.S. 934 (1965) (leading case law on commercial activity exception under the
Tate Letter which describes public debt as governmental activity subject to sovereign immunity).
299. Jurisdiction of U.S. Courts in Suits Against Foreign States: Hearings on H.R. 11315 before the
Subcomm. on Admin. L. & Gov’t Rels. of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 94th Cong. 10–11 (1976).
300. H.R. REP. NO. 94-1487, at 10 (1976).
301. In Asociacion De Reclamantes v. United Mexican States, for example, the D.C. district court suggested
that “non-commercial debt obligations,” a term it did not define, might enjoy immunity under the FSIA. 561 F.
Supp. 1190, 1195 n.10 (D.D.C. 1983), aff’d, 735 F.2d 1517 (D.C. Cir. 1984). The court also noted that, in
removing the provision giving immunity to public debts, the FSIA’s drafters merely suggested that only those
public debts “which are of a commercial nature and should be treated like other commercial transactions are
excepted from sovereign immunity.” Id. (quotations omitted) (citation omitted).
302. Indeed, Weltover expressly rejected Victory Transport’s holding that public debt was sovereign
activity. Republic of Argentina v. Weltover, Inc., 504 U.S. 607, 615 (1992).
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activity, the Weltover court broadly concluded that there was nothing
distinctively sovereign about public debt.303 In doing so, it adopted a view of
public debt that aligned with judicial decisions largely from the Second
Circuit—which includes the financial hub of New York City—treating public
debt as commercial in nature.304 Indeed, courts have since relied on Weltover, as
well as the Second Circuit cases it implicitly sanctioned, to treat public debt as
inherently commercial.305
Weltover’s historical context starkly demonstrates how the global financial
industry has benefited from Weltover’s treatment of public debt. The Weltover
decision occurred against the backdrop of Argentina’s slow-rolling but
pervasive fiscal crisis in the 1980s306—one of several fiscal crises happening in
the developing world at the time that were triggered by global financial
practices.307 During the 1970s, U.S. banks had been awash in cash and eager to
invest in less developed countries.308 These countries had often been offered
“low interest rates, enabling them to borrow massively to finance their sagging
economies . . . .”309 Then, in 1979, the U.S. Federal Reserve hiked interest
rates310 (other creditor countries followed suit), increasing the cost of repaying
loans and triggering a global debt crisis311 that affected many Latin American
countries including Argentina.312 Several of the most heavily indebted Latin
American states faced interest payments that swallowed more than one-third of
revenues from their exports of goods and services, with Argentina shouldering

303. Id.
304. See, e.g., Shapiro v. Republic of Bolivia, 930 F.2d 1013, 1018 (2d Cir. 1991) (“It is self-evident that
issuing public debt is a commercial activity”); Carl Marks & Co. v. Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, 841
F.2d 26, 27 (2d Cir. 1988) (holding that “issuance of public debt falls within the ‘commercial activity’
exception”).
305. See, e.g., Rogers v. Petroleo Brasileiro, S.A., 673 F.3d 131, 135 (2d Cir. 2012) (citing to Second Circuit
case law in holding that it is “well-settled that the issuing of public debt is a commercial activity”); Phaneuf v.
Republic of Indonesia, 106 F.3d 302, 307 (9th Cir. 1997) (citing to Weltover in holding that “issuance of
sovereign debt is a commercial act”).
306. See generally Rudiger Dornbusch & Juan Carlos de Pablo, Argentina: Debt and Macroeconomic
Instability (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Rsch., Working Paper No. 2378, 1987) (discussing Argentina’s debt crisis
during the 1980s), https://www.nber.org/system/files/working_papers/w2378/w2378.pdf.
307. See, e.g., Jocelyn Sims & Jessie Romero, Latin American Debt Crisis of the 1980s, FED. RSRV. HIST.,
(Nov. 22, 2013), https://www.federalreservehistory.org/essays/latin-american-debt-crisis (describing foreign
debt crisis in Latin American countries in the 1980s).
308. MANN, SOURCES OF SOCIAL POWER VOL. 4, supra note 50, at 167.
309. Id.
310. The Federal Reserve’s interest rate hike was an attempt to reverse the 1970s-era inflation crisis in the
United States. JAMES M. BOUGHTON, SILENT REVOLUTION: THE INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND 1979-1989,
at 319 (2001), https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/history/2001/index.htm.
311. MANN, SOURCES OF SOCIAL POWER VOL. 4, supra note 50, at 167.
312. Sims & Romero, supra note 307. While there were many factors that led to the Argentine debt crisis,
they included “much higher interest rates” that made it harder for Argentina to service its foreign debt.
Dornbusch & de Pablo, supra note 306, at 10.
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a burden of fifty percent.313 As of 1985, Argentina alone had approximately
$48.3 billion in debt held by foreign lenders.314
Even though Argentina’s actions were aimed at staving off a major
domestic financial crisis315—indeed the International Monetary Fund had
required that Argentina take the actions it did in order to receive loans to help
deal with its fiscal crisis—316the Court ignored the unique sovereign attributes
of Argentina’s debt.317 Instead, the Court adopted a definition of commercial
activity that protected those holding Argentina’s public debt and the global
financial industry that had financed it.318 As one scholar described the situation
at the time, “[p]rotecting institutional lenders from [Latin American] sovereign
default” was vital because “[t]he failure of one or two multinational banking
institutions could jeopardize the entire U.S. banking system . . . .”319
2. Excluding Human Rights Claims
Since Weltover, the Supreme Court has inconsistently applied its broad
definition of commercial activity, at least when it comes to claims involving
human rights. In its decision in Saudi Arabia v. Nelson—a commercial activity
claim decided after Weltover—the Court held that acts of detention and torture
committed during plaintiff Scott Nelson’s employment in Saudi Arabia were not
commercial in nature. In reaching this result, the Court departed from Weltover’s
definition of commercial activity. It did so by factoring into its analysis the
identities of those government officials who had engaged in the activities in
question. Relying on Nelson, other courts have gone even further and
reintroduced a purpose-based test to dismiss human rights claims brought under
the commercial activity exception, which would otherwise seem to satisfy the
Weltover test. Overall, these decisions have aligned with the interests of

313. BOUGHTON, supra note 310, at 418 n.6.
314. Dornbusch & de Pablo, supra note 306, at 5.
315. Republic of Argentina v. Weltover, Inc., 504 U.S. 607, 616 (1992). In its brief to the Supreme Court,
Argentina argued that the bonds it issued were “necessary steps in its administration of the Government’s own
obligations under a program designed to assure access to foreign exchange, in order to avoid a credit crisis within
the country’s private sector.” Brief of Republic of Argentina and Banco Central de La Republica Argentina at
3, Weltover, 504 U.S. 607 (No. 91-763), 1992 WL 526250 [hereinafter Argentina Brief].
316. BOUGHTON, supra note 310, at 462, 464–65, 469–71; Argentina Brief, supra note 315, at 10.
317. In addition to facing a financial crisis, Argentina was a relatively new democracy in which “the baton
of economic control had very recently been passed from the military” to a civilian government. BOUGHTON,
supra note 310, at 462.
318. As discussed in Part IV.B.2, the Second Circuit decision in Weltover demonstrates even more clearly
that applying the commercial activity exception to this case was seen as good for global financial markets,
especially those in New York.
319. W.H. Knight, Jr., International Debt and the Act of State Doctrine: Judicial Abstention Reconsidered,
13 N.C. J. INTL’L L. & COM. REG. 35, 35–36 (1988). While banks heavily invested in Latin American public
debt faced the possibility these loans would not be repaid, it is debatable whether this situation would have, in
fact, seriously threatened the U.S. financial industry. Id. By the mid-1980s, most commercial banks exposed to
the sovereign debt crisis had had enough time to set aside adequate reserves to deal with any potential defaults.
BOUGHTON, supra note 310, at 415.
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neoliberalism by protecting against regulatory interventions that may threaten
U.S. business with foreign states.
In Nelson, an American citizen employed in a Saudi hospital brought
claims against the hospital, its purchasing agent in the United States, as well as
the Saudi government based on injuries arising from his alleged detention and
torture by government officials.320 Scott Nelson had been recruited in the United
States by a company working for the Saudi government, and signed his
employment contract here.321 As part of his position at the hospital, which was
owned and operated by the Saudi state, Nelson was responsible for monitoring
all facilities, equipment, and systems to ensure safety requirements were met.322
After reporting various safety defects to hospital staff, Nelson was detained and
tortured by Saudi government agents including police officers.323 He was
ultimately held for thirty-nine days in jail, without charge, before being
released.324
After returning to the United States, Nelson and his wife sued.325 The
district court dismissed their claims, but the Eleventh Circuit reversed,
concluding, in part, that Saudi Arabia’s recruitment and hiring of Nelson was
commercial activity.326 The Supreme Court granted cert and reversed the
appellate court.327
While the Court’s majority conceded that Saudi Arabia’s recruitment and
employment of Nelson led to his injury,328 it concluded that the relevant activity
was, in fact, Saudi Arabia’s detention and torture of plaintiff.329 In the Court’s
view, those activities “however monstrous” were uniquely sovereign because
they were “an exercise of the powers of police,” and “not the sort of action by
which private parties can engage in commerce.”330
Four justices disagreed with the majority opinion, with several justices
specifically disputing whether defendants had engaged in commercial
activity.331 In a concurring opinion joined by Justice Blackmun, Justice White
held that Nelson’s detention and torture could be considered commercial
activity.332 As he explained, private parties regularly retaliate against whistleblowers, like Nelson, and, in that regard, may “conspire[e] with public
authorities to effectuate an arrest.”333 Going a step further, Justice White also
320.
321.
322.
323.
324.
325.
326.
327.
328.
329.
330.
331.
332.
333.

Saudi Arabia v. Nelson, 507 U.S. 349, 351 (1993).
Id. at 351–52.
Id. at 352.
Id. at 352–53.
Id. at 353.
Id. at 351.
Nelson (Nelson I) v. Saudi Arabia, 923 F.2d 1528, 1533 (11 Cir. 1991), rev’d, 507 U.S. 349 (1993).
Nelson, 507 U.S. at 363.
Id. at 351.
Id. at 358, 361.
Id. at 361–62.
Id. at 364–79.
Id. at 364–70 (White, J., concurring).
Id. at 364–66.
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suggested that if the hospital had hired thugs, instead of police officers, to
retaliate against Nelson, the majority would have no choice but to characterize
the activity as “commercial” in nature.334 In a dissenting opinion, Justice Stevens
agreed with Justice White’s view that the hospital’s disciplinary procedures were
commercial activities.335
While Justices White and Stevens arguably adhered to Weltover’s private person
test, the approach taken by the Nelson majority is more muddled. Indeed, various
statements by the majority suggested the “nature” of Saudi Arabia’s actions may
not have exclusively guided the Court’s decision. In particular, the majority
focused on the status of those acting on Saudi Arabia’s behalf, namely, “police
and penal officers”336—an approach that Justice White, in fact, criticized.337 For
the majority, the involvement of police, who exercise disciplinary and punitive
powers, proved Saudi Arabia’s actions were not commercial in nature. Put
another way, the Nelson majority did not simply conclude that the “powers of
police” were not the sort of activity private persons could undertake. It also
suggested those activities could not be commercial because police do not
generally pursue commercial aims. As other courts have since described this
aspect of the majority’s decision, it revolved less around the “nature” of the
activity and more around the “status of the police alleged to have tortured the
plaintiff.”338
Since Nelson, some courts have taken the majority’s approach even further
and implicitly reintroduced purpose into the analysis.339 Like Nelson, these cases
have featured human rights-related claims brought by individuals. Unlike
Nelson, however, these suits have involved “private thugs” allegedly hired by
foreign sovereigns, their agencies, or instrumentalities, to commit serious human
rights violations—precisely the sort of claims Justice White thought would
inevitably satisfy Weltover’s private person test for commercial activity.340
For example, in Cicippio v. Islamic Republic of Iran, the D.C. Circuit
dismissed claims brought under the commercial activity exception against the
Iranian government for allegedly hiring private thugs to commit a kidnapping.341
Citing to Nelson, the court held that, even though the act in question was
allegedly committed by private parties, that was not enough to strip the
kidnapping of its sovereign character and place it within a “commercial
334. Id. at 366.
335. Id. at 378 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
336. Id. at 361–62.
337. Justice White described the majority opinion as reflecting a “single-minded focus on the exercise of
police power” that “hardly does [the case] justice.” Id. at 367 (White, J., concurring).
338. Cicippio v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 30 F.3d 164, 167, 168 n.4 (D.C. Cir. 1994).
339. Some commentators have suggested that the Nelson majority itself relied on a “purpose” test. See
Steven Weisman, Individual Protection Crumbles While Sovereignty Reigns: A Comment on Saudi Arabia v.
Nelson, 11 HOFSTRA LAB. L.J. 429, 448 (1993) (“It appears that the Supreme Court [in Nelson] has gone astray
by focusing on the ‘purpose’ test instead of the ‘nature’ test [in defining commercial activity].”).
340. Nelson, 507 U.S. at 366 (White, J., concurring).
341. Cicippio, 30 F.3d at 165.
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context.”342 Because the Iranian government’s actions did not feature such a
“commercial context” and were otherwise attenuated from the marketplace, the
court held that the commercial activity exception did not apply.343 By contrast,
as the court itself noted, if Iran had kidnapped a commercial rival, then that
kidnapping would have qualified as commercial activity.344 Even though the
court insisted that a commercial context approach was not “inconsistent with
eschewing consideration of purpose,”345 it seems evident that if Iran’s purpose
had been commercial—for instance, to undermine a business competitor—then
that would satisfy the commercial activity exception.
Similarly, in Jin v. Ministry of State Security, the D.C. district court held
that the commercial activity exception did not apply to claims that the Chinese
government had hired private thugs in the United States to intimidate members
of the Falun Gong, a persecuted Chinese group.346 While the court attempted to
frame its inquiry in terms of the activity’s nature,347 in fact, its analysis depended
on the belief that China had a political rather than commercial purpose in hiring
the thugs.348 Relying on Nelson, the court determined that China’s alleged
actions did not constitute commercial activity because there was no “hidden or
implicitly commercial component to the Chinese government’s hiring of thugs
to implement its policy of suppressing Falun Gong as a cult.”349 In reaching this
conclusion, the court effectively suggested that if a commercial purpose had
existed the result may have been different.
Whether or not one agrees with the outcomes in these cases, it is hard to
argue that Nelson, Cicippio, and Jin adhere to Weltover’s exclusively naturebased test for defining commercial activity. While foreign policy concerns may
help explain these departures,350 the outcomes in these cases also align with the
deregulatory objectives of neoliberalism.351 A basic premise of neoliberalism is
that deregulation, coupled with free market competition, improves a state’s

342. Id. at 168.
343. Id.
344. Id.
345. Id. at 167–68.
346. Jin v. Ministry of State Sec., 557 F. Supp. 2d 131, 140–41 (D.D.C. 2008).
347. See id. at 141 (“The defendant ministries’ mandate to implement China’s policy and its authority to
hire ‘thugs’ is not of the nature that may be exercised by private citizens participating in the marketplace,
excepting those residing in Hobbes’s state of nature.”).
348. See id. (holding that the “broader political context” behind plaintiffs’ allegations was relevant to the
commercial activity question).
349. Id.
350. See, e.g., Leading Cases: Commercial Activities, 107 HARV. L. REV. 264, 268 (1993) (suggesting the
Nelson majority’s otherwise unpersuasive and inconsistent decision was driven by concerns that exercising
jurisdiction would create foreign policy problems); Robert H. Wood, Saudi Arabia v. Nelson: Roll over Weltover,
Tell Scott Nelson the News, 2 TUL. J. INT’L & COMPAR. L. 175, 187 (1994) (suggesting that Nelson’s narrowing
of the definition of commercial activity was a result of the “politically sensitive areas” involved in the case).
351. Foreign policy rationales do not fully account for statements made by some of these courts that a
commercial “context” or “component” would have changed the outcome. A political economy lens, by contrast,
provides a more coherent way of understanding these decisions.
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attractiveness to business interests in the global market place.352 Regulating
detention, torture, and killing, outside of a “commercial context,” could threaten
the United States’ market position by dissuading foreign sovereigns from
entering into business in the country or with U.S. entities.353 Closely connected
with this concern, preventing human rights suits from proceeding also aligns
with the FSIA’s underlying structural tendency to protect the United States from
becoming the sort of “international collection agency” that might undermine
domestic business interests.354
As discussed in the next Subpart, like its definition of commerciality, the
commercial activity exception’s territorial nexus requirement has also been
judicially finessed in ways that align with interests endemic to neoliberalism.
B. THE TERRITORIAL NEXUS REQUIREMENT: DISADVANTAGING INDIVIDUALS
& BENEFITING CORPORATE, ESPECIALLY FINANCIAL, INTERESTS
The concept of territoriality is at the heart of foreign sovereign immunity.
Indeed, as far back as Schooner Exchange, foreign sovereign immunity has
typically been an issue where a foreign sovereign has engaged in activities
within or closely effecting the territory of other states.355 This territorial hook
continues to be central to the FSIA’s commercial activity exception.356 In fact,
because Weltover and Nelson have settled many of the questions surrounding
the definition of commercial activity, most cases under the commercial activity
exception are now more focused on the exception’s territorial requirement.357
Under the commercial activity exception, an action must be based on one
of three possible territorial connections to the United States: (1) commercial
activity carried on by the foreign sovereign in the United States; (2) activity
“performed in the United States in connection with a commercial activity of the
foreign state elsewhere;” or (3) activity “outside the territory of the United States
in connection with a commercial activity of the foreign state elsewhere and that
act causes a direct effect in the United States.”358 In order to qualify under one
of these requirements, “the commercial activity that provides the jurisdictional
nexus with the United States must . . . be the activity on which the lawsuit is
based.”359

352. DAVID HARVEY, A BRIEF HISTORY OF NEOLIBERALISM 65 (2005).
353. By contrast, allowing foreign sovereigns to use their police powers against commercial rivals would
ostensibly give them an unfair commercial advantage over private business and distort the free market, making
them worthwhile objects of regulation.
354. Weber, supra note 219, at 42–43; see also supra text accompanying note 239.
355. Schooner Exchange v. McFaddon, 11 U.S. 116, 135–38 (1812).
356. YANG, supra note 3, at 65. There are exceptions to this rule, most notably, the FSIA exception for acts
of international terrorism committed by state sponsors of terrorism. 28 U.S.C. § 1605A.
357. YANG, supra note 3, at 108.
358. 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(2).
359. Stena Rederi AB v. Comision de Contratos del Comite Ejecutivo Gen. del Sindicato Revolucionario
de Trabajadores Petroleros de la Republica Mexicana, S.C., 923 F.2d 380, 387 (5th Cir. 1991) (emphasis added).
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As commentators have noted, the case law on territoriality “is the most
diversified, the most fluid, and the most confusing . . . part of the US judicial
practice on State immunity.”360 Nevertheless, a political economy lens
highlights several underexplored aspects of the jurisprudence. In general, the
territorial nexus requirement has disadvantaged individual plaintiffs and
benefitted corporate actors, especially those linked with the global financial
industry. As this Subpart explores, courts have tended to adopt defendantfriendly interpretations of the phrase “based upon” and “direct effect”—two key
elements of the territorial nexus requirement—in cases raising personal injury,
human rights, or employment claims—claims that are more typically brought by
individuals—making these claims harder to win. By contrast, courts have
adopted more plaintiff-friendly approaches to the “direct effect” clause in cases
brought by corporations or that implicate the interests of the global financial
industry —which are more typically brought by corporate plaintiffs. In addition,
in some jurisdictions, courts have afforded more protections under “direct
effect” to American corporations suffering pure financial losses in the United
States, as compared to individual plaintiffs in the United States suffering the
same kind of loss.
These trends reflect and reinforce interests aligned with neoliberalism. As
with Nelson’s decision to exclude human rights from the definition of
commercial activity, removing certain claims sounding in personal injury and
human rights—including ones relating to employment and consumer activity—
from the territorial nexus requirement can be viewed as a species of
deregulation. When it comes to employment-related claims more generally, the
territorial nexus requirement has, in some situations, reinforced neoliberalism’s
tendency to broadly undermine workers’ rights.361
By giving corporate plaintiffs a better chance than individual claimants at
recouping their financial losses, jurisprudence on the territorial nexus
requirement also aligns with the wealth gap created by neoliberalism. Under
neoliberal capitalism, there is a “bias of income redistribution from labor toward
capital”—meaning that while employees and other laborers make less income,
corporate executives and wealthy investors reap more financial gains.362 While
the parallel here is far from exact, the judicial tendency in some commercial
activity cases to allow corporate plaintiffs to recoup their pure financial losses,
360. YANG, supra note 3, at 110.
361. See Flaherty, supra note 52, at 98 (noting that neoliberalism has “weaken[ed] the labor movement
under the combined pressures of service sector growth, labor market deregulation, and the loosening of capital
restraints . . . .”); MANN, SOURCES OF SOCIAL POWER VOL. 4, supra note 50, at 143 (noting that neoliberalism
“privileges fighting inflation over fighting employment and it seeks to keep wages low”). The FSIA itself is
generally less protective of employee rights as compared to other foreign sovereign immunity statutes. Richard
L. Garnett, The Perils of Working at a Foreign Government: Foreign Sovereign Immunity and Employment,
29 CAL. W. INT’L. L.J. 133, 137 (1998). For example, the UK State Immunity Act of 1978 has a specific
provision stripping immunity from foreign sovereigns where they are party to an employment contract made or
wholly or partly performed in the United Kingdom. Id.; State Immunity Act 1978, c. 33, § 4 (UK).
362. Flaherty, supra note 52, at 101.
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while individual plaintiffs with similar claims are denied that opportunity,
comports with neoliberalism’s wealth gap.363
This Subpart starts with judicial approaches to “based upon,” then
examines “direct effect.”
1. “Based Upon”
As mentioned earlier, the “based upon” requirement applies to all three
avenues for establishing territoriality. It has, however, been particularly
important to the commercial activity exception’s first and second nexus
requirements. The first nexus requirement—”commercial activity carried on in
the United States by a foreign state”—is defined as “commercial activity carried
on by such state and having substantial contact with the United States.”364 The
second nexus requirement—activity “performed in the United States in
connection with a commercial activity of the foreign state elsewhere”—applies
to a sovereign’s non-commercial acts in the United States365 that relate “either
to a regular course of commercial conduct elsewhere or to a particular
commercial transaction concluded or carried out in part elsewhere.”366 In
practice, courts have treated the two nexus requirements as virtually identical.367
Neither the FSIA nor its legislative history defines what “based upon”
means.368 In the first few years after the FSIA’s passage, courts took relatively
flexible approaches to the requirement. In a series of later decisions, however,
the Supreme Court narrowly construed “based upon” to exclude claims that were
not directly and squarely related to foreign sovereign commercial activity in the
United States. This defendant-friendly approach was developed in two cases that
variously implicated human rights (relating to an employment relationship) and
personal injury claims (relating to consumer activity): Saudi Arabia v. Nelson369
and OBB Personenverkehr AG v. Sachs.370
While these decisions are trans-substantive, the Nelson and Sachs
approaches to “based upon” have had a particularly negative impact on claims
363. One might also argue that the case law’s tendency to disfavor individual rights sounding in human
rights, personal injury, and employment, also aligns with neoliberalism’s wealth gap as well.
364. 28 U.S.C. § 1603(e).
365. Schoeps v. Bayern, 27 F. Supp. 3d 540, 545 (S.D.N.Y. 2014).
366. H.R. REP. NO. 94-1487, at 19 (1976).
367. Since the second clause of the nexus requirement is largely redundant of the first clause and rarely
used, most cases focus on the first nexus requirement. Richard Wydeven, The Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act
of 1976: A Contemporary Look at Jurisdiction Under the Commercial Activity Exception, 13 REV. LITIG. 143,
155, 180 (1993). Where courts have considered both clauses, however, the analysis and outcome have often been
identical. See, e.g., Siderman de Blake v. Republic of Argentina, 965 F.2d 699, 708–10 (9th Cir. 1992) (holding
that plaintiffs’ expropriation claims satisfied both the first nexus requirement, which required a “nexus” between
plaintiff’s claims and defendant’s commercial activity in the United States, and the second nexus requirement,
which required a “material connection” between the plaintiff’s claim and defendant’s actions in the United
States).
368. Saudi Arabia v. Nelson, 507 U.S. 349, 357 (1993).
369. Id. at 356–58.
370. OBB Personenverkehr AG v. Sachs, 577 U.S. 27, 32–38 (2015).
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similar to those brought in those cases—namely human rights and personal
injury claims sustained abroad that are arguably connected to the employment
and consumer-related activities of foreign sovereigns in the United States. They
have also been generally devastating to employment-based claims of varying
types.371
The approach to “based upon” reflected in Nelson and Sachs is neither
required by the text nor legislative history of the FSIA. Nevertheless, the
relatively rigid approach to “based upon” adopted in both cases has made it more
difficult for courts to regulate foreign sovereign activity in the interest of
protecting workers and consumers from harm—something courts had been able
to do under earlier, more flexible judicial approaches to the “based upon”
requirement.
a. Early Approaches to “Based Upon”
In the early years of the FSIA, courts took various approaches to “based
upon,”372 sometimes ignoring it entirely or adopting a liberal reading.373
Whether intentionally or not, these approaches created opportunities for
plaintiffs to succeed on claims that not only implicated their business interests,
but also rights in labor and employment, as well as rights related to consumer
activity.
For example, in State Bank of India v. NLRB, the Seventh Circuit adopted
an approach to the “based upon” requirement that denied immunity for claims
raising labor rights issues.374 In that case, the court concluded that petitioner
bank, an instrumentality of the Indian government, was not entitled to immunity
in a dispute with the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB).375 The NLRB
had issued various orders against the State Bank of India, which was doing
business in the United States, finding that it had committed unfair labor practices
in refusing to bargain with a union.376 The bank argued, in part, that the FSIA
prevented the NLRB from asserting jurisdiction.377 In determining that the bank
was not entitled to immunity under the first nexus prong, the court effectively
ignored whether the claim against it was actually based upon the bank’s

371. As discussed in Part IV.B.2, direct effect jurisprudence has effectively foreclosed certain personal
injury claims, including those related to employment, as well. See infra notes 454–64, 483–87 and accompanying
text.
372. See Vencedora Oceancia Navigazion, S.A. v. Compagnie Nationale Algerienne De Navigation, 730
F.2d 195, 200 (5th Cir. 1984) (pre-Nelson case noting that in construing the “based upon” language of the first
nexus requirement appellate and district courts took four different approaches, including the “literal” approach,
the “nexus” approach, a “bifurcated literal and nexus” approach, and a “doing business” approach).
373. Garnett, supra note 361, at 141, n.33. While courts also took more rigid approaches to “based upon”
during this time, the liberality of some approaches to the phrase are notable, especially post-Nelson and Sachs.
Vencedora Oceancia, 730 F.2d at 200.
374. State Bank of India v. NLRB, 808 F.2d 526 (7th Cir. 1986).
375. Id.
376. Id. at 527.
377. Id.
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commercial activity, and instead relied on the fact that the bank generally
engaged in commercial transactions in the United States.378
In Sugarman v. Aeromexico, Inc., the Third Circuit adopted an approach to
“based upon” that was not as forgiving as State Bank but still allowed a personal
injury claim related to consumer activity to move forward.379 In construing the
first nexus prong, the court defined the “based upon” requirement to require a
“course of commercial conduct” in the United States.380 Plaintiff, a passenger on
Mexico’s state-owned airline, Aeromexico, claimed defendant caused him
various forms of mental and physical anguish, as well as economic losses,
because of delays to its flight from Mexico to the United States.381 The court
held that the commercial activity exception’s first nexus requirement applied
because Aeromexico engaged in a “regular course of commercial conduct” in
the United States and because plaintiff had purchased his plane ticket in the
United States.382
Though rare, courts sometimes interpreted “based upon” to allow human
rights-based claims connected to employment to be brought against foreign
sovereigns. Indeed, in the Eleventh Circuit decision in Nelson, the court held
that plaintiff’s claims of detention and torture satisfied the “based upon”
requirement.383 In construing plaintiffs’ argument under the first nexus prong,384
the appellate court held that “based upon” required “a bond or link” between the
foreign sovereign’s commercial activity in the United States—namely, the
recruitment and hiring of Scott Nelson—and plaintiffs’ injury—namely,
Nelson’s detention and torture.385 In the court’s view, Nelson’s detention and
torture were so “intertwined” with his employment that they were, indeed, based
upon his recruitment and hiring in the United States.386
b. The Nelson Approach to “Based Upon”
The Supreme Court’s decision in Saudi Arabia v. Nelson was the first blow
to these and other cases taking a flexible approach to “based upon.” In Nelson,
a plurality of the Court held that, under the commercial activity exception, the
phrase “based upon” required something more than a “mere connection with, or
relation to,” commercial activity.387 Instead, to determine whether a claim was
“based upon” commercial activity conducted in the United States, it was
necessary to examine “those elements of a claim that, if proven, would entitle a

378.
379.
380.
381.
382.
383.
384.
385.
386.
387.

Id. at 535.
Sugarman v. Aeromexico, Inc., 626 F.2d 270, 273 (3rd Cir. 1980).
Id.
Id. at 271.
Id. at 273.
Nelson v. Saudi Arabia, 923 F.2d 1528, 1535 (11 Cir. 1991), rev’d, 507 U.S. 349 (1993).
Id. at 1533–34.
Id. at 1534.
Id. at 1535.
Saudi Arabia v. Nelson, 507 U.S. 349, 358 (1993).
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plaintiff to relief under his theory of the case.”388 Applying this approach, the
Court concluded that various commercial activities allegedly conducted by
defendants in the United States, while leading to the conduct that injured
plaintiffs, were not the basis for their suit.389
In explaining its analysis, the Court noted that the FSIA’s legislative
history provided no definition of “based upon.”390 Nevertheless, the plurality
insisted that its approach reflected the clear and “natural” meaning of the term.391
In his dissenting opinion, Justice Stevens disagreed with this supposedly obvious
interpretation and came to the very different conclusion that Nelson’s injury was,
in fact, based upon his recruitment and hiring in the United States.392
The plurality in Nelson did not provide “principled reasons” for its decision
or reconcile its approach to “based upon” with those taken by other courts.393
Indeed, the plurality could have construed the “based upon” requirement less
narrowly and literally, as both Justice Stevens and the Eleventh Circuit had
done.394 It could have taken an approach that did not swing so broadly but still
allowed certain cases involving individual rights to be heard. For example, it
could have allowed rights-based claims that were otherwise “peripherally”
connected to commercial activities to proceed where they satisfied higher
jurisdictional requirements.395
The impact of Nelson’s rigid approach to “based upon” has since been felt
in various ways that have, at times, negatively impacted corporate claimants396
while benefiting some individual plaintiffs with commercial claims.397 That

388. Id. at 357.
389. Id. at 358.
390. Id. at 357.
391. Id.
392. Id. at 378 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
393. Commercial Activities, supra note 350, at 268. Cases like Sugarman v. Aeromexico, Inc., which held
that even though plaintiff’s claim arose from acts committed abroad it satisfied the first nexus requirement
because the claim arose from commercial activity inside the United States, suggest the first prong could have
been satisfied in Nelson based on a similar connection between acts abroad and an employment relationship
established in the United States. Id. at 270–71.
394. Id. at 268.
395. Id. at 272.
396. The Nelson approach has been particularly unfavorable for private corporations that are foreign. See,
e.g., Goodman Holdings v. Rafidain Bank, 26 F.3d 1143, 1145–46 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (citing Nelson and holding
that Irish corporate plaintiffs’ claim did not satisfy the first nexus requirement because the fact that defendant
paid plaintiffs through a U.S. bank account, which was the basis for plaintiffs’ argument that the territorial nexus
requirement was satisfied, was legally irrelevant to plaintiffs’ claim); Crystallex Int’l Corp. v. Petroleos De
Venez, 251 F. Supp. 3d 758, 766–70 (D. Del. 2017) (citing to Nelson and holding that Canadian corporate
plaintiff’s claim did not satisfy the first or second nexus requirements even though it was related to defendant’s
general course of commercial conduct in the United States); Chemarketing Industries, Inc. v. C.V.G. Industria
Venezolana De Alumino, C.A., No. 97 civ 1791, 1998 WL 199937 at *2–3 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 23, 1998) (citing to
Nelson and holding that breach of contract claim brought by British West Indies corporation did not satisfy the
first nexus prong because proof of the elements of plaintiff’s claim was not based upon defendants’ commercial
activity in the United States).
397. See, e.g., Friedman v. Gov’t of Abu Dhabi, United Arab Emirates, 464 F. Supp. 3d 52 (D.D.C. 2020)
(citing to Nelson and holding that individual plaintiff’s claims for quantum meruit and unjust enrichment in
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being said, Nelson’s devastating effects have been most pronounced for
plaintiffs bringing suit under the first or second nexus requirement for certain
personal injury and human rights claims—even where they relate to consumer
activity or employment—or for certain employment-related claims.
First and foremost, Nelson has effectively foreclosed most human rights
claims—including those relating to employment—whether in the United States
or abroad both because of its narrow definition of commercial activity and
because of its rigid approach to the “based upon” requirement.398 Second, with
a few exceptions, Nelson has generally made it more difficult for plaintiffs,
including consumers, to succeed on claims for personal injuries sustained abroad
even when they are based on commercial activities undertaken in the United
States.399
Finally, Nelson has had a damaging effect on particular kinds of
employment-related cases more generally.400 When it comes to employment
cases, the commercial activity exception usually focuses on “the context of
employment, the status of the employee, and the territorial connection between
the action and the United States forum.”401 It is on this last issue—the territorial
connection—that Nelson has had the most impact. Post-Nelson employment
cases have tended to reinforce an employee-employer dynamic in which the
employee has limited rights. This has most often occurred when the employment
itself is outside the United States, notwithstanding links to foreign sovereign
commercial activity in the United States.
Like Nelson, cases involving employment abroad have often relied on job
recruitment by foreign sovereigns in the United States.402 Before Nelson, the
connection with defendant’s failure to pay on several promissory notes satisfied the commercial activity
exception’s first nexus requirement).
398. See, e.g., Alexander J. Mueller, Nelson v. Saudi Arabia and the Need for a Human Rights Exception to
the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, 13 N.Y. INT’L L. REV. 87, 125 (2000) (arguing that Nelson makes it likely
that “the injustices suffered by Scott Nelson [will] be revisited upon other victims of human rights violations by
foreign sovereigns . . . .”).
399. See, e.g., Sun v. Governmental Authorities on Taiwan, No. C 94-2769 SI, 2001 WL 114443 (N.D. Cal.
Jan. 24, 2001), aff’d by Sun v. Taipei Economic, 34 Fed Appx. 529 (9th Cir. 2002) (applying Nelson’s “based
upon” test to reject plaintiffs’ claim that their son’s death abroad was based upon tour operator’s commercial
activities in the United States because those activities were not a necessary element of plaintiffs’ claim). One
notable exception to this trend were claims relating to international transportation to or from the United States,
especially with regards to negligence claims based upon the sale of airline tickets in the United States. These
claims, which were based on cases like Sugarman v. Aeromexico, continued to be recognized after Nelson. See
infra note 432 and accompanying text. As discussed below, the Supreme Court’s decision in Sachs likely put an
end to these cases as well. See infra note 433 and accompanying text.
400. See Garnett, supra note 361, at 141 n.33 (citing to Nelson in arguing that “[w]hile in early cases the
phrase ‘based upon’ was ignored or liberally interpreted, more recently it has received a stricter construction
which has had the effect of significantly increasing the grant of immunity to foreign sovereigns in employment
cases”); Weisman, supra note 339, at 455 (“[B]y restricting the application of the commercial activity exception
to the FSIA [partly through its interpretation of ‘based upon’], [Nelson] has substantially limited the employees’
right of redress in the U.S. courts.”).
401. Garnett, supra note 361, at 138.
402. See id. at 160 (noting that “persons employed abroad have been forced to rely upon their initial
recruitment in the United States” to bring claims under the first prong of the commercial activity exception).
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“based upon” requirement was relatively easy to satisfy for claims based on such
recruitment efforts.403 While cases like these were few and far between, courts
hearing these claims generally construed “based upon” in plaintiff-friendly
ways.404 For example, in Zedan v. Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, the D.C. Circuit
adopted a flexible approach to “based upon” that only required a “direct causal
connection” between plaintiff’s recruitment and his injury.405 After Nelson, the
connection between recruitment in the United States and plaintiff’s injury abroad
became substantially harder to establish. This is because “those elements of a
claim that, if proven, would entitle a plaintiff to relief under his theory of the
case” are more likely to depend upon actions that occurred outside the United
States than they are on recruitment in the United States.406
For example, in Good v. Aramco Services Co., the court denied various
claims brought by a husband, wife, and their child on the ground that they were
not “based upon” commercial activity in the United States or on an act
performed in the United States in connection with commercial activity of the
foreign state elsewhere.407 In Good, plaintiffs claimed that when defendant hired
Mr. Good it made various representations that its medical services were equal to
or better than in the United States and promised that his employment would
include those services.408 After the couple moved to Saudi Arabia, Mrs. Good
gave birth to a son with brain injuries that allegedly resulted from the quality of
medical care defendant had provided.409 Invoking the first and second nexus
requirements, plaintiffs argued their injuries were based upon defendant’s
recruitment activities in the United States, including the execution of an
employment contract with Mr. Good and representations made to him about the
quality of medical services plaintiffs would receive in Saudi Arabia.410 Citing to
Nelson, the court held that plaintiffs’ claims were not “based upon” activities in
the United States because the elements of their injury, if proven, resulted from
actions taken in Saudi Arabia.411 Relying on Nelson, other cases have also
concluded that a foreign sovereign’s recruitment and other pre-employment

403. Id. at 152.
404. See id.
405. Zedan v. Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, 849 F.2d 1511, 1514 (D.C. Cir. 1988). Even though Zedan adopted
a more flexible approach to “based upon,” the court concluded that the commercial activity upon which
plaintiff’s claim was based—a recruitment call in the United States—was too attenuated from his claim. Id. at
1513–14. Other pre-Nelson claims involving employment contracts executed in the United States were more
successful. See Brewer v. Socialist People’s Republic of Iraq, 890 F.2d 97, 101 (8th Cir. 1989) (holding that
claim based on execution of employment contract in the United States brought by two individuals, who were
subsequently employed in Iraq, satisfied the commercial activity exception, without elaboration).
406. Garnett, supra note 361, at 157; see Wood, supra note 350, at 188–87 (noting that under Nelson’s
“literal approach” to defining “based upon” both the “act and the commercial activity must take place in the
United States”).
407. Good v. Aramco Servs. Co., 971 F. Supp. 254 (S.D. Tex. 1997).
408. Id. at 255.
409. Id. at 255–56.
410. Id. at 257.
411. Id. at 258–59.
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activity with individuals in the United States, who were ultimately employed
abroad, do not satisfy the “based upon” requirement.412
While the Nelson approach to “based upon” has not generally impacted
cases involving employment in the United States,413 in some instances it has also
had a negative effect on these suits. For example, in Gates v. Victor Fine Foods,
plaintiffs brought various claims under the first nexus prong relating to their
termination by defendant’s subsidiary.414 Defendant, Alberta Pork, which was
an agency or instrumentality of the Canadian government,415 was involved in
selling hogs to pork processors in the United States and directly or indirectly
owned certain U.S. pork processing plants of which the subsidiary was one.416
Relying on State Bank of India v. NLRB, the district court concluded that the
“based upon” requirement was satisfied because the defendant generally
engaged in commercial activity in the United States.417 The appellate court
reversed. Citing to Nelson, the court held that “we will not find jurisdiction
merely because [defendant] [generally] engaged in commercial activity” in the
United States and instead required that plaintiffs’ claims directly arise from
those activities.418 Concluding that plaintiffs’ claims were not, in fact, based
upon defendant’s commercial activity in the United States—selling hogs to pork
processors together with stock ownership in the subsidiary—but rather were
based upon their termination by the subsidiary (in which defendant had not been
involved), the appellate court upheld immunity.419

412. For example, in Janini v. Kuwait University, the D.C. Circuit also relied on Nelson’s rigid approach to
“based upon” to conclude that plaintiff’s claim against his employer, a university in Kuwait, was based not upon
his “pre-employment contact” with his employer in the United States, but rather on the university’s termination
of his contract in Kuwait, though the court did not decide whether that act could otherwise satisfy the commercial
activity exception. 43 F.3d 1534, 1536–37 (D.C. Cir. 1995). Similarly, in Lempert v. Republic of Kazakstan,
Ministry of Justice, the court cited to Nelson in concluding that plaintiff’s claims for breach of consulting contract
and unjust enrichment were not “based upon” preliminary employment negotiations and solicitation of plaintiff’s
services in the United States but rather on actions taken in Kazakhstan. 223 F. Supp. 2d 200, 203 (D.D.C. 2002).
413. Even after Nelson, if employment occurs in the United States, courts are generally inclined to conclude
that the “based upon” requirement is satisfied as long as the employee is not a civil servant or diplomat or
otherwise performs duties related to government policymaking. Garnett, supra note 361, at 152; see also ElHadad v. United Arab Emirates, 496 F.3d 658, 663–77 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (holding that claims by Egyptian
employee at UAE embassy in the United States satisfied the commercial activity exception because they were
“based upon” breach of his employment contract and defamation connected with that breach and because
plaintiff was not a civil servant and was not involved in government policymaking). In explaining why courts
are relatively sympathetic to claims relating to employment in the United States, one commentator has noted
these courts are “influenced strongly by the policy that all persons employed in the United States should have
the same rights of redress.” Garnett, supra note 361, at 144.
414. Gates v. Victor Fine Foods, 54 F.3d 1457, 1459 (9th Cir. 1995).
415. Id. At 1461.
416. Id. At 1459.
417. Id. At 1463–64.
418. Id. At 1465.
419. Id.
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While it may often be improper for courts to exercise jurisdiction in cases
like Nelson,420 the rigid approach to “based upon” reflected in that case virtually
ensures U.S. citizens employed by foreign sovereigns abroad will enjoy few
workplace protections under U.S. law. At times, the same may be true for
workers employed by foreign sovereigns in the United States. These
circumstances reinforce neoliberal capitalism’s tendency to “increase . . . the
structural powerlessness of labor,” in part, through labor market deregulation—
meaning that workers have less protections against employers and are often
insecure in their jobs.421
c. The Sachs Approach to “Based Upon”
Twenty-two years after Nelson, the Supreme Court narrowed the “based
upon” requirement even further, this time in a case involving claims relating to
consumer activity. In OBB Personenverkehr AG v. Sachs, plaintiff sued an
Austrian railway company, owned by the Austrian government, for injuries she
sustained while boarding one of its trains in Austria.422 Plaintiff argued that her
various tort and contract claims were based upon commercial activity conducted
by the foreign state in the United States, as she had purchased her train ticket
over the Internet while still in the country.423
In an en banc decision, the Ninth Circuit agreed with the plaintiff. It held
that the “based upon” requirement was satisfied for a particular claim “if an
element of [that] claim consists in conduct that occurred in commercial activity
carried on in the United States.”424 Because the sale of the railway ticket formed
“an essential element of each of Sachs’s claims,” the court concluded that the
commercial activity exception was satisfied.425 In reaching this decision, the
Ninth Circuit relied not only on Nelson, but also on a line of cases under the first
nexus requirement establishing that “common carriers owe a duty of utmost care
to their passengers” and that “the basis for that duty of care is established when

420. Indeed, one might argue that it is generally improper for U.S. courts to apply employment-related laws
abroad and “thereby interfer[e] with the foreign government’s right and capacity to apply its own laws.” Garnett,
supra note 361, at 154 n.98; see Weisman, supra note 339, at 460 (noting that some might have criticized a
different decision from the Supreme Court in Nelson as “enabl[ing] courts to unfairly affix jurisdiction to
sovereign states . . . thus . . . unfairly expanding the reach of United States employment laws”). At the same
time, however, other countries have included provisions in their foreign sovereign immunity statutes stripping
immunity from certain employment contracts not performed on their territory. See supra note 363.
421. Flaherty, supra note 52, at 97, 99.
422. OBB Personenverkehr AG v. Sachs, 577 U.S. 27 (2015).
423. Id. At 29–30.
424. Sachs v. Republic of Austria, 737 F.3d 584, 599 (9th Cir. 2013), rev’d, sub nom, OBB Personenverkehr
AG v. Sachs, 577 U.S. 27 (2015) (emphasis in original).
425. Id. At 602. While plaintiff had bought the railway ticket through a Massachusetts company, the
appellate court had concluded the company was an agent of OBB and, therefore, attributed the sale to defendant.
Id. At 593. Though defendant challenged this holding, the Supreme Court did not reach the issue. OBB
Personenverkehr AG, 577 U.S. at, 32–33.
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a foreign state or its agent sells a ticket or otherwise makes travel arrangements
[in the United States] for passage abroad.”426
The Supreme Court reversed the Ninth Circuit’s decision. Citing to Nelson,
the Court held that for a claim to be “based upon” particular sovereign conduct
it was not enough for the conduct to establish only one element of the claim.427
What was necessary, instead, was to examine the “core” of the suit.428 Applying
this test, the Court concluded that the “essentials” of plaintiff’s case occurred in
Austria, not the United States.429
The decision in Sachs foreclosed one of the last avenues for consumers to
hold foreign sovereigns liable under the commercial activity exception for
personal injuries occurring abroad. Even after Nelson, courts continued to allow
plaintiffs who had purchased tickets for foreign air travel in the United States or
otherwise arranged international transportation to or from the United States to
bring at least some suits under the commercial activity exception’s first nexus
prong.430 After Sachs, however, those cases, which were based on an approach
to “based upon” seen in cases like Sugarman v. Aeromexico, were no longer
possible.431
By further constraining the meaning of “based upon,” the Sachs decision
also reinforced existing challenges Nelson created for U.S. citizens bringing
claims related to their employment abroad.432 For example, in the post-Sachs
426. Id. At 600.
427. OBB Personenverkehr AG, 577 U.S. at 34.
428. Id. At 35.
429. Id. At 36.
430. See, e.g., Kirkham v. Societe Air France, 429 F.3d 288, 291–93 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (holding that
plaintiff’s negligence claim based on purchase of airline ticket in United States from defendant satisfied first
nexus requirement under Nelson as it was necessary to prove an element of her claim); Sugimoto v. Exportadora
de Sal, S.A. de C.V., 19 F.3d 1309, 1311 (9th Cir. 2004) (holding that wrongful death suit brought under first
nexus prong satisfied Nelson because “an element of plaintiffs’ claim consists in the tortious flying of the plane
[defendant chartered from Mexico] in United States air space”); Nazarian v. Compagnie Nationale Air France,
989 F. Supp. 504, 509 (S.D.N.Y. 1998) (holding that plaintiffs’ negligence claim based on purchase of airline
ticket in United States from defendant satisfied first nexus requirement under Nelson as it was necessary to prove
an element of their claim). But see Seisay v. Compagnie Nationale Air France, No. 95-civ-7660, 1997 WL
431084 at *4–6 (S.D.N.Y. July 30, 1997) (holding that plaintiff’s claim for “false imprisonment” in Paris was
not “based upon” plaintiff’s purchase of his plane ticket in New York because it was not required to prove a
false imprisonment claim).
431. While these suits have been few and far between since the Supreme Court’s decision in Sachs, existing
case law suggests Sachs has made it difficult for plaintiffs to succeed on such claims. For example, in Popli v.
Air India Airline, the district court denied plaintiff’s claim for personal injury under the first nexus clause. No.
17-337, 2017 WL 1826499, at *3 (E.D. Pa. May 5, 2017). Citing to Sachs, the court held that the Supreme Court
had “implicitly reject[ed] contrary lower court reasoning” in cases like Sugarman v. Aeromexico, Inc. Id. It also
concluded that plaintiff’s claim, in which he alleged he had not received assistance from airline staff after getting
sick on his New York-bound flight on Air India, was not based on commercial activity in the United States, even
though Air India “operates flights, maintains offices, and pays taxes in the United States.” Id. at *1, *3. Instead,
plaintiff’s personal injury claim was based on the purchase of contaminated food at Air India’s first-class lounge
in Delhi, India before his flight. Id.
432. As with Nelson, Sachs’s approach to “based upon” has not uniformly disfavored employee-plaintiffs.
Indeed, notwithstanding Sachs’s rigid test, claims against foreign sovereigns related to employment in the United
States have continued to survive motions to dismiss, though as noted above these sorts of claims tend to receive
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case of Sarkar v. Petroleum Company of Trinidad & Tobago Limited, plaintiff
brought claims for breach of contract, negligent misrepresentation, and
negligence based, in part, on commercial activity undertaken by defendants in
the United States “related to recruitment, hiring, negotiation, and
employment.”433 Sarkar, a U.S. citizen, was recruited in the United States by an
agent of an oil company owned by the government of Trinidad and Tobago to
work at the oil company.434 Plaintiff was subsequently interviewed for the job
in the United States and purportedly negotiated and signed his employment
contract here.435 A few weeks after executing the contract, while plaintiff was
still in the United States, the defendant oil company terminated his employment
because it could not secure a work permit for him in Trinidad and Tobago.436
Evaluating plaintiff’s claim under the commercial activity exception’s first
clause, the court cited to Sachs for the proposition that it “must focus on the core
of the suit—the foreign sovereign’s acts that actually injured the plaintiff—
rather than individually analyzing each cause of action.”437 Though conceding
that plaintiff’s claims were based on “negotiations and communications”
between him and the oil company, the court ultimately concluded that the
negotiations and communications in the United States did not, in fact, have a
“[material] connection to the causes of action pleaded.”438
Though some commentators have described Sachs, like Nelson, as being
driven by foreign policy concerns,439 the approach to “based upon” found in both
Nelson and Sachs has made it demonstrably harder for employees and
consumers to bring certain kinds of claims relating to foreign sovereign
commercial activity in the United States. By and large, these types of claims
have little positive impact on trade or financial markets but could make foreign

more favorable treatment generally. See, e.g., Merlini v. Canada, 926 F.3d 21 (1st Cir. 2019) (citing to Sachs in
holding that workers compensation claim brought by plaintiff, a clerical employee of the Canadian consulate in
Boston, was “based upon” her employment at the consulate). At times, the Sachs test has also disfavored
corporate plaintiffs. See, e.g., Packsys, S.A. de C.V. v. Exportadora de Sal, S.A. de C.V., CV-15-9704-JFW,
2016 WL 3563504, at *5 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 3, 2016) (citing to Sachs in holding that plaintiff Mexican-corporation’s
breach of contract claim was not “based upon” commercial activity in the United States as none of the alleged
ties between plaintiff’s claim and the United States “form[] the gravamen of its suit”).
433. Sarkar v. Petroleum Co. of Trinidad & Tobago Ltd., civ-H-15-2372, 2016 WL 3568114, at *8–9
(S.D.Tex. June 23, 2016).
434. Id. at *1.
435. Id.
436. Id. at *3.
437. Id. at *8.
438. Id. at *8–9. Rather confusingly, the court characterized the communications between plaintiff and
defendants as relating to a “CFO position” as opposed to the position he was ultimately hired for. Id. at *9. While
the oil company’s agent, who plaintiff also sued, had originally approached plaintiff for the CFO position, they
contacted him again to offer a different position, for which plaintiff was ultimately hired. Id. at *1. In rendering
its decision, it is unclear whether the court considered these sets of communications to be separate and, if it did,
why it believed such a division to be justified.
439. See Jason E. Myers, Note, Preserving International Comity: the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of
1976 and OBB Personenverkehr AG v. Sachs, 90 S. CALIF. L. REV. 913, 914 (2017) (arguing that at the heart of
Sachs is a “virtual tug of war” between the rights of private litigants and foreign policy concerns).
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sovereigns more reticent to do business in the United States or with American
firms by subjecting them to the regulatory reach of American law.440
The Nelson and Sachs approaches to the “based upon” requirement have
not only been developed in the context of claims typically brought by individual
plaintiffs; they have also disadvantaged those types of claims. As the next
Subpart explores, the favoring of corporate, over individual, plaintiffs is
particularly apparent in judicial interpretations of the commercial activity
exception’s third nexus prong—the most frequently used basis for bringing
claims under the exception.
2. “Direct Effect”
The “direct effect” prong is perhaps the most important factor in
determining whether the commercial activity exception applies. Under this
territorial nexus requirement, a sovereign’s commercial activity abroad is only
actionable under the FSIA if it has a “direct effect” in the United States.
Congress did not define “direct effect”441 or provide a clear rationale for this
prong of the nexus test.442 But as this Subpart explains, over the years, direct
effect jurisprudence has evolved to privilege the interests of corporations and
businesses, especially those linked with the global financial industry, over the
interests of individual plaintiffs. In supporting the interests of finance and
ensuring corporations, rather than individuals, are positioned to accumulate
wealth, direct effect jurisprudence further reflects trends associated with
neoliberalism.
To demonstrate this, Part IV.B.2 begins by looking at the historical
evolution of judicial approaches to the direct effect clause. As it demonstrates,
two tests were initially developed for “direct effect.” The more rigid defendantfriendly test, which emerged first, responded to personal injury claims brought
by individual plaintiffs. In the FSIA’s early days, it was mostly individuals, and
not corporate plaintiffs, who relied on the direct effect prong. By and large, these
cases involved claims for economic and other losses associated with injury or
death of Americans abroad. In response to these claims, the first judicial test for
determining direct effect, the test of “substantial foreseeability,” emerged.
Under this test, “the effect [had to] be (1) direct; (2) substantial; (3) foreseeable,
not fortuitous; and (4) a legally significant event in the United States, beyond
440. Other commentators have, in fact, applauded how Nelson and Sachs favored the smooth operation of
global commerce. Id. at 933 (arguing that the Sachs decision was correct from a policy standpoint because
“expanding the scope of the commercial activity exception would hinder global commerce”); J.H. Trotter,
Narrow Construction of the FSIA Commercial Activity Exception: Saudi Arabia v. Nelson, 33 VA. J. INT’L
L. 717, 733 (1993) (suggesting that the Nelson decision creates the sort of “clear boundaries” crucial to “stable
international commerce” with foreign sovereigns).
441. See Tex. Trading & Milling Corp. v. Federal Republic of Nigeria, 647 F.2d 300, 311 (2d Cir. 1981),
overruled on other grounds by Frontera Resources Azerbaijan Corp. v. State Oil Co. of Azerbaijan Rep., 582
F.3d 393 (2d. Cir. 2009) (noting that the FSIA’s legislative history provides little guidance on the meaning of
“direct effect”).
442. Brittenham, supra note 16, at 1458 n.88.
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mere financial loss.”443 Applying this relatively rigid test, courts dismissed
nearly all the early cases brought by individual plaintiffs for death or injury
abroad.
Around the same time, a more flexible, plaintiff-friendly test for direct
effect emerged, which rejected the requirement that effects be either substantial
or foreseeable. This second test, which was first articulated by the Second
Circuit in Texas Trading Milling Corp. v Federal Republic of Nigeria, responded
to a very different set of claims: ones brought by corporate plaintiffs for
commercial interests connected to the global financial industry.444
After its emergence, the substantial foreseeability test was embraced by
most circuits for all direct effect claims, whether personal or corporate.445 Then,
in Republic of Argentina v. Weltover, the Supreme Court rejected the substantial
foreseeability test and adopted the broader Texas Trading test.446 In doing so,
the Court sided (yet again) with the Second Circuit, which was committed to the
Texas Trading approach. The Second Circuit’s dedication to the test was driven,
at least partially, by its desire to protect the interests of the global financial
industry headquartered in New York City—interests that were also preserved by
Weltover.
Part IV.B.2 ends by demonstrating how Weltover’s approach to direct
effect has differentially impacted corporate and individual plaintiffs. For
example, courts adopting Weltover’s direct effect test have continued to reject
claims from American plaintiffs—including employees and consumers—
physically injured abroad. In certain jurisdictions post-Weltover, there have also
been noticeably different outcomes for U.S. corporations suing for pure financial
losses suffered in the United States—which have often been successful—as
compared to individuals bringing similar claims, which have often failed. These
trends align with the economic inequality and wealth gap that have become
endemic to the neoliberal age.
a. “Direct Effect”: The Early Days, Pre-Weltover
While initially referenced in a case brought by corporate plaintiffs, the
substantial foreseeability test was developed and defined in a series of personal
injury cases that significantly tightened and narrowed the test’s original
articulation.
The first reference to the substantial foreseeability test came in Carey v.
National Oil Corp.447 In that case, the Southern District of New York dismissed
443. Nicolas J. Evanoff, Direct Effect Jurisdiction Under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976:
Ending the Chaos in the Circuit Courts, 28 HOUS. L. REV. 629, 645 (1991).
444. Tex. Trading, 647 F.2d 300.
445. As discussed below, the rationale for extending the substantial foreseeability test from personal injury
to corporate cases may also arguably be aligned with capitalist concerns. See infra notes 489–94 and
accompanying text.
446. Republic of Argentina v. Weltover, Inc. 504 U.S. 607, 617–18 (1992).
447. Carey v. Nat’l Oil Corp., 453 F. Supp. 1097 (S.D.N.Y. 1978), aff’d, 592 F.2d 673 (2d Cir. 1979).
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breach of contract claims brought under the commercial activity exception by a
New York corporation and assignee against the Libyan government and its stateowned oil company.448 While the court did not use the language of substantial
and foreseeable effects, it laid out the legal underpinning for that test. Citing to
the FSIA’s legislative history, the court held that the “(t)he requirements of
minimum jurisdictional contacts and adequate notice are embodied” in the direct
effect prong.449 In the court’s view, those minimum contacts were based on
International Shoe Co. v. State of Washington,450 the seminal Supreme Court
case that allowed states to exercise general jurisdiction over defendants “doing
business” within their borders.451
A little over a year later, in a case involving the death of an American
citizen abroad, the test laid out in Carey was modified and significantly
tightened. In Harris v. VAO Intourist, Moscow, plaintiff brought a wrongful
death claim against the Soviet Union and two Soviet-owned tourist services for
the death of an American in a fire at a Moscow hotel.452 The court conceded that
defendants had enough tourism activities in the Unites States to satisfy
International Shoe’s minimum contacts analysis.453 But the court balked at
applying that test to the FSIA, suggesting that the statute’s “language and
policy” required a more restrictive approach to direct effect.454
In developing its alternative test, the court relied on language in the
statute’s legislative history suggesting that direct effect jurisdiction should be
exercised consistently with principles set out in Restatement (Second) of
Foreign Relations Law of the United States § 18—Jurisdiction to Prescribe With
Respect to the Effect Within the Territory.455 According to that provision,
A state has jurisdiction to prescribe a rule of law attaching legal consequences
to conduct that occurs outside its territory and causes an effect within its
territory, if either:
(a) the conduct and its effect are generally recognized as constituent elements
of a crime or tort under the law of states that have reasonably developed legal
systems, or
(b) (i) the conduct and its effect are constituent elements of activity to which
the rule applies; (ii) the effect within the territory is substantial; (iii) it occurs
as a direct and foreseeable result of the conduct outside the territory; and (iv)

448. Id. at 1101.
449. Id. (quotations omitted) (citation omitted).
450. Id.
451. Int’l Shoe Co. v. State of Wash., Office of Unemployment Compensation and Planning, 326 U.S. 310,
319 (1945).
452. Harris v. VAO Intourist, Moscow, 481 F. Supp. 1056 (E.D.N.Y. 1979).
453. Id. at 1059.
454. Id.
455. Id. at 1062–63.
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the rule is not inconsistent with the principles of justice generally recognized
by states that have reasonably developed legal systems.456

The Harris court conceded that because the case involved a widelyrecognized tort it could adopt the more permissive approach of subsection (a).457
But, instead, the court adopted the “more restrictive” requirements of subsection
(b) simply because it, like the third nexus prong itself, contained the words
“direct” and “effect.”458 On this arguably thin rationale, the court held, for the
first time, that the direct effect requirement demanded “an effect which is both
substantial and the direct and foreseeable result of conduct outside the
jurisdiction.”459
Relying on this substantial foreseeability test, courts repeatedly dismissed
claims for personal injury or death sustained by American citizens abroad.460
These cases became such universal failures that several courts held that injury
to American citizens sustained in other countries—including injuries in
connection with employment or consumer activity461—could not create a direct
effect in the United States, as a categorical matter, even where the person
sustained economic losses in the country.462
On the heels of the substantial foreseeability test’s development, a looser,
more plaintiff-friendly test began emerging in the corporate context. Litigation

456. Id. at 1063 (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAWS OF THE UNITED STATES
§ 18 (AM. L. INST. 1965)) (emphasis added).
457. Id.
458. Id.
459. Id. The court also looked to the District of Columbia’s long-arm statute, though it concluded that
because it was so different from the FSIA it was hard to use that law as a road map for understanding the direct
effect requirement. Id. at 1061. Instead, the court used the long-arm statute, which had been a guide for the
FSIA’s drafters, to support its Restatement-based analysis. In an earlier case involving claims relating to the
death and injury of American citizens abroad, another court also invoked D.C.’s long arm statute to deny relief
under the direct effect clause. Upton v. Empire of Iran. 459 F. Supp. 264, 266 (D.D.C. 1978), aff’d 607 F.2d 494
(D.C. Cir. 1979). Like Harris, that case appears to have taken a more stringent approach than Casey. Though it
did not use the language of “substantial foreseeability,” Upton did say that “[t]he common sense interpretation
of a ‘direct effect’ is one which has no intervening element, but, rather, flows in a straight line without deviation
or interruption.” Id.
460. See, e.g., Berkovitz v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 735 F.2d 329, 332 (9th Cir. 1984) (dismissing wrongful
death claim against Iranian government and revolutionary group for lack of direct and substantial effect in the
United States, as required by the direct effect clause); Tucker v. Whitaker Travel, Ltd., 501 A.2d 643, 647 (Pa.
1985) (holding that direct effect “‘requires a substantial impact in this country that is a directly foreseeable result
of the negligent act outside the country’” in dismissing personal injury claims against agencies and
instrumentalities of Bahamian government).
461. See, e.g., Zernicek v. Brown & Root, Inc., 826 F.2d 415, 418 (5th Cir. 1987) (rejecting claim under the
direct effect clause by employee of subcontractor against Mexican national petroleum company for personal
injuries at job site in Mexico because personal injury abroad is not “direct” within the meeting of the commercial
activity exception); Sugarman v. Aeromexico, Inc., 626 F.2d 270, 272 (3rd Cir. 1980) (rejecting claim under
direct effect clause brought by airline passenger for personal injuries suffered in connection with flight abroad
because injury to American citizen abroad is not direct enough).
462. Zernicek, 826 F.2d at 418; Close v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 587 F. Supp. 1062, 1064 (S.D.N.Y. 1984);
Verlinden B.V. v. Cent. Bank of Nigeria (Verlinden I), 488 F. Supp. 1284, 1298 (S.D.N.Y. 1980), aff’d, Tex.
Trading & Milling Corp. v. Fed. Republic of Nigeria, 647 F.2d 320 (2d Cir. 1981), rev’d on other grounds, 461
U.S. 480 (1983); Tucker, 501 A.2d at 647.
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arising out of the 1970s Nigerian cement crisis was the impetus for this
alternative direct effect test. The Nigerian cement crisis was “one of the most
enormous commercial disputes in history, and present[ed] questions which
strike to the very heart of the modern international economic order.”463 Faced
with claims that had significant implications for global trade and finance, U.S.
courts shifted gears and introduced a test for direct effect that was comparatively
more forgiving.
Awash in oil money, the Nigerian government had purchased large
quantities of cement in the spring of 1975 for various infrastructure projects.464
In total, Nigeria executed 109 contracts with 68 suppliers, purchasing over 16
million metric tons of cement at a price close to one billion dollars.465 While
Nigeria expected only twenty percent of those suppliers to fulfil their contracts,
hundreds of ships were soon arriving in its ports carrying concrete, with more
ships on the way.466 Realizing it had misjudged the market, the Nigerian
government took steps to restrict additional ships from entering its ports while
also notifying suppliers to cease sending cement.467
In August 1975, the government attempted to stave off further economic
loss by instructing Morgan Guaranty Trust Company of New York (“Morgan”)
not to honor letters of credit from the Nigerian government presented by cement
sellers, unless sellers provided supplemental documentation not previously
required under those letters.468 In response to Nigeria’s actions, cement sellers
brought countless suits against the government in the United States and
Europe.469
In Texas Trading Milling Corp. v Federal Republic of Nigeria, American
corporations brought claims relating to the cement crisis against the Nigerian
government. Unlike courts applying the substantial foreseeability test, the court
in Texas Trading ultimately held that financial loss suffered in the United States
was sufficient to trigger the direct effect clause.470 In particular, because
plaintiffs were supposed to be paid by Morgan in New York, the court concluded
that the direct effect clause was satisfied.471 In reaching this conclusion, the court
suggested that neither a “substantial” nor “foreseeable” effect was required to
satisfy direct effect.472 In justifying its approach, the Second Circuit noted the
importance of being “mindful of Congress’s concern with providing ‘access to
the courts’ to those aggrieved by the commercial acts of a foreign
463. Tex. Trading & Milling Corp. v. Fed. Republic of Nigeria, 647 F.2d 300, 302 (2d Cir. 1981).
464. Id. at 302–03.
465. Id. at 303.
466. Id. at 305.
467. Id.
468. Id. In addition to documents required by the letter of credit, Nigeria demanded each cement vendor
present Morgan with a written document from the Central Bank of Nigeria authorizing payment. Id.
469. Id. at 306 n.15.
470. Id. at 312.
471. Id.
472. Id. at 311 n.32.
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sovereign . . . .”473 “No rigid parsing of [the direct effect clause] should lose
sight of that purpose[,]” it wrote.474
As the court itself observed, however, the result in Texas Trading did more
than just uphold Congress’s intent—it also protected the interests of
corporations engaged in global commerce:
Our rulings today vindicate more than Congressional intent. They affirm
the right of all participants in the marketplace of the world to be treated as
equals, and to ascribe to principles of trade which found their birth in the law
merchant, centuries ago. Corporations can enter contracts without fear that the
defense of sovereign immunity will be inequitably interposed, and foreign
states can bargain without paying a premium required by a trader in
anticipation of a judgment-proof client. Commerce is fostered, and all interests
are advanced.475

At the time, Texas Trading was a watershed. It was the first case to hold
that direct effect did not require substantial and foreseeable effects and to
recognize financial losses in the United States as satisfying that test. It also
arguably benefited the interests of global finance, especially in the United States.
At the time, the New York banking industry was focusing more and more on
lending money to foreign governments.476 Many foreign sovereigns, especially
in the developing world, were desperate for the capital.477 While Texas Trading
could be viewed as discouraging foreign governments from transacting with
American banks, the need for American capital meant the decision did not
meaningfully threaten those investments. Instead, Texas Trading likely
bolstered New York’s reputation as a leader in global finance by preserving the
integrity of its transactions.478
In the wake of Texas Trading, corporate plaintiffs were increasingly
successful on direct effect claims for economic losses sustained in the United
States.479 Texas Trading’s benefits to individuals were, however, more mixed.
While some individual plaintiffs bringing claims based on economic losses
suffered in the United States did well, those results often depended on their

473. Id. at 312–13.
474. Id. at 313.
475. Id. at 315–16.
476. HARVEY, supra note 352, at 29.
477. Id. at 28–29.
478. See id. at 72–73 (arguing that neoliberal states, like the United States, “typically facilitate the diffusion
of financial institutions . . . [by] guarantee[ing] the integrity . . . of financial institutions at no matter what cost”).
479. See, e.g., Transamerican S.S. Corp. v. Somali Democratic Republic, 590 F. Supp. 968, 975–76 (D.D.C.
1984), aff’d in part and rev’d on other grounds, 767 F.2d 998 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (applying Texas Trading analysis
to conclude that the direct effect clause applied to economic losses sustained in the United States by a U.S.
corporate plaintiff); Chisholm & Co. v. Bank of Jamaica, 643 F. Supp. 1393, 1401 (S.D. Fla. 1986) (citing to
Texas Trading and holding that the direct effect clause was satisfied where defendant had breached a contract
with a U.S. corporation that was to be paid in the United States); Schmidt v. Polish People’s Republic, 579 F.
Supp. 23, 27 (S.D.N.Y. 1984) (citing to Texas Trading in holding that direct effect was satisfied because
American company was to receive payment in the United States, but had not).
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losses, in fact, being substantial and foreseeable.480 When it came to plaintiffs
who had suffered personal injuries abroad, the Texas Trading approach arguably
made them even worse off than they were under the substantial foreseeability
test. This is because Texas Trading included language suggesting individual
plaintiffs should be treated differently from corporate ones. As the decision
noted, where those injured abroad are “natural persons, not corporations, it is
easy to locate the ‘effect’ outside the United States” whereas whether “an
American corporation injured overseas incurs a direct effect in the United States
remains an open question.”481
A number of courts that otherwise adopted the Texas Trading approach
latched onto this language to deny relief to individual plaintiffs who had suffered
personal injuries abroad.482 In one case, the court noted that, under Texas
Trading, “corporations injured in their American pocket books by commercial
activities of state trading companies occurring outside the United States would
enjoy greater access to the American courts than personal injury or death
claimants similarly injured . . . .”483 While the court conceded that this “would
seem on initial examination to present a somewhat anomalous statutory
construction,”484 it was bound by Texas Trading and required to deny relief.485
Most courts did not adopt the Texas Trading test and, instead, applied the
more rigid substantial foreseeability test to all direct effect claims.486 While this
test was more difficult even for corporate plaintiffs to satisfy, the test was still
used, in some circumstances, to protect the U.S. financial industry’s interests.
This can be seen in the district court decision in Verlinden B.V. v. Central Bank
of Nigeria, which was also about the Nigerian cement crisis.487
Verlinden was one of the earliest decisions to apply the substantial
foreseeability test to a suit brought by a corporate plaintiff. Whether or not its

480. For example, in Callejo v. Bancomer, the Fifth Circuit relied in large part on Texas Trading to hold
that the direct effect clause was satisfied where individual plaintiffs had suffered financial losses inside the
United States. 764 F.2d 1101, 1111–12 (5th Cir. 1985). In reaching this decision, however, the court held that
plaintiffs’ financial loss was a substantial and foreseeable effect, thereby modifying Texas Trading’s direct effect
test. See id. (noting that financial loss in United States was “foreseeable” and that bank had engaged in business
with plaintiffs over a several year period, mailing certificate of deposits to them in United States and remitting
payment through American bank).
481. Tex. Trading, 647 F.2d at 312 n.35.
482. See, e.g., Martin v. Republic of South Africa, 836 F.2d 91, 94 (2d Cir. 1987) (in denying application
of commercial activity exception to personal injury case observing that, in Texas Trading, “we stated that when
Americans sustain personal injuries overseas it was easy to locate the ‘effect’ outside the United States”); Close
v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 587 F. Supp. 1062, 1065 (S.D.N.Y. 1984) (citing to language from Texas Trading stating
that for “natural persons, not corporations, it is easy to locate the ‘effect’ outside the United States” in denying
application of commercial activity exception to personal injury case).
483. Close, 587 F. Supp. at 1065.
484. Id.
485. Id.
486. See, e.g., Am. W. Airlines, Inc. v. GPA Group, Ltd., 877 F.2d 793, 799 (9th Cir. 1989) (adopting the
substantial and foreseeable test for direct effect and noting that the majority of appellate courts had done the
same).
487. 488 F. Supp. 1284 (S.D.N.Y. 1980).
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reasoning was sound, the district court’s application of the substantial
foreseeability test was driven, in part, by a desire to protect New York’s status
as a center of global finance. In Verlinden, the court concluded that Morgan’s
failure to pay a foreign corporate plaintiff in New York on an irrevocable letter
of credit issued by the Central Bank of Nigeria was insufficient to establish
direct effect under the commercial activity exception.488 In reaching this
decision, the court stated that, in its view, “solicitude for New York’s
‘preeminent financial position’ should induce the courts to forbear the exercise
of jurisdiction in close cases.”489 The court went on to note that “New York
would be detrimentally served by a decision subjecting foreign customers of its
banks to the in personam jurisdiction of American courts whenever they advise
credits to foreign beneficiaries through American banks.”490 Expressing concern
that this arrangement would encourage foreign sovereigns to use non-U.S.
banking institutions for their transactions, the court insisted it would have
“hardly been the purpose of Congress to force the loss of such business on the
American financial community.”491
While this early push and pull between different interpretations of direct
effect may have had varying consequences for corporate plaintiffs, it exhibited
sensitivity to the financial industry’s interests either way. By contrast, individual
plaintiffs were often on the losing end of this tug of war. As discussed in the
next Subpart, these trends have continued with the Supreme Court’s decision in
Republic of Argentina v. Weltover, which rejected the test of substantial
foreseeability and adopted the Texas Trading approach.
b. “Direct Effect”: Weltover and Its Progeny
In Weltover, the Supreme Court finally weighed in on the definition of
direct effect. In that case, plaintiffs sued Argentina for breach of contract in
connection with its unilateral decision to extend the payment time on certain
government bonds.492 The bonds were denominated in U.S. dollars and could be
paid in various specified locations, including New York, at the creditor’s
election.493 Plaintiffs, who held $1.3 million in bonds, refused to accept
Argentina’s debt rescheduling, and demanded payment in New York.494
Focusing their claim on the commercial activity exception, plaintiffs
argued that Argentina’s activities caused a direct effect in the United States—an

488. Verlinden I, 488 F. Supp. at 1298.
489. Id.
490. Id.
491. Id. As discussed below, by the 1990s, when Weltover was decided, Verlinden’s fears about the risk of
adverse effects on New York banking was arguably outdated, as the U.S. financial industry had fully established
itself as a primary center of global finance that foreign sovereigns had little choice but to use. See infra notes
511–13 and accompanying text. Indeed, it was likely outdated even when Verlinden itself was decided.
492. Republic of Argentina v. Weltover, 504 U.S. 607, 610.
493. Id. at 609–10.
494. Id. at 610.
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argument that had been accepted in an earlier Second Circuit decision in the
case.495 In affirming the Second Circuit, the Supreme Court held that direct
effect does not contain any requirement of substantiality or foreseeability.496
Instead, as the Court concluded, a direct effect “follows as an immediate
consequence of the defendant’s . . . activity” and must not be “too remote and
attenuated.”497 Applying this rule to the facts of the case, the Court held that,
because payment under the parties’ contract was supposed to be, but had not
been, made in a New York bank account,498 there was a sufficiently direct effect
in the United States.499
That a direct effect should have been found on the facts of this case was
not immediately obvious—plaintiffs, who were two Panamanian corporations
and a Swiss Bank,500 were all located abroad, with no other connection to the
United States;501 most of the commercial activity relating to their claims also
took place outside the United States.502 The only territorial connection was the
fact that payment was to be made in U.S. dollars to New York banks. For the
appellate court in Weltover, this connection to New York banking was
particularly important. In upholding jurisdiction under the commercial activity
exception, the Second Circuit expressly stated that preserving New York’s status
as a preeminent financial center favored abrogating immunity.503 In particular,
the appellate court noted that “public policy should make American courts
available to foreign plaintiffs if this will preserve or even enhance New York’s
status as a world financial leader.”504 According to the court, to protect New
York’s status as a global financial hub, courts must “encourag[e] foreign debtors
to pay their debts that are due in New York even though plaintiffs are not
domiciled in New York.”505
While the Supreme Court rejected this New York-centric justification for
exercising jurisdiction,506 it also did not challenge its logic.507 Indeed, the
495. Id. at 617–18.
496. Id. at 618. In line with Texas Trading, the Second Circuit’s decision in Weltover had also rejected a
substantial foreseeability requirement for the direct effect clause. Weltover (Weltover I) v. Republic of
Argentina, 941 F.2d 145, 152 (2d Cir. 1991).
497. Weltover, 504 U.S. at 618.
498. Argentina had previously made some interest payments to defendants’ New York accounts before
altering the payment schedule. Id. at 619.
499. Id.
500. Id. at 610
501. Id. at 619.
502. Id. at 609–10.
503. Weltover I, 941 F.2d at 153.
504. Id.
505. Id.
506. Weltover, 504 U.S. at 618.
507. In an unrelated case, the Second Circuit similarly observed that the United States had an important
interest in “ensuring that creditors entitled to payment in the United States in United States dollars under
contracts subject to the jurisdiction of United States courts [can] assume that, except under the most
extraordinary circumstances, their rights will be determined in accordance with recognized principles
of . . . law.” Allied Bank Int’l v. Banco Credito Agricola de Cartago, 757 F.2d 516, 521–22 (2d Cir. 1985).
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Second Circuit’s concerns were both quite sensible and responsive to the time.
During the 1970s, 80s, and 90s, the U.S. financial sector had become the most
important part of the U.S. economy508 and one of the main centers of global
finance.509 In extending the protections of U.S. law to the transaction in
Weltover—despite the arguably tenuous connection to the United States—the
Second Circuit understood that protecting investor interests would only bolster
and strengthen the U.S. financial sector’s preeminence.510 In ratifying the
appellate court’s decision, the Supreme Court reinforced those benefits.
Since Weltover, the circuits have spilt over how to interpret the Court’s
definition of direct effect. Some jurisdictions have taken a narrow approach and
interpreted the direct effect clause as requiring a “legally significant act,”511 like,
for example, an express breach of contract occurring in the United States.512
Other circuits have taken a broader approach that requires no such legally
significant act.513 Invoking Weltover, these courts, which include the Fifth,
Sixth, and D.C. Circuits, have defined direct effect as an effect that “follows as
an immediate consequence of the defendant’s . . . activity.”514
Even under this broader test, individual plaintiffs have been disfavored as
compared to corporate plaintiffs.515 Specifically, where individual plaintiffs
have allegedly suffered pure financial losses in the United States, courts have
often been reticent to exercise jurisdiction absent contractual language or
representations from the foreign sovereign demonstrating specific performance
contemplated in the United States. By contrast, where an American company
508. HARVEY, supra note 352, at 33.
509. See Sassen, supra note 257, at 75.
510. As with the decision in Texas Trading, because of New York’s global dominance, foreign sovereigns
were unlikely to take their business elsewhere or avoid transacting with American investors as a result of
Weltover. Indeed, despite the unfavorable ruling it received in Weltover, Argentina chose to use J.P. Morgan, a
New York investment bank, as one of the two lead managers for its $1 billion bond offering in November 1998;
most buyers were U.S. institutional investors. Id. at 76.
511. See Adler v. Fed. Republic of Nigeria, 107 F.3d 720, 727 (9th Cir. 1997) (adopting legally significant
acts test); United World Trade, Inc. v. Mangyshlakneft Oil Prod. Ass’n, 33 F.3d 1232, 1239 (10th Cir. 1994)
(same); Gen. Elec. Cap. Corp. v. Grossman, 991 F.2d 1376, 1385 (8th Cir. 1993) (same).
512. While there has been much confusion about what the “legally significant acts” requirement demands,
defendant’s breach of an express contractual term that contemplates performance in the United States seems to
satisfy this test. Guirlando v. T.C. Ziraat Bankasi A.S., 602 F.3d 69, 76 (2d Cir. 2010); Virtual Countries, Inc.
v. Republic of South Africa, 300 F.3d 230, 239 (2d Cir. 2000).
513. See, e.g., Keller v. Cent. Bank of Nigeria, 277 F.3d 811, 818 (6th Cir. 2002), abrogated on other
grounds by Samantar v. Yousuf, 560 U.S. 305 (2010) (rejecting legally significant acts test); Voest-Alpine
Trading USA Corp. v. Bank of China, 142 F.3d 887, 894 (5th Cir. 1998). (same); Glob. Index, Inc. v. Mkapa,
290 F. Supp. 2d 108, 113 (D.D.C. 2003) (“While other circuits have expressly adopted or rejected the ‘legally
significant act’ test, the D.C. Circuit follows the same, more general approach set forth in Weltover.”).
514. Voest-Alpine Trading, 142 F.3d at 893 (quotations omitted) (citation omitted).
515. Notably, even after Weltover rejected the substantial foreseeability test, courts across the circuits
continued to classify cases of personal injury or death abroad as beyond the scope of the direct effect clause as
a categorical matter. See, e.g., Evans v. Petroleos Mexicanos, 05-20434, 2006 WL 952265, at *2 (5th Cir. Apr.
13, 2006) (dismissing plaintiff’s claims against instrumentalities of Mexican government arising from personal
injury in Mexico for failing to satisfy direct effect test); Antares Aircraft, L.P. v. Fed. Republic of Nigeria, 999
F.2d 33, 36 (2d Cir. 1993) (noting that economic loss to an American citizen as a result of personal injury
sustained abroad is not a direct effect under the commercial activity exception).
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has experienced pure financial losses in the United States, flexible approaches
to direct effect have been more common. This latter group of decisions has
turned not on any clear contractual obligation to pay the company in the United
States—rather, the determinative fact has often been that these are American
companies that have suffered financial setbacks. 516
The D.C. Circuit case of Odhiambo v. Republic of Kenya neatly highlights
this disparity between individual and corporate plaintiffs suffering pure financial
losses.517 In Odhiambo, the majority held that plaintiff, a private individual, had
failed to satisfy the direct effect prong because his payment agreement with
defendant did not contemplate contractual performance in the United States.518
In Odhimabo, a Kenyan national and employee at a private bank in Kenya,
alleged that he was entitled to reward payments from the Kenyan government
for whistle-blowing on hundreds of account holders who had potentially
engaged in tax evasion.519 Plaintiff had reported this tax evasion in response to
a reward scheme established by the government to encourage people to share
such information.520 After making his reports, plaintiff had received two reward
payments under the scheme.521 After experiencing various threats to his safety
as a result of his whistle-blowing activities, plaintiff was forced to flee Kenya
and seek asylum in the United States.522 According to plaintiff, he was still owed
reward payments from the Kenyan government, which he pressed through
written correspondence, fact-to-face meetings with Kenyan officials in the
United States, and, eventually, litigation in U.S. court.523
Characterizing plaintiff’s claim as a “pay wherever you are arrangement,”
the majority rejected plaintiff’s suit and reasoned that, under the direct effect
clause, there needed to be, but was not, an express or implicit contractual
agreement under which Kenya agreed to pay plaintiff in the United States.524
Instead, in the majority’s view, the effect in the United States arose “only after

516. By contrast, in cases where the corporation is not an American one, courts eschewing the legally
significant acts test have often adopted a stringent approach that effectively mirrors that test. For example, in
Goodman Holdings v. Rafidain Bank, the D.C. Circuit held that plaintiffs, Irish corporations, had not established
a direct effect in the United States since there was no breach of an express contractual provision designating the
United States as the place of performance. Goodman Holdings v. Rafidain Bank, 26 F.3d 1143, 1146–47 (D.C.
Cir. 1994). In some cases, courts have actually conceded that they applied Weltover’s more flexible direct effect
test to benefit American corporations but not foreign ones. See Voest-Alpine Trading, 142 F.3d at 893 (noting
nationality of plaintiffs in flexible direct effect cases and underscoring greater success of American as compared
to foreign plaintiffs using that clause in the Fifth Circuit).
517. Odhiambo v. Republic of Kenya, 764 F.3d 31 (D.C. Cir. 2014).
518. Id. at 40.
519. Id. at 33.
520. Id. at 34.
521. Id.
522. Id. at 34.
523. Id.
524. Id. at 39, 41. Plaintiff had argued that his claim satisfied the “direct effect” prong because his contract
with Kenya did, in fact, contemplate performance, specifically payment of the reward, in the United States. Id.
at 40.
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a variety of intervening events, including the unveiling of Odhiambo’s role as a
whistle-blower . . . and move to the United States as a refugee.”525
In a partially concurring opinion, one judge challenged the majority’s
understanding of the direct effect requirement, and argued that it did not
necessitate contractual language, explicit or implicit, designating the United
States as the place of performance or payment.526 As the concurrence noted,
“[t]he absence of a United States place-of-performance clause in Kenya’s reward
scheme cannot negate the fact that Kenya’s nonpayment is felt here” because
“Odhiambo’s presence in the United States and the financial loss he suffers here
are a direct effect of actions in connection with the commercial activity of the
reward contract.”527
In particular, the concurring judge noted that the majority’s decision was
inconsistent both with circuit precedent as well as with decisions in sister courts
on the direct effect clause.528 Indeed, many of these cases—all of which involved
corporate plaintiffs—took a more flexible approach to concluding that plaintiffs’
pure financial loss in the United States satisfied the direct effect requirement,
even where there was a chain of intervening events or little indication the parties’
agreement was intended to be expressly or implicitly performed in the United
States.
For example, the Odhiambo concurrence referenced Cruise Connections
Charter Management 1, LP v. Attorney General of Canada.529 In Cruise
Connections, the D.C. Circuit held that direct effect was satisfied where plaintiff,
a U.S. corporation, did not receive its expected economic benefits, even though
that expectation was not wholly reflected in the parties’ agreement and
depended, in part, upon an intervening chain of events.530 In Cruise Connections,
plaintiff entered into a contract with the Royal Canadian Mounted Police
(“RCMP”) to provide ships to house Canadian security personnel during the
2010 Olympic Games in Vancouver.531 After executing the contract, plaintiff
sought financing for the deal through the Royal Bank of Canada (“RBC”).532
Because it had no ships of its own, plaintiff also began negotiations with two
American cruise lines to provide the vessels.533 Those negotiations fell through
when RCMP refused the cruise lines’ request that RCMP pay income and payroll
taxes incurred while the cruise ships were in Canada.534 RCMP also demanded
a letter of credit from plaintiff, which had not been required under the original
525. Id. at 41.
526. Id. at 44 (Pillard, J., concurring in part).
527. Id. at 50.
528. Id. at 47.
529. Id. at 48.
530. Cruise Connections Charter Mgmt. 1, LP v. Att’y Gen. of Can., 600 F.3d 661 (D.C. Cir. 2010).
531. Cruise Connections Charter Mgmt. 1, LP v. Att’y Gen. of Can. (Cruise Connections I), 634 F. Supp.
2d 86, 87 (D.D.C. 2009), rev’d and remanded, 600 F.3d 661 (D.C. Cir. 2010).
532. Id.
533. Id.
534. Cruise Connections, 600 F.3d at 663. RCMP had allegedly initially agreed to pay these taxes. Id.
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agreement.535 Plaintiff refused to comply with the request and, as a result, RBC
declined to provide financing.536 Ultimately, RCMP terminated the contract with
plaintiff for failure to timely secure financing.537
According to the D.C. Circuit, plaintiff satisfied the direct effect prong
because it had suffered financial losses in the United States.538 In reaching this
conclusion, the appellate court took a flexible approach to direct effect, which
did not exclusively focus on the contractual agreement between the parties.539
Instead, it emphasized the agreement’s general impact on the U.S. travel and
cruise industry, including the loss of “$40 million (U.S.) worth of cruise-related
business in the United States.”540 It also concluded that plaintiff’s lost revenue
from a separate, third-party deal with a U.S. travel agency to charter one of the
cruise ships as it traveled from the United States to Canada constituted a direct
effect, even though there was no indication the third-party deal was
contemplated by the RCMP and Cruise Connection contract.541
To the extent the court did focus on the parties’ agreement, it pointed to
effects that seemed to be no less remote and attenuated as those in Odhiambo.
In particular, the court insisted that because the parties’ agreement required
plaintiff use ships from two specific cruise companies, and that record evidence
established those companies were U.S.-based, defendant’s actions caused a
direct effect in the United States.542 Even though this effect would require a
series of intervening events, including plaintiff’s ability to successfully secure
contracts with these other entities and the third-parties’ ability to perform on
those contracts,543 the court rejected defendant’s argument that it was too remote
and attenuated.544
The Odhiambo concurrence also referenced DRFP LLC v. Republic
Bolivariana de Venezuela,545 a Sixth Circuit case where the court held that
plaintiff, an Ohio corporation, satisfied the direct effect requirement because it
had demanded, but not received, payment in Ohio.546 The court reached this

535. Cruise Connections I, 634 F. Supp. 2d at 87.
536. Id.
537. Id.
538. Cruise Connections, 600 F.3d at 665.
539. The district court in Cruise Connections, which held that the direct effect clause was not satisfied,
focused exclusively on the transaction between RCMP and Cruise Connections. Cruise Connections I, 634 F.
Supp. 2d, at 87. It also considered direct effect only in terms of payment, rather than broader contractual
performance, in the United States (as the D.C. circuit did). Id. at 89–90; Cruise Connections, 600 F.3d at 666.
540. Cruise Connections, 600 F.3d at 665.
541. Id. at 663–65.
542. Id. at 665.
543. The district court had rejected this direct effect claim, finding that it was too attenuated from the
agreement between Cruise Connections and RCMP. Cruise Connections I, 634 F. Supp. 2d, at 90.
544. Cruise Connections, 600 F.3d at 664–66. Notably, the appellate court never resolved whether the
parties’ contract contemplated payment in the United States, a claim the district court rejected. Id. at 663–64,
666.
545. Odhiambo v. Republic of Kenya, 764 F.3d 31, 47 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (Pillard, J., concurring in part).
546. DRFP L.L.C. v. Republic Bolivariana de Venez., 622 F.3d 513 (6th Cir. 2010).
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conclusion even though the relevant contract arguably did not require, either
expressly or implicitly, that payment be made in the United States. In DRFP,
plaintiff had purchased promissory notes from a Panamanian company.547 The
promissory notes were originally issued in 1981 by a Venezuelan state-owned
bank, with a maturity date of December 1999.548 After the Panamanian company
demanded payment in 2001, the Venezuelan Finance Ministry conducted an
investigation and concluded the notes were invalid forgeries.549 Aware of the
Ministry’s position, plaintiff acquired the notes from the Panamanian
corporation and demanded payment at its Ohio office, a request which
Venezuela denied.550 Plaintiff’s demand for payment in Ohio was the only
connection between Venezuela’s commercial activity—the issuance of the
notes—and the United States.551
Rather than examining whether Venezuela had agreed, either explicitly or
implicitly, to make payment in the United States, the Sixth Circuit looked to
“whether the bearer of the notes . . . is restricted by contract or by the terms of
the notes in selecting the United States” as place of payment.552 Looking to
Swiss law, which was the law governing the notes, the court held that the bearer
of the notes may sue for collection in the jurisdiction of their choosing.553 While
the court conceded that “neither the terms of the notes nor any other contractual
arrangement between the parties explicitly designated the United States as the
place of payment,” the court held that reliance on Swiss law meant the note
bearer could be paid where it wanted—554 precisely the sort of “pay wherever
you are arrangement” the D.C. Circuit rejected in Odhiambo.555
As the Odhimabo concurrence pointed out, the majority approach was even
inconsistent with language in the Second Circuit case of Hanil Bank v. PT Bank
Negara Indonesia, which actually adopted the more stringent legally significant
act test.556 Much like DRFP, the Second Circuit concluded there was a direct
effect in the United States because plaintiff had selected the United States as the
place of payment, payment had not been made, and plaintiff was not forbidden
from selecting the United States for payment under the parties’ agreement.557 In
547. Id. at 515.
548. Id.
549. Id.
550. Id.
551. Id. at 516.
552. Id. (emphasis added)
553. Id.
554. Id. at 517.
555. While the court insisted that under “the provision that Swiss law will be applied, the parties implicitly
agreed to leave it to the bearer to demand payment of the notes anywhere,” it arguably adopted a flexible
approach by looking beyond the parties’ agreement and course of conduct to the governing law to determine
what place of payment defendant had “implicitly” agreed to. Id. at 517.
556. Odhiambo v. Republic of Kenya, 764 F.3d 31, 47 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (Pillard, J., concurring in part).
557. Hanil Bank v. PT Bank Negara Indonesia, 148 F.3d 127, 132 (2d. Cir. 1998). Like DRFP, plaintiff’s
contractual right to be paid in the United States was far from clear based on the parties’ agreement. See id. at
129–130, 133 (noting that the letter of credit governing the transaction between the parties provided that
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reaching its conclusion the court explicitly held that the direct effect clause does
not require “that the place of performance” be in the United States “in order for
a financial transaction to cause a direct effect in this country.”558 Instead, it held
that direct effect “only requires an effect in the United States that follows as an
immediate consequence of the defendant’s actions overseas”559 —a holding that
was also arguably at odds with the D.C. Circuit approach in Odhiambo.
The disparate outcome, post-Weltover, between direct effect claims
involving individual and corporate plaintiffs suffering pure economic losses in
the United States can be seen in a number of other cases, as well.560 These results
reflect neoliberal capitalism’s overall tendency to protect the wealth of corporate
plaintiffs while disadvantaging private individuals whose transactions do not
implicate important commercial or financial interests. As a result, these
individuals are left economically vulnerable, a situation that comports with
neoliberalism’s economic inequality and resulting wealth gap.
The FSIA’s tendency to protect corporate, over individual, plaintiffs is
further underscored by the role contractual rights play in commercial activity
cases, as discussed in the next Subpart.
C. CONTRACTS
Freedom of contract is central to capitalism. It is unsurprising, then, that
the commercial activity exception—especially its direct effect clause—has often
been successfully used by plaintiffs in cases involving contracts and less often
in cases involving other kinds of claims, like business torts. This privileging of
contract has helped ensure that more sophisticated parties with access to
lawyers—typically corporations—are able to benefit the most from the
commercial activity exception’s reach, a reality that further aligns with
disparities in wealth between the most and least affluent members of society.
As the modern law of contract took shape in the nineteenth century, it was
intimately connected to the capitalist belief that society was most efficiently
organized around markets where parties exchanged commodities according to
defendant would reimburse plaintiff “according to [plaintiff’s] instruction” while also noting defendant’s
argument that under letter of credit law Indonesia was the place of performance, not the United States).
558. Id. at 133.
559. Id.
560. See, e.g., Peterson v. the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, 416 F.3d 83, 89–91 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (holding that
there was no direct effect in the United States, as a result of the Saudi government’s failure to refund payments
to a U.S. citizen in the United States under a Saudi retirement fund because there was no agreement “implied or
express” that plaintiff was to be paid in the United States, even though plaintiff presented evidence the Saudi
government knew plaintiff would be moving back to the United States, and therefore would need to be paid
there, the government’s practice was to remit payment to the United States for similarly situated foreign workers,
and the government had made representations it would pay plaintiff wherever he was); Virtual Def. & Dev. Int’l,
Inc. v. Republic of Moldova, 133 F. Supp. 2d 1, 6–7 (D.D.C. 1999) (holding that that the direct effect clause
was triggered where a U.S. corporation suffered a pure financial loss in the United States because plaintiff “is
solely a United States corporation and the alleged contract contemplated that [it] would receive compensation,”
notwithstanding the fact that the contract had been negotiated in Moldova and did not call for payment to be
made in the United States).
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their individual self-interest and free will.561 Protecting this market required a
predictable and reliable legal system for enforcing contractual rights. Through
the common law of contracts, nineteenth century judges and lawyers worked to
ensure this predictability and reliability.562
The FSIA’s commercial activity exception is similarly aligned with
upholding the sanctity of contract. In fact, an early draft of the FSIA developed
in the late 1960s for the State Department largely limited the commercial activity
exception to claims for contractual breach.563 While the FSIA’s drafters
eschewed that approach for a broader view of “commercial activity,” contract
was still front of mind. For instance, the FSIA’s legislative history contains
various examples of “commercial activity,” which mostly focus on contractbased scenarios.564 These examples include entering into contractual
arrangements for the sale of services or products, as well as other transactions
typically involving contracts, including the lease of property and borrowing of
money.565
Admittedly, since the FSIA went into effect, courts have resisted treating
breach of contract claims as per se commercial.566 Nevertheless, contract-based
claims are still more likely to trigger the commercial activity exception’s
territorial nexus requirement as compared to other kinds of claims.567 In
particular, some courts have made clear that contract performance in the United
States can, on its own, satisfy the commercial activity exception’s direct effect
requirement.568 Indeed, contract breach has arguably become one of the most
well-developed and reliable ways of establishing direct effect since Weltover.569

561. Julian S. Webb, Contract, Capitalism, and the Free Market: The Changing Face of Contractual
Freedom, 21 L. TCHR. 23, 24 (1987).
562. Daniel Song, From Status to Contract (and Back?): A Historiography of Contract Law and the
Transition to Capitalism, 22 EX POST FACTO 127, 134 (2013).
563. The State Department-commissioned proposal provided that an:
[a]ction may be brought . . . against a foreign state, or [its] agency or instrumentality . . . only
upon . . . an express or implied contract entered into, to be performed, or arising out of transactions
in the United States . . . under circumstances where the foreign state, agency, or instrumentality, if a
private person, would be subject to suit in accordance with the law of the place where the action is
brought.
Lowenfeld, supra note 271, at 937.
564. Brittenham, supra note 16, at 1473.
565. H.R. REP. No. 94-1487, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 1, 10, 16 (1976).
566. See Practical Concepts Inc. v. Republic of Bolivia, 613 F. Supp. 863, 869 (D.D.C. 1985), rev’d on
other grounds 811 F.3d 1543 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (listing FSIA cases in which “courts have not automatically
treated every contract for goods or services as commercial activity”). But see Tex. Trading Milling Corp. v Fed.
Republic of Nigeria, 647 F.2d 300, 309 (2d Cir. 1981) (“The House Report [on the FSIA] seems to conclude
that a contract or series of contracts for the purchase of goods would be per se a “commercial activity . . . .”).
567. Donoghue, supra note 12, at 504–05.
568. Odhiambo v. Republic of Kenya, 764 F.3d 31, 40 (D.C. Cir. 2014); Atlantica Holdings v. Sovereign
Wealth Fund Samruk-Kazyna, JSC, 813 F.3d 98, 108-09 (2d Cir. 2016).
569. See Cruise Connections I, 634 F. Supp. 2d at 88 (articulating the various ways in which contract breach
satisfies the direct effect requirement).
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Other grounds for establishing direct effect are not nearly as successful.570 For
example, some courts have suggested that foreign business torts will not, on their
own, trigger the direct effect clause.571
This privileging of contract means that private parties can structure their
agreements with foreign sovereigns in ways that help ensure they can sue in U.S.
courts, if necessary. Indeed, during congressional consideration of the FSIA, one
private attorney insisted the FSIA would “assist potential litigants and their
counsel in appraising the effective contractual provisions, the extent to which
negotiations can take into account the likelihood that a foreign state party could
be subject to suit in the United States, and have those specific contractual
provisions enforced.”572 While this guidance is undoubtedly useful to all
litigants, it is especially beneficial to sophisticated parties, like large
corporations, that can afford lawyers and have sufficient bargaining power to
press their interests with their foreign sovereign counterparts.573
In this way, the FSIA’s commercial activity exception helps facilitate what
Professor Katharina Pistor refers to as the “coding of capital.”574 As Pistor
describes it, lawyers—usually ones who work for the largest and most
prestigious law firms—“use their legal know-how, which they built over years
of practice in exchanges with clients and their professional kin, to
craft . . . capital” and help already wealthy individuals and entities accumulate
even more wealth.575 While Pistor is concerned with how lawyers use the law to

570. See Wydeven, supra note 367, at 167 (noting that “[i]t is difficult to ascertain the parameters of direct
effect jurisdiction when the plaintiff suffers a financial injury unconnected with any contractual relationship”).
571. See Guirlando v. T.C. Ziraat Bankasi A.S., 602 F.3d 69, 78 (2d Cir. 2010) (“[T]he fact that an American
individual or firm suffers some financial loss from a foreign tort (like conversion or fraud) cannot, standing
alone, suffice to trigger the exception.”) (quotations omitted) (citation omitted). Of course, courts may have good
reasons for limiting the exception’s scope in this way. As one court wrote, “[i]f a loss to an American individual
and firm resulting from a foreign tort were sufficient standing alone to satisfy the direct effect requirement, the
commercial activity exception would in large part eviscerate the FSIA’s provision of immunity for foreign
states.” Antares Aircraft, L.P. v. Fed. Republic of Nigeria, 999 F.2d 33, 36 (2d Cir. 1993). It is, however, hard
to reconcile this approach with a broad, nearly per se rule, that as long as there is contract performance in the
United States jurisdiction will lie. Another possible explanation for the approach to foreign torts, including
business torts, is that, under the FSIA, jurisdiction in contract cases is based on the place of performance, while
in tort cases jurisdiction is based on the locus of injury. Nnaka v. Federal Republic of Nigeria, 238 F. Supp. 3d
17, 29 (D.D.C. 2017), aff’d 756 Fed. Appx. 16 (D.C. Cir. 2019). Again, however, this does not explain why
foreign business torts that financially injure plaintiffs in the United States would not suffice, “standing alone,”
to trigger the commercial activity exception.
572. Jurisdiction of U.S. Courts in Suits Against Foreign States: Hearing before the 94th Congress
Committee of the Judiciary, 94th Cong. 88 (1976) (statement of J. Roderick Heller, Member of the D.C. Bar
Ass’n, Partner in the Wash., D.C. L. Firm of Wilmer, Cutler, & Pickering, and Lecturer at Geo. Wash. L. Sch.).
573. Of course, states and state-owned enterprises also benefit from increased predictability under the FSIA.
See Lowenfeld, supra note 271, at 903 (noting that the pre-FSIA regime created uncertainty and unpredictability
for foreign sovereigns and urging adoption of sovereign immunity statute to mitigate the problem). But
sophisticated parties with access to lawyers, like corporations, are still far more likely to negotiate for better
terms than are less sophisticated parties, like individuals, entering into transactions with foreign states.
574. KATHARINA PISTOR, THE CODE OF CAPITAL: HOW THE LAW CREATES WEALTH AND INEQUALITY 3
(2019).
575. Id. at 160–62.
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create and protect new corporate devices or asset classes,576 the basic logic
applies to the commercial activity exception as well. In the FSIA context, the
coding of capital is similarly about taking assets “that exist outside the law,”
turning them into capital, and protecting them through law577—a practice that
aligns with neoliberalism’s wealth gap. Specifically, by drafting a contract that
takes the FSIA and its commercial activity exception into account, lawyers
ensure that certain assets—for example, express agreements to make payments
in the United States—are transformed into a form of capital that does not “exist
outside the law” as a result of sovereign immunity, but rather is protected by law
in ways that disproportionately allow certain more affluent and powerful
plaintiffs—like large corporations—to continue accruing wealth, while leaving
other less affluent parties—like individuals—out in the dust.
CONCLUSION
A political economy approach shows how the history of foreign sovereign
immunity doctrine and the development of the FSIA have centered upon the
commercial activity of foreign states and aligned with and furthered capitalist
interests. It also demonstrates how the FSIA’s commercial activity exception has
been applied and interpreted by courts such that certain rights and interests—
often those implicating the U.S. financial sector—held by certain plaintiffs—
corporations, as opposed to individuals—have enjoyed noticeable benefits.
Given the statute’s history and evolution, capitalist tendencies are likely to
be reflected in the future development of the FSIA’s commercial activity
exception. Addressing the effects of this alignment is, however, particularly
urgent and timely. While the United States has long been considered the
“epicenter” of capitalism,578 capitalism’s centrality to the U.S. economic and
political framework is increasingly being challenged. As a result of decades of
deregulation,579 stagnant wages,580 and the 2008 financial crisis,581 mainstream
criticism and debate about capitalism’s (especially neoliberalism’s) place within
American society are becoming more prominent.582 Addressing these problems
will require substantial legal reforms, including to doctrines like the FSIA’s
commercial activity exception that embody neoliberal norms.

576. Id. at 164.
577. Id. at 165.
578. SVEN BECKERT & CHRISTINE DESAN, AMERICAN CAPITALISM: NEW HISTORIES 2 (2d ed., 2019).
579. Eric Keller & Nathan J. Kelly, Partisan Politics, Financial Deregulation, and the New Gilded Age,
68 POL. RSCH. QUART. 428–44 (2015).
580. Richard V. Reeves, Capitalism is Failing. People Want a Job and a Decent Wage—Why Is That So
Hard?, BROOKINGS (Apr. 29, 2019), https://www.brookings.edu/opinions/capitalism-is-failing-people-want-ajob-with-a-decent-wage-why-is-that-so-hard.
581. Rana Foroohar, American Capitalism’s Great Crisis, TIME (May 12, 2016), https://time.com/4327419/
american-capitalisms-great-crisis.
582. Id.; Kim Kelly, What Capitalism Is and How It Affects People, TEEN VOGUE (Apr. 11, 2018),
https://www.teenvogue.com/story/what-capitalism-is.
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While it is beyond this Article’s scope to fully describe all the necessary
changes to the exception, it is worth mentioning a few basic modifications. They
include addressing existing and unjustified inconsistencies in the case law on
commercial activity, like the disparate treatment of corporate and individual
plaintiffs suffering pure financial losses in the United States. They also include
promoting a consistent definition of commercial activity, instead of one that
toggles between nature and purpose depending upon the type of case under
consideration. In terms of the case law’s deregulatory effects, one starting point
would be to introduce an amendment to the commercial activity exception that
strips away immunity for employment contracts that are made, or partially or
fully performed, in the United States—a provision that exists in the foreign
sovereign immunity statutes of some other countries.583
A more ambitious project for FSIA reform would address the commercial
activity exception’s role in promoting the interests of the global financial system.
For example, judicial approaches to the commercial activity exception might be
less protective of global finance and more solicitous of the interests of foreign
sovereign defendants protecting public goods, including domestic economies
upon which their citizens’ survival depends. A case in point are public debt cases
like Republic of Argentina v. Weltover. This shift would, of course, require more
drastic changes to the definition of commercial activity, including revisiting the
exclusively nature-based test set out in Weltover and devising a more flexible
test that accounts for the purpose of sovereign activity. A more thorough reform
program would also require deeper engagement with the FSIA case law’s
deregulatory effects and, in particular, provide robust protections for
employment, personal injury, and human rights-related commercial activity
claims, even if they occur abroad. To this end, amending the commercial activity
exception ought to go beyond the earlier suggestion relating to employment
contracts made, or partially or fully performed, in the United States, and protect
all employment, personal injury, and human rights claims that result from the
commercial activity of states and lead to injury, including financial losses, in the
United States or to U.S. persons.
State-owned companies are amongst the largest and fastest-growing
multinational enterprises.584 Coupled with globalization’s continued dominance,
this reality means commercially-related transactions with foreign state-owned
businesses are likely to persist and even increase.585 In this environment, the
FSIA’s political economy and tendency to privilege certain commercial activity
claims and parties over others must be understood and addressed.

583. See supra note 363.
584. Victoria A. Valentine, Shelli Feinberg & Simone Fibiilli, The Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act’s
Crippling Effect on United States Business, 24 MICH. ST. INT’L L. REV. 625, 636 (2016).
585. Id.
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